{
  "id": "R43368",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R43368",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 427490,
      "date": "2014-01-24",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T23:10:01.140753",
      "title": "Contractors and HealthCare.gov: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions\t",
      "summary": "The widely reported problems with the rollout of the HealthCare.gov website\u2014the federal online health insurance portal called for by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) (P.L. 111-148, as amended)\u2014have prompted interest in the role that contractors played in developing this site. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relied upon the services of over 50 vendors to build the site, which was reportedly largely unusable when it first became available to the public on October 1, 2013, and has been the subject of ongoing work since then. \nGiven HealthCare.gov\u2019s problematic debut, questions have arisen about how CMS selected vendors to work on HealthCare.gov, and the terms of the vendors\u2019 contractual relationships with the government. For example, some have wondered how CMS could assign work to specific vendors without engaging in \u201cfull and open competition through the use of competitive procedures\u201d; whether there are any restrictions on agencies\u2019 dealings with vendors that have foreign parent corporations, as some HealthCare.gov vendors do; and whether political input plays a role in the source-selection process. There have also been questions about how to obtain copies of particular contracts; vendor obligations to report performance problems to the government; modifications to existing contracts; how parties to a government contract resolve disputes; and whether the government can get its money back. \nMost recently, questions have been raised about potential amendments to federal procurement law that could, some commentators suggest, prevent issues of the sort experienced with HealthCare.gov. HeathCare.gov\u2019s early difficulties are generally seen to have increased interest in the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) (H.R. 1232), which would, among other things, increase the authority of the top agency chief information officers. FITARA passed the House, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2014, prior to HealthCare.gov\u2019s rollout, but was not included in the NDAA as enacted (P.L. 113-66). Other measures have been introduced specifically in response to the rollout of HealthCare.gov (e.g., H.R. 3373, S. 1843). Yet other potential reforms have been suggested, but are not reflected in proposed legislation. Topics of such proposed reforms include consideration of risk and use of modular contracting methods when acquiring information technology (IT); performance bonds and express warranties; and use of lead system integrators (i.e., contractors responsible for assembling a system from components developed and/or tested by other vendors). \nThe questions in this report are those that happen to have been frequently asked of the Congressional Research Service by congressional staffers. The inclusion of a particular question, or the exclusion of another question, should not be taken to indicate that particular factors did\u2014or did not\u2014contribute to HealthCare.gov\u2019s problematic debut. In addition, answers to these questions must often be provided in general terms, in part, because specific language in the parties\u2019 contracts may be subject to multiple interpretations and has not been construed by any court. In addition, the parties\u2019 conduct in performing the contract\u2014the details of which are generally still emerging\u2014can affect their rights. For example, the government could potentially be found to have waived certain rights that the contract\u2019s plain language would appear to grant to it by engaging in conduct that warrants an inference that it has relinquished the right. The authors of this report rely upon third-party investigations of the facts and circumstances surrounding HealthCare.gov, and additional information may emerge regarding topics discussed herein.\nThere is also a video, CRS WVB00013, Contractors and HealthCare.gov: Background in Brief, by L. Elaine Halchin and Kate M. Manuel, that addresses certain of these questions.",
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  "topics": [
    "National Defense"
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}