{
  "id": "R41375",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R41375",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 366733,
      "date": "2010-08-19",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T22:15:30.929765",
      "title": "OMB Controls on Agency Mandatory Spending Programs: \u201cAdministrative PAYGO\u201d and Related Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "On May 23, 2005, during President George W. Bush\u2019s second term, then-Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Joshua B. Bolten issued a memorandum to the heads of agencies. The memorandum announced that OMB would involve itself systematically in some aspects of how agencies execute laws related to mandatory spending. Under the process outlined in the OMB memorandum, if an agency wished to use discretion under current law in a way that would \u201cincrease mandatory spending,\u201d the memorandum required the agency to propose the action to OMB. Such actions might include regulations, demonstration program notices, and other forms of program guidance. For purposes of OMB\u2019s process, an increase was defined as spending more than the amount that the Administration assumed in its most recent projection of what is required under current law to fund the mandatory spending program. To offset such a difference in spending, the memorandum also required the agency to propose actions that would \u201ccomparably reduce\u201d mandatory spending. The memorandum did not address, however, whether agencies\u2019 administrative actions and corresponding spending changes would be consistent with congressional intent or expectations, or whether agencies\u2019 proposals and OMB\u2019s decisions would be transparent to Congress and the public.\nFor the most part, mandatory spending programs are provided for in substantive laws under the jurisdiction of House and Senate authorizing committees. The Administration characterized the OMB review process as \u201caugmenting its ... controls\u201d on agency decisions. It also referred to the process as \u201cadministrative PAYGO.\u201d In using the term \u201cPAYGO,\u201d the Administration juxtaposed this OMB involvement in agency decision making with a statutory and comparatively transparent mechanism that Congress has used when carrying out its legislative function.\nIn 2009, the Barack Obama Administration said it would continue the OMB memorandum\u2019s process. After several years of implementation, however, very little is publicly known about the scope and effect of OMB\u2019s process, the rationales for OMB determinations, or whether the process has achieved its stated purpose of constraining mandatory spending. In one case, concerning a program in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, some details about OMB\u2019s process were disclosed publicly in June 2010. The disclosure prompted congressional concerns about the relationships between congressional intent, agency policy implementation, and the role of OMB. Even though OMB\u2019s process is not transparent, it is possible to analyze some of the memorandum\u2019s other potential implications, if its process were used. While potentially limiting spending, the OMB process may have measurable effects on program outcomes for entitlement programs, for example, and may impose administrative burdens on federal agencies. Moreover, if agencies experience difficulty in identifying plausible offsets, it is conceivable that agencies may choose to not consider, pursue, or submit to OMB an administrative action that would cost money, regardless of the agency\u2019s perception of a policy\u2019s merits or whether it would be consistent with congressional intent. Differences may arise between OMB and CBO baselines of projected federal spending.\nIn approaching the subject of OMB controls on agency mandatory spending, Congress might assess at least five general options. First, if Congress sees no need to engage in lawmaking or oversight of the process, it might continue with the status quo. Second, if Congress wished to learn more about the process, Congress could conduct oversight. If Congress wished to address the topic prospectively through lawmaking, Congress might consider three other options: increasing transparency of OMB\u2019s process, legislating in greater detail, or modifying how OMB\u2019s process operates.",
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      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": []
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  ],
  "topics": [
    "Agricultural Policy",
    "American Law",
    "Domestic Social Policy",
    "Education Policy",
    "Energy Policy",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Health Policy"
  ]
}