{
  "id": "R40453",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R40453",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 435243,
      "date": "2009-03-17",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T02:39:22.779994",
      "title": "The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002: Background and Implementation",
      "summary": "U.S. policy on Tibet is governed by the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (TPA), enacted as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY2003 (P.L. 107-228). In addition to establishing a number of U.S. principles with respect to human rights, religious freedom, political prisoners, and economic development projects in Tibet, the TPA established in statute the State Department position of Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues; required a number of annual reporting requirements on Sino-Tibetan negotiations, both by the State Department and by the congressionally established Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC); mandated the provision of Tibetan language training to interested foreign service officers in the U.S. government; required U.S. government officials to raise issues of religious freedom and political prisoners; and urged the State Department to seek establishment of a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa. \nSince the TPA\u2019s enactment, opinions on the effectiveness of the Act have varied. These views include assessments on the nature of the objectives the TPA sets forth for U.S. policy; the attainability of those objectives; the achievements of the Special Coordinators; and the manner of the Act\u2019s implementation. \nA number of people who follow Tibetan issues closely were interviewed for this report in an effort to assess the TPA\u2019s effectiveness. A commonly held view was that the Act was being implemented as intended and that those who had filled the Special Coordinator position created by the Act had been diligent in carrying out their responsibilities. In instances where the Act\u2019s objectives had not been achieved, such as the establishment of a U.S. Consulate in Lhasa or a meeting with the 11th Panchen Lama, the lack of achievements generally were ascribed to obstacles put in place by Beijing rather than failures in implementation on the U.S. side. Some suggestions were raised for improvements in the Act, including an expansion of the Special Coordinator\u2019s authority to task other U.S. government agencies and a broadening of issues to be included in annual reporting. A minority view held that the Act\u2019s principle objective \u2013 to encourage PRC dialogue with the Dalai Lama \u2013 was inherently flawed. According to this view, placing dialogue with the Dalai Lama at the center of U.S. policy objectives raises unrealistic expectations among Tibetans; prompts recurring PRC crackdowns that contribute to a worsening situation in Tibet; and ultimately may be counterproductive to fulfilling other legitimate interests of Tibetans in Tibet.\nThis report will not be updated.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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}