{
  "id": "R42084",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R42084",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
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      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 393839,
      "date": "2011-11-14",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-07T00:28:42.317824",
      "title": "Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "Government contracting in Afghanistan and other wartime environments is different than contracting in peacetime. In peacetime, the goal of contracting is generally to obtain the good or service that is required. The measurements of success are generally getting the right good or service, on schedule, and at a fair price. In wartime, however\u2014and particularly in a counterinsurgency environment\u2014cost, schedule, and performance are often secondary to larger strategic goals of promoting security and denying popular support for the insurgency. \nFrom FY2005 through 2011, the U.S. government obligated more than $50 billion for contracts performed primarily in Afghanistan. Because a primary goal of defense contracting in Afghanistan is to support the overall mission, it is deemed essential that contracting is not only thought of as a response to immediate needs but also as part of the larger strategy. As General Allen, Commander, International Security Assistance Force, recently wrote, \u201cWe must improve our contracting practices to ensure they fully support our mission.\u201d\nMany of the weaknesses of the current government acquisition process can be exacerbated and exploited in a wartime environment, making it more difficult to adhere to best practices. These weaknesses include inadequate acquisition planning, poorly written requirements, and an insufficient number of capable acquisition and contract oversight personnel. For example, in a wartime environment, it is more difficult to research and evaluate companies bidding on a contract and more difficult to conduct oversight of projects built in dangerous locations.\nIn Afghanistan, an effort is currently underway to improve contracting. This effort, led by senior military officers, seeks to take a strategic approach to contracting by (1) articulating the role of contracting in current operations; (2) identifying specific acquisition weaknesses and creating the infrastructure to address them; and (3) using reliable data to make better acquisitions decisions. \nTwo of the major initiatives to improve contracting in Afghanistan that are well underway are Task Force 2010 and the Vendor Vetting Cell. Task Force 2010 was established in 2010 to help DOD commanders and acquisition personnel better understand with whom they are doing business, to conduct investigations to gain visibility into the flow of money at the subcontractor level, and to promote best contracting practices. The task force also supports efforts to track and recover goods stolen while in the possession of contractors providing logistics support. As of October 2, 2011, Task Force 2010 assisted in recovering over 180,000 pieces of equipment worth over $170 million and successfully suspended or debarred over 120 companies or individuals.\nThe Afghanistan Vendor Vetting Cell was established to ensure that government contracts are not awarded to companies with ties to insurgents, warlords, or criminal networks. The cell was set up in the fall of 2010 and is based in CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, FL. In June 2011, the vendor vetting cell consisted of 14 analysts capable of vetting approximately 15 companies a week. The cell is expected to have 63 analysts by December 2011.\nThe billions of contracting dollars spent to support military operations and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan raise a number of potential questions for Congress that may have significant policy implications for current and future overseas operations. These questions include (1) to what extent are U.S. government development and CERP contracts contributing to the overall mission in Afghanistan; (2) how will contract oversight be impacted by a troop drawdown; and (3) to what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors in future military operations?",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": []
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  "topics": [
    "Economic Policy",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}