{ "id": "R43719", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R43719", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 442254, "date": "2015-06-08", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T18:58:28.316622", "title": "Campaign Finance: Constitutionality of Limits on Contributions and Expenditures", "summary": "The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that \u201cCongress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.\u201d This provision limits the government\u2019s power to restrict speech. In 1976, the Supreme Court issued its landmark campaign finance ruling in Buckley v. Valeo. In Buckley, the Court determined that limits on campaign contributions, which involve giving money to an entity, and expenditures, which involve spending money directly for electoral advocacy, implicate rights of political expression and association under the First Amendment. In view of the fact that contributions and expenditures facilitate speech, the Court concluded, they cannot be regulated as mere conduct.\nThe Court in Buckley, however, afforded different degrees of First Amendment protection to contributions and expenditures. Contribution limits are subject to more lenient review because they impose only a marginal restriction on speech, and will be upheld if the government can demonstrate that they are a \u201cclosely drawn\u201d means of achieving a \u201csufficiently important\u201d governmental interest. On the other hand, expenditure limits are subject to strict scrutiny because they impose a substantial restraint on speech. That is, limits on expenditures must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Therefore, in Buckley and its progeny, the Court has generally upheld limits on contributions, finding that they serve the governmental interest of protecting elections from corruption, while invalidating limits on independent expenditures, finding that they do not pose a risk of corruption. Importantly, the Court\u2019s recent case law has announced that only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance constitute a sufficiently important governmental interest to justify limits on contributions and expenditures. Although the Supreme Court\u2019s campaign finance jurisprudence has shifted over the years, the basic Buckley framework has generally been applied when determining whether a campaign finance limit violates the First Amendment. \nThis report discusses current Supreme Court and other case law evaluating the constitutionality of limits on contributions and expenditures. For example, while the Court has generally upheld reasonable limits on contributions, it has invalidated them when it found that they were too low, prohibited minors age 17 or under from contributing, and after determining that aggregate contribution limits serve as a complete ban once the aggregate amount has been reached. The Court has also ruled that a series of staggered increases in contribution limits for candidates whose opponents significantly self-finance their campaigns are unconstitutional. An appellate court has held that limits on contributions to groups making only independent expenditures are unconstitutional, which resulted in the creation of super PACs. Cases including McConnell, Davis, SpeechNow.org, McCutcheon, and Williams-Yulee are examined.\nThe Supreme Court has overturned limits on candidate expenditures, including limits on candidates using personal wealth to finance campaigns, as well as on independent expenditures by political parties. Further, the Court has held that requiring parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures after nominating a candidate is unconstitutional because it burdens the right of parties to make unlimited independent expenditures. On the other hand, the Court has upheld limits on party coordinated expenditures because they are functionally similar to contributions. The Court has also invalidated a long-standing prohibition on corporations, and it appears labor unions, using treasury funds for independent expenditures, finding that regardless of the speaker being a corporation, such expenditures are protected speech. Cases including Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, Randall, Wisconsin Right to Life, and Citizens United are discussed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43719", "sha1": "8a13a8ffdc132779bdf3ff1a1e0c439156f7c877", "filename": "files/20150608_R43719_8a13a8ffdc132779bdf3ff1a1e0c439156f7c877.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43719", "sha1": "111ead3fd5d403c3c178b823cfdc1502d83b97cd", "filename": "files/20150608_R43719_111ead3fd5d403c3c178b823cfdc1502d83b97cd.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 529, "name": "Campaign Finance" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc812379/", "id": "R43719_2014Sep04", "date": "2014-09-04", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Campaign Finance: Constitutionality of Limits on Contributions and Expenditures", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20140904_R43719_ec1871c51cef56c9090c47d003fa679e69ece9f5.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20140904_R43719_ec1871c51cef56c9090c47d003fa679e69ece9f5.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Constitutional Questions" ] }