{ "id": "R40888", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R40888", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 353347, "date": "2006-01-05", "retrieved": "2016-04-07T19:22:46.469029", "title": "Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information", "summary": "The Revelations in December 2005 that President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to collect signals intelligence from communications involving U.S. persons within the United States, without obtaining a warrant or court order, raised numerous questions regarding the President\u2019s authority to order warrantless electronic surveillance. President Bush stated that he believes his order to be fully supported by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and Attorney General Gonzales clarified that the Administration based its authority both on inherent presidential powers and the joint resolution authorizing the use of \u201call necessary and appropriate force\u201d to engage militarily those responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (\u201cAUMF\u201d). Although the resolution does not expressly specify what it authorizes as \u201cnecessary and appropriate force,\u201d the Administration discerned the intent of Congress to provide the statutory authority necessary to take virtually any action reasonably calculated to prevent a terrorist attack, including by overriding at least some statutory prohibitions that contain exceptions for conduct that is \u201cotherwise authorized by statute.\u201d Specifically, the Administration asserts that a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that punishes those who conduct \u201celectronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute\u201d does not bar the NSA surveillance at issue because the AUMF is just such a statute. On December 22, 2005, the Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs released a letter to certain members of the House and Senate intelligence committees setting forth in somewhat greater detail the Administration\u2019s position with regard to the legal authority supporting the NSA activities described by the President.\nThis report lays out a general framework for analyzing the constitutional and statutory issues raised by the NSA electronic surveillance activity. It then outlines the legal framework regulating electronic surveillance by the government, explores ambiguities in those statutes that could provide exceptions for the NSA intelligence-gathering operation at issue, and addresses the arguments that the President possesses inherent authority to order the operations or that Congress has provided such authority.\nThis report supersedes CRS memorandum product WD00002, Presidential Authority to Conduct Warrantless Electronic Surveillance to Gather Foreign Intelligence Information, by Elizabeth B. Bazan and Jennifer K. Elsea.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R40888", "sha1": "d034ceda891d69f0d78a33245d3cc787618fdf59", "filename": "files/20060105_R40888_d034ceda891d69f0d78a33245d3cc787618fdf59.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R40888", "sha1": "2d48c321723413cc282f9f046d7b7ae3b91bc902", "filename": "files/20060105_R40888_2d48c321723413cc282f9f046d7b7ae3b91bc902.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Constitutional Questions", "Intelligence and National Security" ] }