{ "id": "IN11185", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "number": "IN11185", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 606708, "date": "2019-10-23", "retrieved": "2019-10-25T22:13:46.240524", "title": "Turkey Sanctions in Pending Legislation: Issues for Congress", "summary": "Congress is actively considering a variety of bills that could impose sanctions on Turkey. The pending legislation is largely in response to a Turkish-led incursion into Syria (which Turkey calls Operation Peace Spring, or OPS) that began in early October after the Trump Administration announced that the United States was relocating some U.S. Special Forces away from the Syria-Turkey border area. Sanctions imposed via legislation would add to sanctions that the Administration imposed on Turkey in response to OPS, and many would stand until Turkey withdraws from areas it has already occupied. \nAdministration Sanctions by Executive Order\nOn October 14, President Trump signed an executive order (EO 13894) authorizing sanctions against current and former Turkish officials, government agencies, and sectors of the Turkish economy\u2014as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. The order also authorizes sanctions against any person (along with other parties deemed to be assisting any designated persons) found to be responsible for (1) ongoing military operations in northeastern Syria, (2) intimidation of displaced persons or forcible repatriation of persons to Syria, or (3) interference with a political solution to the Syrian conflict. According to the President, the order authorizes \u201ca broad range of consequences, including financial sanctions, the blocking of property, and barring entry into the United States.\u201d \nThe Administration\u2019s sanctions may have been intended to mollify Members of Congress calling for stronger sanctions and to encourage diplomacy to end hostilities. On October 14, the Department of the Treasury designated for sanctions\u2014under EO 13894\u2014Turkey\u2019s defense and energy ministries and their ministers, as well as Turkey\u2019s interior minister. However, the Administration issued three general licenses alongside EO 13894, including one that exempted from sanctions official U.S. government business with designated persons\u2014thus possibly permitting continued bilateral dealings, including U.S. arms sales to Turkey. In addition, on October 17, a joint U.S.-Turkey statement declaring a pause to OPS provided for the possibility of reversing the October 14 sanctions designations. The Department of the Treasury reversed the designations on October 23, after President Trump said that in light of the sustained pause to OPS, the sanctions on Turkey would be lifted \u201cunless something happens that we\u2019re not happy with.\u201d As of October 23, EO 13894 remains available to impose sanctions on Turkish individuals and economic sectors. The President may exercise that authority, or revoke the Executive Order, at any time going forward. Congressional consideration of sanctions has continued.\nPending Legislation\nThe following major Turkey sanctions bills have been introduced in October:\nThe Protect Against Conflict by Turkey Act (H.R. 4695);\nThe Promoting American National Security and Preventing the Resurgence of ISIS Act of 2019 (S. 2641); and\ntwo versions of the Countering Turkish Aggression Act of 2019 (S. 2644 and H.R. 4692).\nIt is unclear whether President Trump would sign sanctions legislation on Turkey. It also is unclear whether legislation could attract veto-proof support in Congress, though the House passed H.J.Res. 77, which criticized OPS and certain Administration actions regarding Syria, by a vote of 354-60 on October 16.\nLeverage with Turkey\nThe potential for sanctions prompted by OPS to affect Turkish behavior could depend on various factors. The following considerations suggest that Turkish-led forces may not give up control of the areas of Syria that they have occupied to date during OPS: \nTurkish priorities to prevent control of those areas by the Kurdish YPG (People\u2019s Protection Units) elements of the Syrian Democratic Forces, and open areas for Syrian refugees in Turkey to return; and \nthe Trump Administration\u2019s October 17 approval of a primarily Turkish-patrolled \u201csafe zone.\u201d \nIn an October 9 letter to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President Trump referred to August 2018 U.S. sanctions and other economic actions against Turkey\u2014when U.S. officials were seeking the release of an American pastor from a Turkish prison\u2014as a \u201clittle sample\u201d of what the United States can do. Turkey released the pastor in October 2018.\nTurkish Economy and Financial Stability\nEffects from sanctions on Turkey\u2019s economy and financial system could potentially affect its behavior. Some sources assert that sanctions could negatively affect market confidence in Turkey, as well as its financial and commercial activities. While Turkey\u2019s economy has rebounded somewhat in 2019 from a 2018 recession, the International Monetary Fund said in September, \u201cThe current calm appears fragile. Reserves remain low, and private sector [foreign exchange] debt and external financing needs high.\u201d At various points in Turkey\u2019s history, economic crises have contributed to political instability.\nNew sanctions could affect key Turkish financial institutions, given their indebtedness and dependence on foreign investment flows. Those institutions include Halkbank\u2014a major bank that is majority-owned by the Turkish government, and (in a case that is domestically sensitive for President Erdogan) was indicted in U.S. federal court on October 15 in relation to an alleged scheme to evade U.S. sanctions on Iran.\nTurkish Public Sentiment\nSanctions\u2019 effect on Turkish public sentiment may be difficult to gauge. While negative effects on Turkey\u2019s economy could lead to domestic pressure to change Turkish policies, they also could increase popular support for the government. Some sources suggest that Turkish citizens broadly support action in Syria to counter the YPG and to increase the likelihood of Syrian refugees returning home. Provisions in the pending bills requiring the imposition of sanctions against Turkey in connection with domestically popular policies could potentially create a \u201crally-round-the-flag\u2019 effect\u201d and boost support for President Erdogan given substantial existing anti-U.S. sentiment. While Turkey has long-standing, deeply rooted ties with the West, provisions such as the following from the pending bills also could potentially create incentives for Turkey to increase trade, investment, and arms dealings with non-Western actors:\nsanctions or other penalties against Turkish financial institutions; \nprovisions prohibiting U.S. arms sales to Turkey and imposing sanctions on foreign persons who knowingly support or transact with the Turkish military; and\na provision requiring a report on the net worth and sources of income of Erdogan and his family.\n\nLinkage with Russian S-400 Issue\nRequiring sanctions against Turkey\u2014because of OPS\u2014that are linked to other sensitive aspects of U.S.-Turkey relations could affect U.S. leverage on Turkey. Each of the pending bills would require the President to impose sanctions under title II of P.L. 115-44 (Countering American\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA) in connection with Turkey\u2019s acquisition of a Russian S-400 air defense system. Members of Congress might consider how these provisions could influence Turkish actions both on Syria and the S-400 issue, and how they might otherwise apply carrots and sticks to affect Turkish behavior on both issues.", "type": "CRS Insight", "typeId": "INSIGHTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/IN11185", "sha1": "664deb3e0b3a3b4d4c18a77743313b0a2b91b452", "filename": "files/20191023_IN11185_664deb3e0b3a3b4d4c18a77743313b0a2b91b452.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/IN11185", "sha1": "17cce64c9a41e02687f622e9e96a70629137a592", "filename": "files/20191023_IN11185_17cce64c9a41e02687f622e9e96a70629137a592.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "CRS Insights" ] }