{ "id": "IN10977", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN10977", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 593822, "date": "2019-02-19", "retrieved": "2019-12-20T19:57:42.313373", "title": "Macedonia Changes Name, Moves Closer to NATO Membership", "summary": "On February 12, 2019, Macedonia formally changed its name to become the Republic of North Macedonia. The name change resolves a long-standing dispute with Greece and is expected to clear the path for North Macedonia to become NATO\u2019s 30th member. U.S. and European Union (EU) officials believe NATO enlargement to the Western Balkans could help stabilize the region and counter Russian influence. Many Members of Congress have long supported Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration.\nPrespa Agreement with Greece\nNorth Macedonia\u2019s NATO membership bid was delayed due to a nearly three-decade bilateral dispute with neighboring Greece over Macedonia\u2019s name. The dispute stems from Macedonia\u2019s 1991 declaration of independence from Yugoslavia as the Republic of Macedonia. From Greece\u2019s perspective, the new republic\u2019s use of the name Macedonia implied territorial ambitions toward Greece\u2019s northern province of Macedonia and a broader claim to ancient Macedonia\u2019s cultural heritage. In response, Greece wielded its veto power to block Macedonia\u2019s pursuit of NATO and EU membership despite generally positive assessments of Macedonia\u2019s qualifications. \nIn 2017, newly elected Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev took office pledging to redouble efforts to resolve the country\u2019s bilateral dispute with Greece and further its overarching goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. In June 2018, Greece and Macedonia signed the Prespa Agreement, whereby Macedonia would change its name to the Republic of North Macedonia, Greece would no longer block Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration, and both countries would promise to respect existing borders. \nThe Prespa Agreement\u2019s enactment was far from certain. It required legislative action in the Greek and Macedonian parliaments, where both governments faced sharp challenges from nationalist opponents. To the surprise of some observers, in January 2019, the Macedonian and Greek governments were successful, albeit with slim vote margins. Prime Minister Zaev and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras expended political capital in the process: Zaev\u2019s government accepted a controversial amnesty of some opposition lawmakers to secure their legislative support for the Prespa Agreement, and Tsipras narrowly survived a no-confidence vote. \nAlthough the country\u2019s name is now the Republic of North Macedonia, the agreement specifies that its language and citizens will remain \u201cMacedonian.\u201d Some analysts believe the Prespa Agreement could set a powerful example of compromise for parties to other seemingly intractable disputes in the Balkans, such as between Serbia and Kosovo. Prime Ministers Zaev and Tsipras have been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize.\nNext Steps\nOn February 6, 2019, Macedonia signed its NATO accession protocol. For North Macedonia to join the alliance, NATO\u2019s 29 members now must ratify the protocol in accordance with domestic procedures. On February 8, 2019, Greece became the first NATO member to ratify the protocol. In the United States, the Senate is responsible for protocol ratification (by two-thirds majority). If all 29 NATO members approve the protocol, the NATO secretary-general would formally invite North Macedonia to accede to NATO\u2019s Washington Treaty. In the final step, North Macedonia would be able to approve its NATO membership through a referendum or a parliamentary vote and submit this decision to the U.S. Department of State, which is the formal \u201cguardian\u201d of the Washington Treaty. \nAlthough the ratification process typically takes one year, some analysts speculate that the allies may attempt to complete the process before a NATO summit scheduled for December 2019 to leverage the symbolic value of the alliance\u2019s 30th member joining in the same year it celebrates its 70th anniversary. \nIn addition to securing NATO membership, the Zaev government hopes to launch accession negotiations with the European Union this year. In 2005, Macedonia became the first country in the Western Balkans to achieve EU candidate status. However, its progress subsequently stalled amid domestic political crises and the name dispute with Greece. \nBased on a positive assessment of North Macedonia\u2019s progress in 2018, the European Commission recommended that the EU initiate accession negotiations. However, in June 2018, EU member state leaders delayed the launch of negotiations until 2019, subject to North Macedonia\u2019s progress in implementing reforms. \nRussian Influence\nProponents of North Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration believe NATO membership could help stabilize the Western Balkans and prevent renewed ethnic conflict within North Macedonia. Some analysts also argue that NATO membership could help counter growing Russian influence. Russia, which opposes NATO enlargement in the Balkans, continues to challenge the legitimacy of the Prespa Agreement and claims that the West \u201cforced\u201d North Macedonia into NATO.\nIn North Macedonia, Russian influence allegedly includes disinformation campaigns, a proliferation of Russia-Macedonia friendship organizations, and Kremlin support for nationalist forces that rely on disruptive tactics. In July 2018, Greece expelled two Russian diplomats who were accused of providing funding for anti-Prespa protests. In September 2018, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis accused Russia of backing a campaign to boycott a Macedonian referendum on changing the country\u2019s name. \nSome analysts have expressed concern that Moscow could attempt to intervene as North Macedonia moves closer to the final stages of its NATO membership bid. Russia was accused of orchestrating an unsuccessful coup attempt in nearby Montenegro in 2016 to prevent it from joining the alliance. Macedonian officials have cautioned that a lengthy accession process would give Russia more opportunities to meddle.\nU.S. Support for Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic Integration\nSince 1991, successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have strongly supported North Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration and urged North Macedonia and Greece to resolve their bilateral dispute. With U.S. support, North Macedonia joined NATO\u2019s Partnership for Peace in 1995 and launched its Membership Action Plan in 1999. North Macedonia has contributed to NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. \nMany Members of Congress supported Greece and Macedonia\u2019s negotiations to resolve their bilateral dispute and continue to support North Macedonia\u2019s NATO accession. Many Members in both chambers welcomed the 2018 Prespa Agreement and urged both parties to finalize it. On February 6, 2019, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs wrote an open letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urging the Administration to back North Macedonia\u2019s expeditious accession.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10977", "sha1": "be32294f2f075d15647e2fb80f0ff0e2ad59eeed", "filename": "files/20190219_IN10977_be32294f2f075d15647e2fb80f0ff0e2ad59eeed.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10977", "sha1": "0116df2b4446190f03cbbb60b42ec37d3ab17f12", "filename": "files/20190219_IN10977_0116df2b4446190f03cbbb60b42ec37d3ab17f12.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 586529, "date": "2018-10-22", "retrieved": "2018-10-24T13:04:50.847364", "title": "Macedonia: Next Steps Toward Finalizing Prespa Agreement", "summary": "A September 30, 2018, referendum on changing Macedonia\u2019s name to the Republic of North Macedonia produced rival interpretations from the government and opposition. Despite voter turnout (37%) being lower than many expected, nearly 92% of those who voted approved changing the country\u2019s name to resolve a long-standing dispute with Greece and facilitate Macedonia\u2019s eventual membership in NATO and the European Union (EU). Based on this relatively high margin of victory, the government of Zoran Zaev claimed that the nonbinding referendum result was a clear mandate to move forward with a parliamentary vote on required constitutional changes. Yet many analysts believed the referendum\u2019s low turnout could bolster the opposition and ultimately jeopardize the agreement.\nTo the surprise of some observers, on October 19, Macedonia\u2019s parliament approved a motion to initiate the process of amending the country\u2019s constitution to incorporate provisions of the Prespa Agreement, a June 2018 agreement signed by the Macedonian and Greek foreign ministers whereby Macedonia would change its name to the Republic of North Macedonia, Greece would no longer object to Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration, and both countries would promise to respect existing borders. The government secured the support of eight opposition members of parliament (MPs), including seven from the nationalist VMRO DPMNE, to reach the 80 votes required for a two-thirds majority. Although this vote is only the first step, observers see it as a crucial test of the Zaev government\u2019s ability to secure final passage of the amendments. The eight MPs who defied their parties\u2019 position on the Prespa Agreement declared that their further support depends on four conditions being met, the most controversial of which is a reconciliation measure that some view as a maneuver to amnesty VMRO DPMNE officials charged with abuse of office. If parliament does not pass the Prespa-related amendments in the final vote, some analysts believe it could be years before conditions are conducive to another Greek-Macedonian agreement on the name issue.\nRecent Breakthrough in Name Dispute\nFor nearly three decades, Greece has wielded its veto power to block Macedonia\u2019s NATO and EU membership despite generally positive assessments of Macedonia\u2019s qualifications. The bilateral dispute dates back to 1991, when Macedonia declared independence from the former Yugoslavia as the Republic of Macedonia. From Greece\u2019s perspective, Macedonia\u2019s use of the name implies territorial ambitions toward northern Greece reflecting its claim to the cultural heritage of ancient Macedonia. Greece continues to refer to the country as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. \nIn 2017, Macedonia\u2019s new Social Democrat-led government prioritized renewed efforts toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The presence of new leaders at the bargaining table, along with EU and NATO support and positive signals from Athens, provided an opportunity to compromise over the name issue, as evidenced by the signing of the Prespa Agreement in June 2018.\nNationalist protests broke out in both countries over the agreement. Prior to the referendum, key officials from Macedonia\u2019s opposition VMRO DPMNE party, including President Gjorge Ivanov and party leader Hristijan Mickoski, accused the government of betraying Macedonia.\nNext Steps\nFor the Prespa Agreement to advance, Macedonia\u2019s parliament must pass constitutional amendments that incorporate its requirements, including the name change. Despite external pressure from U.S., NATO, and European officials, the VMRO DPMNE\u2019s opposition to the agreement remained steadfast. Some analysts believe that the party is loath to give a political victory to the Zaev government and instead hopes to author a more palatable agreement with Greece down the road, even though it could be years before this is feasible. \nThe amendment process entails three steps. As noted above, the first step was accomplished on October 19. Second, a simple majority of MPs must confirm the draft changes. Third, after a period of public debate, two-thirds of parliament must approve the final amendments. \nFor now, the Zaev government remains cautiously optimistic that constitutional amendments will be secured under the current parliament. Going forward, the government\u2019s key challenge will be retaining its partial opposition support and maintaining the momentum for change until the final round of voting, which could be months away. \nIf Macedonia\u2019s constitutional amendments pass, the next step would be ratification by Greece\u2019s parliament. The issue is also contentious in Greece, where nationalist protests and accusations of betrayal have mirrored the situation in Macedonia. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras faces opposition to the deal from his government\u2019s junior coalition partner, the Independent Greeks, as well as from the conservative opposition. Most recently, Greece\u2019s Foreign Minister, a key supporter of the agreement, resigned amid tensions with Defense Minister Panos Kammenos, who opposes it. Tsipras declared his continued support for the agreement and has assumed the Foreign Affairs portfolio on an interim basis.\nU.S. Support for Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic Integration\nU.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have long supported Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration and backed its compromise with Greece to resolve the name dispute. A U.S. diplomat has been the key U.N. negotiator for over two decades. \nNATO leaders have said that membership consultations with Macedonia could be finalized once the Prespa Agreement is fully implemented. Macedonia then could become NATO\u2019s 30th member, pending final ratification by member states, including by the U.S. Senate. During past NATO enlargements, the ratification process typically has taken from six months to one year.\nU.S. officials and many Members of Congress believe that Macedonia\u2019s NATO and EU membership would help ward off the violence and interethnic tensions that have periodically flared in Macedonia. Some analysts speculate that the Prespa Agreement could set a powerful example of compromise for parties to other seemingly intractable disputes in the Balkans, such as Serbia and Kosovo. \nProponents of Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration also have stressed the importance of countering Russia\u2019s increased presence in Macedonia. This includes a heightened Russian media footprint, a proliferation of Russia-Macedonia friendship organizations, and cooperation between Vladimir Putin\u2019s United Russia party and the United Macedonia Party. Some analysts believe that Russia, which opposes Macedonia\u2019s potential NATO membership, may have supported the boycott campaign that dampened referendum turnout.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10977", "sha1": "5b631392af225fdfcbe6a4a60e1bfdcc45e6c0f7", "filename": "files/20181022_IN10977_5b631392af225fdfcbe6a4a60e1bfdcc45e6c0f7.html", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 585925, "date": "2018-10-03", "retrieved": "2018-10-05T22:09:29.559986", "title": "Macedonia: Uncertainty after Referendum on Country\u2019s Name", "summary": "A September 30, 2018, referendum on changing Macedonia\u2019s name to the Republic of North Macedonia produced mixed results and rival interpretations from the government and opposition. Despite voter turnout (37%) being lower than many expected, nearly 92% of those who voted approved changing the country\u2019s name to resolve a long-standing dispute with Greece and facilitate Macedonia\u2019s eventual membership in NATO and the European Union (EU). Based on this relatively high margin of victory, the government quickly claimed that the nonbinding referendum result was a clear mandate to proceed with a parliamentary vote on required constitutional changes. Yet opponents of the name change, who generally boycotted the referendum, also viewed the result as a win because voter turnout was below the 50% necessary for the referendum results to be considered valid. \nWith both sides claiming victory, it is unclear whether the government of Zoran Zaev can secure the two-thirds majority of parliamentary votes needed to amend the constitution to allow the name change. If it does not, Macedonia\u2019s path to NATO and EU membership could remain blocked, and some analysts suggest it could be years before conditions are conducive to another Greek-Macedonian agreement on the name issue.\nRecent Breakthrough in Name Dispute\nFor nearly three decades, Greece has wielded its veto power to block Macedonia\u2019s NATO and EU membership despite generally positive assessments of Macedonia\u2019s qualifications. The bilateral dispute dates back to 1991, when Macedonia declared independence from the former Yugoslavia as the Republic of Macedonia. From Greece\u2019s perspective, Macedonia\u2019s use of the name implies territorial ambitions toward northern Greece reflecting its claim to the cultural heritage of ancient Macedonia. Greece continues to refer to the country as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. \nIn 2017, Macedonia\u2019s new Social Democrat-led government prioritized renewed efforts toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The presence of new leaders at the bargaining table, along with EU and NATO support and positive signals from Athens, provided an opportunity to compromise over the name issue. In June, the foreign ministers of Greece and Macedonia signed the Prespa Agreement, whereby Macedonia would change its name to the Republic of North Macedonia, Greece would no longer object to Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration, and both countries would promise to respect existing borders.\nNationalist protests broke out in both countries over the agreement. Prior to the referendum, key officials from Macedonia\u2019s opposition VMRO DPMNE party, including President Gjorge Ivanov and party leader Hristijan Mickoski, accused the government of betraying Macedonia. Ivanov called on the party\u2019s supporters to boycott the referendum. \nNext Steps\nFor the Prespa Agreement to enter into force, Macedonia\u2019s parliament must make constitutional changes that adopt key provisions\u2014including the name change\u2014by the end of 2018. Although the referendum is not binding, the Macedonian government hoped that strong turnout would pressure opposition members of parliament to endorse the necessary changes. Prime Minister Zaev has vowed to move the process forward in parliament. The government believes it has approximately 71 of the 80 votes (out of 120) necessary, but the referendum\u2019s relatively low turnout makes it harder for the government to secure nine opposition votes. VMRO DPMNE leader Mickoski declared that the deal with Greece is \u201cdead.\u201d Some analysts believe the party is loath to give a political victory to the Zaev government and instead hopes to author a more palatable agreement with Greece down the road, even though it could be years before this is feasible. \nVMRO DPMNE lists NATO and EU membership as strategic priorities, and a strong majority of Macedonia\u2019s population supports these goals. Some analysts believe the party is sensitive to its international reputation and could yield to pressure from other conservative parties, particularly the parties of key \u201cyes\u201d campaign proponents such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz. \nPrime Minister Zaev put additional pressure on the VMRO DPMNE by threatening to hold snap elections if the constitutional changes fail to pass. If governing parties gain additional seats, the changes could pass without the opposition\u2019s support. Some observers view early elections as the more likely scenario. \nIf parliament approves the constitutional changes, the next step would be ratification by Greece\u2019s parliament. The issue is also contentious in Greece, where nationalist protests and accusations of betrayal have mirrored the situation in Macedonia. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras faces opposition to the deal from his government\u2019s junior coalition partner, the Independent Greeks, as well as from the conservative opposition. Nevertheless, Tsipras survived a no-confidence vote over the agreement in June. \nU.S. Support for Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic Integration\nU.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have long supported Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration and backed its compromise with Greece to resolve the name dispute. A U.S. diplomat has been the key U.N. negotiator for over two decades. The State Department praised the support from Macedonian voters in the September 30 referendum and urged politicians to rise above the partisan fray by finalizing the Prespa Agreement. \nNATO leaders have said that membership consultations with Macedonia could be finalized once the Prespa Agreement is fully implemented. Macedonia then could become NATO\u2019s 30th member, pending final ratification by member states, including by the U.S. Senate. During past NATO enlargements, the ratification process typically has taken from six months to one year.\nU.S. officials and many Members of Congress believe that Macedonia\u2019s NATO and EU membership would be a source of stability in the Western Balkans and would help ward off the violence and interethnic tensions that have flared periodically in Macedonia. Some analysts speculate that the Prespa Agreement could set a powerful example of compromise for parties to other seemingly intractable disputes in the Balkans, such as Serbia and Kosovo. \nProponents of Macedonia\u2019s Euro-Atlantic integration also have stressed the importance of countering Russia\u2019s increased presence in Macedonia, which presence includes a heightened Russian media footprint, a proliferation of Russia-Macedonia friendship organizations, and cooperation between Vladimir Putin\u2019s United Russia party and the United Macedonia Party. Some analysts believe that Russia, which opposes Macedonia\u2019s potential NATO membership, may have supported the boycott campaign that dampened referendum turnout.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN10977", "sha1": "15ba2526aa73f88a4c1fa12f99bbae68156bf5dc", "filename": "files/20181003_IN10977_15ba2526aa73f88a4c1fa12f99bbae68156bf5dc.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN10977", "sha1": "8f42fc40ea4967f6cd6c69f5546a42e78b729a2d", "filename": "files/20181003_IN10977_8f42fc40ea4967f6cd6c69f5546a42e78b729a2d.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights", "Foreign Affairs" ] }