{ "id": "R43125", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R43125", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 576746, "date": "2017-12-14", "retrieved": "2017-12-19T13:50:48.883356", "title": "Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues", "summary": "The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in South Carolina has been a key component of the current U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium from the Cold War. Disposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and the Russian Federation. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons, to begin in 2018. Russia suspended its participation in the agreement in October 2016 due to what it called \u201chostile actions\u201d by the United States. However, both countries appear to be continuing their plans for surplus plutonium disposition.\nThe U.S. disposition strategy called for the surplus plutonium, in oxide form, to be blended with uranium oxide to make mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. The plutonium in MOX fuel would be mostly destroyed in the reactors by fission (splitting into other isotopes). At the same time, isotopes of plutonium undesirable for weapons would be created, along with highly radioactive fission products. As a result, after several years in a reactor, spent MOX fuel would have less total plutonium than when it was freshly loaded, and the remaining plutonium would be degraded for weapons purposes. Moreover, the fission products would make the material difficult to handle, in case of future attempts to use the plutonium.\nBecause of sharply rising cost estimates for the MOX project, the Obama Administration proposed to terminate the project in its FY2017 budget request. The Trump Administration in its FY2018 request also proposed replacing the MFF with the dilute and dispose option. Starting with the FY2015 budget request, the Administration proposed placing MFFF in \u201ccold standby\u201d and studying other plutonium disposition options. However, Congress authorized and appropriated $345 million for FY2015 to continue construction at a reduced level and required the Department of Energy (DOE) to procure an independent cost and schedule estimate for MFFF and alternative disposition approaches. Pending the results of those analyses, DOE requested $340 million for FY2016 to continue construction at about the FY2015 level. DOE\u2019s FY2017 budget proposed to instead pursue a dilute and dispose (D&D) program. \nThe federal plutonium disposition program is run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency of DOE. NNSA estimated in 2002 that MFFF would cost about $1 billion to design and build. DOE said in its budget justification for FY2014 that the MFFF contractor had estimated the project\u2019s total construction cost would rise to $7.78 billion, and that construction would not be completed until November 2019. DOE\u2019s FY2015 budget justification said the life-cycle cost estimate for the MOX program had risen to $30 billion.\nDiffering sharply from the U.S. MOX strategy, Russia is planning to use its BN-600 and BN-800 fast breeder reactors for plutonium disposition. According to the World Nuclear Association, the BN-800 started producing electricity in 2015, and the reactor is \u201ccapable of burning 1.7 metric tons of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons.\u201d The DOE FY2015 through FY2018 budget requests included no funds for support of the Russian plutonium disposition program. \nThe debate over U.S. plutonium disposition strategy raises several issues for Congress. The Administration asserts that the rising cost estimates for MFFF are unsustainable in the current budget environment and proposes a different disposal method. The effects of alternative disposal options on DOE\u2019s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where MFFF is located, will also be an important element of the debate.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43125", "sha1": "a18a8b65f734cdf26d04f92af89eba96e5c5df67", "filename": "files/20171214_R43125_a18a8b65f734cdf26d04f92af89eba96e5c5df67.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43125", "sha1": "4d2f0c7c71f05e3ed9dc18b138da16e9d9cc67bf", "filename": "files/20171214_R43125_4d2f0c7c71f05e3ed9dc18b138da16e9d9cc67bf.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4840, "name": "Electricity" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4844, "name": "Waste Management & Cleanup" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 456362, "date": "2016-10-03", "retrieved": "2016-10-17T19:21:52.454834", "title": "Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues", "summary": "The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in South Carolina has been a key component of the current U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium from the Cold War. That strategy called for the surplus plutonium, in oxide form, to be blended with uranium oxide to make mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. The plutonium in MOX fuel would be mostly destroyed in the reactors by fission (splitting into other isotopes). At the same time, isotopes of plutonium undesirable for weapons would be created, along with highly radioactive fission products. As a result, after several years in a reactor, spent MOX fuel would have less total plutonium than when it was freshly loaded, and the remaining plutonium would be degraded for weapons purposes. Moreover, the fission products would make the material difficult to handle, in case of future attempts to use the plutonium.\nBecause of sharply rising cost estimates for the MOX project, the Obama Administration proposed to terminate the project in its FY2017 budget request. Starting with the FY2015 budget request, the Administration proposed placing MFFF in \u201ccold standby\u201d and studying other plutonium disposition options. However, Congress authorized and appropriated $345 million for FY2015 to continue construction at a reduced level and required the Department of Energy (DOE) to procure an independent cost and schedule estimate for MFFF and alternative disposition approaches. Pending the results of those analyses, DOE requested $340 million for FY2016 to continue construction at about the FY2015 level. DOE\u2019s FY2017 budget proposes to instead pursue a dilute and dispose (D&D) program. \nThe federal plutonium disposition program is run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency of DOE. NNSA estimated in 2002 that MFFF would cost about $1 billion to design and build. DOE said in its budget justification for FY2014 that the MFFF contractor had estimated the project\u2019s total construction cost would rise to $7.78 billion, and that construction would not be completed until November 2019. DOE\u2019s FY2015 budget justification said the life-cycle cost estimate for the MOX program had risen to $30 billion.\nDisposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and Russia. On October 3, 2016, the Russian president announced a decree that suspends Russian participation in the agreement due to \u201chostile actions\u201d by the United States. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed to begin plutonium disposition in 2018. After disposition began, the United States was to pay a maximum of $400 million to support the Russian plutonium disposition effort. The Russian government was to fund the remainder of Russia\u2019s approximately $2.5 billion in estimated costs. \nDiffering sharply from the U.S. MOX strategy, Russia is planning to use its BN-600 and BN-800 fast breeder reactors for plutonium disposition. According to the World Nuclear Association, the BN-800 started producing electricity in 2015, and the reactor is \u201ccapable of burning 1.7 metric tons of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons.\u201d The DOE FY2015 through FY2017 budget requests included no funds for support of the Russian plutonium disposition program. \nThe debate over U.S. plutonium disposition strategy raises several issues for Congress. The Administration asserts that the rising cost estimates for MFFF are unsustainable in the current budget environment and proposes a different disposal method. The effects of alternative disposal options on DOE\u2019s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where MFFF is located, will also be an important element of the debate. It is not yet clear how or whether Russian suspension will affect the U.S. strategy or congressional action.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43125", "sha1": "1614d4da6adb173cf3f17ccbd48ef36b53c94490", "filename": "files/20161003_R43125_1614d4da6adb173cf3f17ccbd48ef36b53c94490.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43125", "sha1": "4613d54e2a8580533ff2d23fbd9d69a852fdb7c8", "filename": "files/20161003_R43125_4613d54e2a8580533ff2d23fbd9d69a852fdb7c8.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4840, "name": "Electricity" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 453887, "date": "2016-06-21", "retrieved": "2016-09-09T19:20:52.143372", "title": "Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues", "summary": "The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in South Carolina has been a key component of the current U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium from the Cold War. That strategy called for the surplus plutonium, in oxide form, to be blended with uranium oxide to make mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. The plutonium in MOX fuel would be mostly destroyed in the reactors by fission (splitting into other isotopes). At the same time, isotopes of plutonium undesirable for weapons would be created, along with highly radioactive fission products. As a result, after several years in a reactor, spent MOX fuel would have less total plutonium than when it was freshly loaded, and the remaining plutonium would be degraded for weapons purposes. Moreover, the fission products would make the material difficult to handle, in case of future attempts to use the plutonium.\nBecause of sharply rising cost estimates for the MOX project, the Obama Administration proposed to terminate the project in its FY2017 budget request. Starting with the FY2015 budget request, the administration proposed placing MFFF in \u201ccold standby\u201d and studying other plutonium disposition options. However, Congress authorized and appropriated $345 million for FY2015 to continue construction at a reduced level and required the Department of Energy (DOE) to procure an independent cost and schedule estimate for MFFF and alternative disposition approaches. Pending the results of those analyses, DOE requested $340 million for FY2016 to continue construction at about the FY2015 level. DOE\u2019s FY2017 budget proposes to instead pursue a dilute and dispose (D&D) program. \nThe federal plutonium disposition program is run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency of DOE. NNSA estimated in 2002 that MFFF would cost about $1 billion to design and build. DOE said in its budget justification for FY2014 that the MFFF contractor had estimated the project\u2019s total construction cost would rise to $7.78 billion, and that construction would not be completed until November 2019. DOE\u2019s FY2015 budget justification said the life-cycle cost estimate for the MOX program had risen to $30 billion.\nDisposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and Russia. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed to begin plutonium disposition in 2018. After disposition begins, the United States is to pay a maximum of $400 million to support the Russian plutonium disposition effort. The Russian government is to fund the remainder of Russia\u2019s approximately $2.5 billion in estimated costs. \nDiffering sharply from the U.S. MOX strategy, Russia is planning to use its BN-600 and BN-800 fast breeder reactors for plutonium disposition. According to the World Nuclear Association, the BN-800 started producing electricity in 2015, and the reactor is \u201ccapable of burning 1.7 metric tons of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons.\u201d The DOE FY2015 through FY2017 budget requests included no funds for support of the Russian plutonium disposition program. \nThe debate over U.S. plutonium disposition strategy raises several issues for Congress. The Administration asserts that the rising cost estimates for MFFF are unsustainable in the current budget environment and proposes a different disposal method. However, any delay or major change to the program could affect the planned disposition of Russian weapons plutonium. The effects of alternative disposal options on DOE\u2019s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where MFFF is located, will also be an important element of the debate.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43125", "sha1": "d6d9bd8a7cda6de299236e721b7517dac7986043", "filename": "files/20160621_R43125_d6d9bd8a7cda6de299236e721b7517dac7986043.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43125", "sha1": "69440e4970cfdc3716452eb784a32c31d69e3a68", "filename": "files/20160621_R43125_69440e4970cfdc3716452eb784a32c31d69e3a68.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 2599, "name": "Nuclear Energy" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 3227, "name": "Proliferation and Arms Control" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4531, "name": "Defense Authorization" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 438769, "date": "2015-03-02", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T19:26:17.921565", "title": "Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues", "summary": "The Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in South Carolina has been a key component of the current U.S. strategy for disposing of surplus weapons plutonium from the Cold War. That strategy called for the surplus plutonium, in oxide form, to be blended with uranium oxide to make mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for U.S. commercial nuclear reactors. The plutonium in MOX fuel would be mostly destroyed in the reactors by fission (splitting into other isotopes). At the same time, isotopes of plutonium undesirable for weapons would be created, along with highly radioactive fission products. As a result, after several years in a reactor, spent MOX fuel would have less total plutonium than when it was freshly loaded, and the remaining plutonium would be degraded for weapons purposes. Moreover, the fission products would make the material difficult to handle, in case of future attempts to use the plutonium.\nBecause of sharply rising cost estimates for the MOX project, the Obama Administration proposed in its FY2015 budget request to place MFFF in \u201ccold standby\u201d and study other plutonium disposition options. However, Congress authorized and appropriated $345 million for FY2015 to continue construction at a reduced level and required the Department of Energy (DOE) to procure an independent cost and schedule estimate for MFFF and alternative disposition approaches. Pending the results of those analyses, DOE requested $345 million for FY2016 to continue construction at the FY2015 level.\nThe federal plutonium disposition program is run by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency of DOE. NNSA estimated in 2002 that MFFF would cost about $1 billion to design and build. DOE said in its budget justification for FY2014 that the MFFF contractor had estimated the project\u2019s total construction cost would rise to $7.78 billion, and that construction would not be completed until November 2019. DOE\u2019s FY2015 budget justification said the life-cycle cost estimate for the MOX program had risen to $30 billion.\nDisposition of surplus plutonium is required by a 1998 agreement, amended in 2010, between the United States and Russia. Each country agreed to convert 34 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed to begin plutonium disposition in 2018. After disposition begins, the United States is to pay a maximum of $400 million to support the Russian plutonium disposition effort. The Russian government is to fund the remainder of Russia\u2019s approximately $2.5 billion in estimated costs. \nDiffering sharply from the U.S. MOX strategy, Russia is planning to use its BN-600 and BN-800 fast breeder reactors for plutonium disposition. According to the World Nuclear Association, the BN-800 is expected to start up in 2015, and the reactor is \u201ccapable of burning 1.7 metric tons of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons.\u201d The DOE FY2015 and FY2016 budget requests included no funds for support of the Russian plutonium disposition program. As in FY2014 and FY2015, NNSA plans to use prior-year funds to support these activities in FY2016.\nThe debate over U.S. plutonium disposition strategy raises several issues for Congress. A fundamental question is whether the rising cost estimates for MFFF are sustainable in the current budget environment. And if the MFFF is not sustainable, what should replace it? However, any delay or major change to the program could affect the planned disposition of Russian weapons plutonium. The effects of alternative disposal options on DOE\u2019s Savannah River Site in South Carolina, where MFFF is located, will also be an important element of the debate.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43125", "sha1": "735fc38746542b2f6987fdb4dd6e2745109d75da", "filename": "files/20150302_R43125_735fc38746542b2f6987fdb4dd6e2745109d75da.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43125", "sha1": "bf3b40d9c180f5ade3e9141b41ab8a7c1cadad55", "filename": "files/20150302_R43125_bf3b40d9c180f5ade3e9141b41ab8a7c1cadad55.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 2599, "name": "Nuclear Energy" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 3227, "name": "Proliferation and Arms Control" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4531, "name": "Defense Authorization" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc284517/", "id": "R43125_2014Mar28", "date": "2014-03-28", "retrieved": "2014-05-06T21:21:54", "title": "Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Plant and Plutonium Disposition: Management and Policy Issues", "summary": "This report discusses the control of surplus nuclear weapons material that became an urgent U.S. foreign policy goal with the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20140328_R43125_bdafda2739f71d289a834158675728f95dc4c20b.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20140328_R43125_bdafda2739f71d289a834158675728f95dc4c20b.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear weapons", "name": "Nuclear weapons" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear weapons -- Russia", "name": "Nuclear weapons -- Russia" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Nuclear nonproliferation", "name": "Nuclear nonproliferation" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "International control of nuclear power", "name": "International control of nuclear power" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Energy Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }