{
  "id": "R41183",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R41183",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 363884,
      "date": "2010-06-16",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T01:37:17.282279",
      "title": "Post-Incarceration Controls of Convicted Sex Offenders",
      "summary": "The United States witnessed increased attention to sex offender management policy at the federal, state, and local levels beginning in the 1990s. As a result, laws have been enacted which impose a variety of post-incarceration controls on sex offenders, including but not limited to registration and community notification requirements, civil commitment, global positioning system (GPS) monitoring and tracking, and residency restrictions. Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases\u2014United States v. Carr and United States v. Comstock\u2014involved challenges to such controls passed at the federal level. This report provides background information and examines relevant case law, with a particular focus on registration requirements and residency restrictions. \nLegislation enacted to protect the community from sex offenders is not a novel concept. At the federal level, Congress has passed a series of laws adopting the use of sex offender registries and community notification for sexually violent offenders and those committing offenses against children. Most recently, as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-248), Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The statute categorizes sex offenders into three tiers, with progressively longer and more scrutinizing registration requirements for each tier.\nProponents argue that post-incarceration restrictions are necessary to reduce a demonstrably high recidivism rate, safeguard potential victims, and assist law enforcement in tracking offenders. Opponents question the restrictions\u2019 practical impact on recidivism rates and argue that the controls may be disproportionate to the crimes committed. \nAs some commentators question the efficacy of these controls, courts are assessing their constitutionality. Defendants have invoked a myriad of constitutional grounds in challenges to post-conviction restrictions. With some exceptions, federal courts have generally upheld the restrictions. For example, in a 2003 case, Smith v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Alaska\u2019s sex offender registration requirements against an ex post facto challenge. Applying Smith, federal courts of appeals have also generally upheld the federal registration law against such challenges. However, as restrictions have increased in both number and severity, questions remain. Is it possible that a statute\u2019s purpose or effect is so punitive as to negate a legislature\u2019s apparent non-punitive intent? Under what circumstances may these restrictions be applied? Can states and localities apply these restrictions retroactively? These are some of the issues likely to emerge in pending and future federal court cases.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
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  ],
  "topics": [
    "Constitutional Questions"
  ]
}