{
  "id": "R43112",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R43112",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
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      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 421823,
      "date": "2013-06-20",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T21:05:49.379652",
      "title": "Independent Counsels, Special Prosecutors, Special Counsels, and the Role of Congress",
      "summary": "This report provides information on the procedure for the appointment of an \u201cindependent counsel,\u201d a \u201cspecial prosecutor,\u201d or a \u201cspecial counsel\u201d to investigate and prosecute potential or possible violations of federal criminal law by officials in the executive branch of the federal government and in federal agencies. Specifically examined is the role or authority of Congress in requiring an independent or special counsel investigation of executive branch officials.\nUnder the Constitution and its separation of powers principles and structure, Congress has no direct role in federal law enforcement, nor in triggering or initiating the appointment of any prosecutor for any particular matter (other than the advice and consent role of the Senate regarding certain nominations made by the President). Congress, however, has recognized inherent authority to conduct oversight hearings and legislative investigations by its committees into misconduct, mismanagement, or any other malfeasance relating to the officers and agencies of the executive branch of government to assure the government\u2019s proper functioning, to assure the proper expenditure of funds that Congress appropriates, and to explore the need for remedial legislation. Revelations from such investigations and oversight, in addition to providing information for remedial legislation, may contribute to the public pressure on the Administration or Department of Justice to appoint an \u201cindependent\u201d counsel or prosecutor to investigate uncovered evidence or allegations of wrongdoing by persons in the Administration.\nCongress may also have a legislative role in designing a statutory mechanism for the appointment of \u201cindependent counsels\u201d or \u201cspecial prosecutors,\u201d as it did in title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Under the provisions of that law relating to the appointment of \u201cindependent counsels\u201d (called \u201cspecial prosecutors\u201d until 1983), the Attorney General was directed to petition a special three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals to name an independent counsel upon the receipt of credible allegations of criminal misconduct by certain high-level personnel in the executive branch of the federal government whose prosecution by the Administration might give rise to an appearance of a conflict of interest. In 1999, Congress allowed the \u201cindependent counsel\u201d provisions of law to expire. Upon the expiration of the law in June of 1999, no new \u201cindependent counsels\u201d or \u201cspecial prosecutors\u201d may be appointed by a three-judge panel upon the application of the Attorney General.\nThe Attorney General retains the general authority to designate or name individuals as \u201cspecial counsels\u201d to conduct investigations or prosecutions of particular matters or individuals on behalf of the United States. Under regulations issued by the Attorney General in 1999, the Attorney General may appoint a \u201cspecial counsel\u201d from outside of the Department of Justice who acts as a special employee of the Department of Justice under the direction of the Attorney General. The Attorney General, however, may also appoint an individual as a special counsel, and may invest that individual with a greater degree of independence and autonomy to conduct investigations and prosecutions, regardless of any \u201cspecial counsel\u201d regulations, as Attorneys General did in 1973, 1994, and 2003. In 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson named Archibald Cox to be the \u201cspecial prosecutor\u201d for the \u201cWatergate\u201d investigation; in 1994, during an earlier expiration of the independent counsel provisions of law, Attorney General Janet Reno named a \u201cregulatory\u201d independent counsel Robert Fisk to investigate allegations concerning the matter known as \u201cWhitewater\u201d; and in 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft recused himself from the investigation of the leak of the identity of a CIA agent, and Deputy Attorney General Comey named U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald to be special counsel \u201cwith all the authority of the Attorney General\u201d to pursue that matter.",
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      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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}