INSIGHTi
Israel and Houthis in Yemen: Attacks
Highlight Regional Conflict Risks
July 22, 2024
On July 19, 2024, the
Ansar Allah/Houthi movement, an Iran-backed force that controls parts o
f Yemen,
attacked Tel Aviv, Israel using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Israeli government
reported that
the attack killed one Israeli citizen near the U.S. Embassy Branch Office and wounded eight others, and
marked the first Israeli death amid the over 200 Houthi missile and UAV attacks the Israeli government
has
reported since October 2023. Houthi leaders hav
e stated they will continue attacks against Israel until
Israel ends its operations in Gaza.
On July 20, Israel launched
Operation Long Arm, in which combat/refueling aircraft flew more than
1,000 miles from their bases in Israel to strike the Houthi-held port of Hudaydah (alt. Hodeidah). The
operation, which Israel
characterized as a retaliatory strike, hit fuel depots, a refinery and power station,
and dockside cranes
, reportedly killing a number of people and wounding dozens. Hudaydah is an
important commercial port, and damage to its infrastructure may limit flows of goods, food, humanitarian
supplies
, and fuel until functions are restored. Economic and humanitarian impact estimates may follow
more complete damage assessments. A statement by the U.N. Secretary General
noted “considerable
damage to civilian infrastructure” and urged “all to exercise utmost restraint.” The Houthis have targeted
Israel with missiles
since the July 20 Israeli air strikes, elevating concerns about the possibility of a
regional war.
U.S. Policy vis-à-vis Yemen and the Houthis
The July 19 Houthi attack on Israel and Israel’s counterstrike occurred amidst
debate over the direction
and effectiveness of U.S. policy toward the Houthis. The Biden Administration has pursued the de-
escalation of Yemen’s long-running civil war and worked to preserve a fragile ceasefire reached in 2022
while
condemning and responding militarily to Houthi attacks since October 2023.
U.S. Navy and partner forces positioned in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have intercepted Houthi UAVs,
missiles, and uncrewed surface craft and are conducting maritime security operations through the
multinational, U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and some
U.S. partners also have
targeted Houthi militar
y sites t
o “disrupt and degrade” Houthi capabilities. In May
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN12391
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
2024, the CENTCOM Commander
called for a greater multilateral effort to stop Iran’s weapons
shipments.
Broadening Houthi attacks have prompted some calls for more
expansive action against them.
Others have warned that the Houthis m
ay benefit from confrontation with the United States and Israel to
the extent it raises their profile and enables them to tighten their local control.
Houthi control over parts of Yemen provides the group with revenue and leverage and facilitates Iranian
arms shipments to them. If Houthi control endures, lasting threats to regional security and maritime
commerce could result. Efforts to end Houthi challenges through negotiation, whether or not they lead to
short-term de-escalation, may embolden the Houthis to make new threats to neighbors, Israel, and
maritime commerce. Attempting to degrade or dislodge them by force could result in major conflict in
Yemen and the region with uncertain outcomes beyond deepening humanitarian consequences.
Congress has not specificall
y authorized U.S. military operations against the Houthis The Fiscal Year
(FY) 2024 national security supplemental act
(P.L. 118-50) made available $2.4 billion for operations,
force protection, deterrence, and the replacement of combat expenditures in the CENTCOM area of
operations. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 2722 (2024) calls on the Houthis to cease their attacks on
international shipping and notes the right of states, in accordance with international law, to act to defend
their vessels from attack.
Issues for Congress
In assessing whether and how to respond to Houthi and Israeli attacks on one another, Congress may
consider various factors.
Regional Conflict Risks: Impact on U.S. Forces/Citizens and U.S. Support for Israel
Deeper conflict involving the Houthis may put at further risk thousands of U.S. military personnel
deployed to the eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and
Persian Gulf, along with U.S. citizens residing in the regi
on. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71)
carrier strike group is operating in the Gulf of Aden to “deter aggression, promote regional stability, and
protect the free flow of commerce in the region.”
Escalation also could present challenges for Israel in maintaining military strength on several fronts—
Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank—amid th
e possibility of a larger conflict with Lebanese Hezbollah.
Congress and the Administration may consider the nature of Israeli operations and any potential shortfalls
in Israel’s defense capacity and stockpiles when weighing future direct U.S. involvement in Israel’s
defense and/or the timing, nature, and volume of arms shipments.
Humanitarian Aid to Yemen
The U.N
. estimates that 21.6 million people in Yemen (more than half the population) need humanitarian
assistance, 4.5 million are internally displaced, and 17 million ar
e food insecure. Over 90% of staple
cereals are imported, making the food supply susceptible to disruption.
The 2024 U.N. Humanitarian
Response Plan appeal for Yemen seeks $2.7 billion
. Constraints on humanitarian access affect aid
delivery across Yemen, and the Houthis ha
ve detained U.N. and other humanitarian staff. In FY2023, the
United States provided more than $761 million in humanitarian assistance to Yemen.
U.S.-Israeli Counter Drone Cooperation
UAV
s pose risks to Israeli and U.S. forces as hard to detect, cost-effective systems that can swarm aerial
defense systems. Israel faces UAV threats from a range of Iran-backed forces including Hezbollah,
which
fired dozens of rockets and UAVs at Israel on July 21. In 2018, Congress first
authorized a cooperative
U.S.-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) program and th
en extended that authority. Since
Congressional Research Service
3
FY2020, Congress has appropriated $120 million in defense appropriations for C-UAS programs,
including directed energy capabilities.
The Houthis and Terrorism Designations
In February 202
1, the Biden Administration revoked the previous administration’s designation of the
Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
[see CRS In Focus IF10613, Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO)]. In January 2024, the U.S. State Department
designated the Houthis as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist group. On April 17, 2024, the House adopted
H.R. 6046, which would direct the
Administration to redesignate the Houthis as an FTO.
Author Information
Christopher M. Blanchard, Coordinator
Jim Zanotti
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Jeremy M. Sharp
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
IN12391 · VERSION 1 · NEW