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After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both parties met the treaty\u2019s requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. The treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for no more than five years. \nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least through 2021. The Administration has not yet determined whether it will request or support an extension of the treaty through 2026. It has, however, raised questions about the value of the treaty, and suggested that the United States should allow it to lapse while negotiating a new treaty that would include Russia and China, and capture all types of Russian nuclear weapons.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "c96d7bb13d5fdbcad6025a772239b89c433b14bf", "filename": "files/20200402_R41219_c96d7bb13d5fdbcad6025a772239b89c433b14bf.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "131b0cf8272f7aaa5850828feedc915b8a1debd6", "filename": "files/20200402_R41219_131b0cf8272f7aaa5850828feedc915b8a1debd6.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 609297, "date": "2019-11-27", "retrieved": "2019-12-13T15:10:23.231352", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both parties met the treaty\u2019s requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. The treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for no more than five years. \nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least through 2021. The Administration has not yet determined whether it will request or support an extension of the treaty through 2026. It has, however, raised questions about the value of the treaty, and suggested that the United States should allow it to lapse while negotiating a new treaty that would include Russia and China, and capture all types of Russian nuclear weapons.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "2cf62f2a88a33751a9bceff616bb8065ff056bd5", "filename": "files/20191127_R41219_2cf62f2a88a33751a9bceff616bb8065ff056bd5.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "b5ec5b2dcf60c73e7369cb2945cd2b5c2aad61d4", "filename": "files/20191127_R41219_b5ec5b2dcf60c73e7369cb2945cd2b5c2aad61d4.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 598953, "date": "2019-05-30", "retrieved": "2019-05-31T22:13:09.841859", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both parties met the treaty\u2019s requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. The treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for no more than five years. \nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support for the treaty during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports \u201cthe long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles\u201d and that it is important for the United States \u201cto stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START.\u201d The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least through 2021. The Administration has not yet determined whether it will request or support an extension of the treaty through 2026.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "77c5f131d8cc451b229066205b28276cb8881f00", "filename": "files/20190530_R41219_77c5f131d8cc451b229066205b28276cb8881f00.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "d2a1fd6394b449e95c6af032d51ea83ce6895b29", "filename": "files/20190530_R41219_d2a1fd6394b449e95c6af032d51ea83ce6895b29.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 595925, "date": "2019-04-05", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T13:46:29.989485", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both parties met the treaty\u2019s requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. The treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for no more than five years. \nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support for the treaty during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports \u201cthe long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles\u201d and that it is important for the United States \u201cto stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START.\u201d The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the treaty, at least through 2021. The Administration has not yet determined whether it will request or support an extension of the treaty through 2026.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "fda3707ece41da8ab27dd22fccb239420fdffdd9", "filename": "files/20190405_R41219_fda3707ece41da8ab27dd22fccb239420fdffdd9.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "608f5e4f559250f14da6afb22bc7cd3d92dda2d6", "filename": "files/20190405_R41219_608f5e4f559250f14da6afb22bc7cd3d92dda2d6.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 585870, "date": "2018-09-27", "retrieved": "2018-10-05T22:14:24.160096", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. Reductions were to be implemented by February 5, 2018, a goal met by both parties. The Treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for up to five years.\nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support for the Treaty during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports \u201cthe long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles\u201d and that it is important for the United States \u201cto stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START.\u201d The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the Treaty, at least through 2021. The Administration has not yet determined whether it will request or support an extension of the Treaty through 2026.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "d0be2c7ae618c9f669843f5196af3c1205b433c2", "filename": "files/20180927_R41219_d0be2c7ae618c9f669843f5196af3c1205b433c2.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "f4469065a5a478b999d82cd628c3f1ffa7d55ab4", "filename": "files/20180927_R41219_f4469065a5a478b999d82cd628c3f1ffa7d55ab4.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 578180, "date": "2018-02-05", "retrieved": "2018-05-10T11:32:09.433468", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. Reductions were to be implemented by February 5, 2018, a goal met by both parties.\nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support for the Treaty during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports \u201cthe long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles\u201d and that it is important for the United States \u201cto stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START.\u201d The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that the United States would continue to implement the Treaty, at least through 2021.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "2a16a3000391b069ab7cea7a2936f156aed88c79", "filename": "files/20180205_R41219_2a16a3000391b069ab7cea7a2936f156aed88c79.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "c9359ec0db9741db55e49cbb438c7cc8b26dfb06", "filename": "files/20180205_R41219_c9359ec0db9741db55e49cbb438c7cc8b26dfb06.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 573804, "date": "2017-10-05", "retrieved": "2017-10-06T12:47:41.944734", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification.\nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. While the Trump Administration has not offered an official assessment of the treaty, Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports \u201cthe long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles\u201d and that it is important for the United States \u201cto stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START.\u201d", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "882739fd195a9b72a6ea88a1ae46362a79280573", "filename": "files/20171005_R41219_882739fd195a9b72a6ea88a1ae46362a79280573.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "d04b3079673b8761a27fb30cf7fcc67021f1e035", "filename": "files/20171005_R41219_d04b3079673b8761a27fb30cf7fcc67021f1e035.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461985, "date": "2017-06-13", "retrieved": "2017-08-22T14:22:22.546919", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification.\nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. While the Trump Administration has not offered an official assessment of the treaty, Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports \u201cthe long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles\u201d and that it is important for the United States \u201cto stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START.\u201d", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "4054c4c69accb8123c57cc21ce2251f96b9e37bb", "filename": "files/20170613_R41219_4054c4c69accb8123c57cc21ce2251f96b9e37bb.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "ba9c50d53ea408de17f40c79a3d579c1e9deff70", "filename": "files/20170613_R41219_ba9c50d53ea408de17f40c79a3d579c1e9deff70.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 458617, "date": "2017-02-01", "retrieved": "2017-02-03T19:08:35.007573", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification.\nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argued that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, questioned whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. While the Trump Administration has not offered an official assessment of the treaty, Secretary of State-designate Tillerson offered support during his confirmation hearings, noting that he supports \u201cthe long-standing bipartisan policy of engaging with Russia and other nuclear arms states to verifiably reduce nuclear stockpiles\u201d and that it is important for the United States \u201cto stay engaged with Russia [and] hold them accountable to commitments made under the New START.\u201d", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "6891e0fd93ece1d4833a1ab76bb826b0eec213eb", "filename": "files/20170201_R41219_6891e0fd93ece1d4833a1ab76bb826b0eec213eb.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "1ea73696f0ff8d60763cb36057a2a391ea6029f8", "filename": "files/20170201_R41219_1ea73696f0ff8d60763cb36057a2a391ea6029f8.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 456354, "date": "2016-10-11", "retrieved": "2016-11-28T21:24:28.535174", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification.\nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. The United States may deploy a small number of these systems during the time that New START is in force.\nThe Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START strengthens strategic stability and enhances U.S. national security. Critics, however, question whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R41219", "sha1": "2a1606b3cb2ac64877ce66faa7d02dfe48d17510", "filename": "files/20161011_R41219_2a1606b3cb2ac64877ce66faa7d02dfe48d17510.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R41219", "sha1": "510b2e6e0c6be1e46324518ffe61314b0dfe7e8f", "filename": "files/20161011_R41219_510b2e6e0c6be1e46324518ffe61314b0dfe7e8f.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 451715, "date": "2016-04-13", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T19:23:32.436941", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament\u2014the Duma and Federation Council\u2014approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification.\nNew START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber. \nNew START contains detailed definitions and counting rules that will help the parties calculate the number of warheads that count under the treaty limits. Moreover, the delivery vehicles and their warheads will count under the treaty limits until they are converted or eliminated according to the provisions described in the treaty\u2019s Protocol. These provisions are far less demanding than those in the original START Treaty and will provide the United States and Russia with far more flexibility in determining how to reduce their forces to meet the treaty limits.\nThe monitoring and verification regime in the New START Treaty is less costly and complex than the regime in START. Like START, though, it contains detailed definitions of items limited by the treaty; provisions governing the use of national technical means (NTM) to gather data on each side\u2019s forces and activities; an extensive database that identifies the numbers, types, and locations of items limited by the treaty; provisions requiring notifications about items limited by the treaty; and inspections allowing the parties to confirm information shared during data exchanges.\nNew START does not limit current or planned U.S. missile defense programs. It does ban the conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to launchers for missile defense interceptors, but the United States never intended to pursue such conversions when deploying missile defense interceptors. Under New START, the United States can deploy conventional warheads on its ballistic missiles, but these will count under the treaty limit on nuclear warheads. 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This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20120214_R41219_2f8d383feabceda9ffaa1beb17ec79dce6ccb968.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20120214_R41219_2f8d383feabceda9ffaa1beb17ec79dce6ccb968.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Russia", "name": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Russia" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - Russia - U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations - Russia - U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Defense policy", "name": "Defense policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear nonproliferation", "name": "Nuclear nonproliferation" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "National security", "name": "National security" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear weapons", "name": "Nuclear weapons" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Weapons systems", "name": "Weapons systems" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc83945/", "id": "R41219_2011Dec23", "date": "2011-12-23", "retrieved": "2012-04-27T15:49:45", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. This treaty is designed to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START), which expired, after 15 years of implementation, on December 5, 2009. This report provides an overview of New START, including a comparison to the original START Treaty, the belief of the Obama Administration and outside analysts that New START will enhance U.S. national security, and the criticisms of those who say that New START (and, indeed, the entire issue of U.S.-Russian arms control) is a distraction from more important items on the nonproliferation agenda.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20111223_R41219_a76fcd4daf159c5a7df28bbb6fd9909fa7ae01b1.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20111223_R41219_a76fcd4daf159c5a7df28bbb6fd9909fa7ae01b1.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Russia", "name": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Russia" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations - Russia - U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations - Russia - U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Defense policy", "name": "Defense policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear nonproliferation", "name": "Nuclear nonproliferation" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "National security", "name": "National security" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear weapons", "name": "Nuclear weapons" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Weapons systems", "name": "Weapons systems" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc40097/", "id": "R41219_2011April21", "date": "2011-04-21", "retrieved": "2011-08-27T10:13:38", "title": "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions", "summary": "The United States and Russia signed a new strategic arms reduction treaty - known as New START - on April 8, 2010. 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