{ "id": "R43813", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "R", "number": "R43813", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "retrieved": "2022-01-13T04:03:31.639613", "id": "R43813_30_2021-12-16", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2021-12-16_R43813_09127fb75e2c5c80e53f4f7731b5f87d038f1c99.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43813/30", "sha1": "09127fb75e2c5c80e53f4f7731b5f87d038f1c99" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-12-16_R43813_09127fb75e2c5c80e53f4f7731b5f87d038f1c99.html" } ], "date": "2021-12-16", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R43813", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "retrieved": "2022-01-13T04:03:31.635941", "id": "R43813_26_2020-10-26", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2020-10-26_R43813_683607d890a66045050db7b0fc9598113100b6f1.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43813/26", "sha1": "683607d890a66045050db7b0fc9598113100b6f1" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2020-10-26_R43813_683607d890a66045050db7b0fc9598113100b6f1.html" } ], "date": "2020-10-26", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R43813", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 610579, "date": "2019-11-29", "retrieved": "2019-12-13T15:09:24.260409", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Colombia, a key Latin American ally, endured half a century of internal armed conflict. Drug trafficking fueled the violence, funding left- and right-wing armed groups. Some analysts feared in the 1990s that Colombia would become a failed state, but the Colombian government devised a novel security strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the insurgencies. Plan Colombia and follow-on programs ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. The partnership initially focused on counternarcotics and later included counterterrorism. When fully implemented, it also included sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and other areas of cooperation. \nCongress appropriated more than $10 billion for Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs between FY2000 and FY2016, about 20% of which was funded through the U.S. Department of Defense. Since 2017, Congress has provided nearly $1.2 billion in additional assistance for Colombia. For FY2019, Congress appropriated $418.1 million in foreign aid for Colombia, which encompassed efforts to promote peace and reconciliation, assist rural communities, and continue counternarcotics support through the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Congress has signed two continuing resolutions for FY2020 appropriations, with FY2020 aid levels set to match FY2019 levels through late December 2019.\nPeace Accord Forged But Remains Polarizing\nPresident Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) primarily focused on concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)\u2014the country\u2019s largest leftist guerrilla organization. Following four years of negotiations, Colombia\u2019s Congress ratified the peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, some 13,000 FARC disarmed, including combatants, militia members, and others deemed eligible to demobilize.\nIn August 2018, Iv\u00e1n Duque, a former senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term. He campaigned as a critic of the peace accord. His party objected to measures concerning justice and political representation of the FARC after its demobilization. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN)\u2014Colombia\u2019s second-largest rebel group\u2014which had begun under Santos. \nContinuing Challenges\nMany consider Plan Colombia and its successor strategies to have significantly improved Colombia\u2019s security and economic stability. Nevertheless, recent developments threaten the country\u2019s progress. The FARC\u2019s demobilization and abandonment of illegal activities have triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), who seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit businesses. In August 2019, a FARC splinter faction, which included the former lead FARC negotiator of the peace accord, announced its return to arms. In response, Venezuela appears to be sheltering and perhaps collaborating with FARC dissidents and ELN fighters, a development of grave concerns to the U.S. and Colombian governments.\nColombia faces major challenges, including a sharp increase of coca cultivation and cocaine production; vulnerability to a mass migration of Venezuelans fleeing the authoritarian government of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro; and a spike in attacks on human rights defenders, including social leaders implementing peace accord programs. As of September 2019, 1.4 million Venezuelans were residing in Colombia. Neighboring Venezuela\u2019s upheaval increased after the United States and several other nations, including Colombia, called for a democratic transition and recognized Juan Guaid\u00f3 as Venezuela\u2019s interim president; as of late 2019 Guaid\u00f3 and his supporters have not dislodged Maduro. Since FY2017, the U.S. State Department has allocated more than $400 million to support countries receiving Venezuelan migrants, with over half (almost $215 million in U.S. humanitarian and development assistance) for Colombia, as the most severely affected nation. \nThe United States remains Colombia\u2019s top trading partner. Colombia\u2019s economy grew by 2.6% in 2018 and is forecast to grow by more than 3% in 2019, with foreign direct investment also on the rise. For additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia\u2019s 2018 Elections, CRS Report R42982, Colombia\u2019s Peace Process Through 2016, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43813", "sha1": "384d3a6e05644224f9639f218f382a72cc70ea57", "filename": "files/20191129_R43813_384d3a6e05644224f9639f218f382a72cc70ea57.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/1.png": "files/20191129_R43813_images_d9adcb67cf4724589548c86f4f10e399b2199cb0.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/2.png": "files/20191129_R43813_images_2724696b9e72b1cfc2178a991b3c0275b8c6886f.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/3.png": "files/20191129_R43813_images_947559e7dee7d671a36a26f98ac70c8762ea3474.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/0.png": "files/20191129_R43813_images_e11068a0324245cfc7bff48370cf46629487738b.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43813", "sha1": "b1db9f2497bf250ac7ae232b986135783418c300", "filename": "files/20191129_R43813_b1db9f2497bf250ac7ae232b986135783418c300.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 591207, "date": "2019-02-08", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T14:21:02.961592", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "A key U.S. ally in the Latin American region, Colombia endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. Some analysts feared Colombia would become a failed state in the late 1990s, but the Colombian government devised a new security strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the insurgencies. Originally designed as a 6-year program, Plan Colombia ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. The partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism; it then broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to help fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $391.3 million in foreign aid for Colombia, including assistance to promote peace and end the conflict.\nPresident Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)\u2014the country\u2019s largest leftist guerrilla organization\u2014his government\u2019s primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia\u2019s Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 11,000 FARC disarmed and demobilized. This figure included FARC who had been held in prison for crimes of rebellion and those making up FARC militias, who were accredited by the Colombian government as eligible to demobilize.\nOn August 7, 2018, Iv\u00e1n Duque, a senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term. Duque, who also worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC, and is Colombia\u2019s youngest president in a century, campaigned as a critic of the peace accord with the FARC. His party objected to specific measures concerning justice and political representation. Some observers maintain that his election has generated uncertainty for implementation of the accord. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country\u2019s second-largest rebel group, which had begun under President Santos. \nSince the ratification of the peace accord, Colombia\u2019s long-term strategy has evolved from defeating insurgents to post-conflict stabilization. Many considered Plan Colombia and its successor strategies a remarkable advance, given the country\u2019s improvements in security and economic stability. Nevertheless, recent developments have called into question Colombia\u2019s progress. The FARC\u2019s demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), which seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit businesses that the demobilized FARC abandoned. The ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas recalls the conditions that originally gave rise to the FARC and other armed groups.\nMany observers continue to raise concerns about the country\u2019s human-rights conditions, sharp increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and problems stemming from the failing authoritarian government of neighboring Venezuela, which shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with Colombia. Venezuela\u2019s humanitarian crisis has set in motion an exodus of migrants, many of whom have sought temporary residence (or extended stays) in Colombia. Political upheaval has added yet more uncertainty after the United States and many other Western Hemisphere and European nations, including Colombia, called for a democratic transition in Venezuela and recognized the president of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaid\u00f3, as the country\u2019s interim president in January 2019.\nThe U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement went into force in May 2012. The United States remains Colombia\u2019s top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia grew by an estimated 2.7% in 2018. The FARC-government peace accord is projected to cost more than $40 billion to implement over 15 years, adding to the polarization over the controversial peace process. \nFor additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia\u2019s 2018 Elections, CRS Report R44779, Colombia\u2019s Changing Approach to Drug Policy, CRS Report R42982, Colombia\u2019s Peace Process Through 2016, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43813", "sha1": "f8b1296a021224b71b1ee625ba5c980c536b162d", "filename": "files/20190208_R43813_f8b1296a021224b71b1ee625ba5c980c536b162d.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190208_R43813_images_d9adcb67cf4724589548c86f4f10e399b2199cb0.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/2.png": "files/20190208_R43813_images_ddb027db3764fa811c12d33866752d60fdbe6d83.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/3.png": "files/20190208_R43813_images_1da86cee8525e5a52e669efb7c6c7b799e599bde.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190208_R43813_images_fb72680b6d4bfbb2f2b322f81145ac62f6cd7206.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43813", "sha1": "9758abc0f91e1daea9f6a526ebe6ea1858d0d4e8", "filename": "files/20190208_R43813_9758abc0f91e1daea9f6a526ebe6ea1858d0d4e8.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 588883, "date": "2018-12-14", "retrieved": "2018-12-19T13:58:56.515847", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "A key U.S. ally in the Latin American region, Colombia endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. Some analysts feared Colombia would become a failed state in the late 1990s, but the Colombian government devised a new security strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to counter the insurgencies. Originally designed as a 6-year program, Plan Colombia ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. The partnership focused initially on counternarcotics and later on counterterrorism; it then broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to help fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $391.3 million in foreign aid for Colombia, including assistance to promote peace and end the conflict.\nPresident Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)\u2014the country\u2019s largest leftist guerrilla organization\u2014his government\u2019s primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia\u2019s Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 11,000 FARC disarmed and demobilized. This figure included FARC who had been held in prison for crimes of rebellion and those making up FARC militias, who were accredited by the Colombian government as eligible to demobilize.\nOn August 7, 2018, Iv\u00e1n Duque, a senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term. Duque, who also worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC, and is Colombia\u2019s youngest president in a century, campaigned as a critic of the peace accord with the FARC. His party objected to specific measures concerning justice and political representation. Some observers maintain that his election has generated uncertainty for implementation of the accord. Shortly after taking office, Duque suspended peace talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), the country\u2019s second-largest rebel group, which had begun under President Santos. \nSince the ratification of the peace accord, Colombia\u2019s long-term strategy has evolved from defeating insurgents to post-conflict stabilization. Many considered Plan Colombia and its successor strategies a remarkable advance, given the country\u2019s improvements in security and economic stability. Nevertheless, recent developments have called into question Colombia\u2019s progress. The FARC\u2019s demobilization has triggered open conflict among armed actors (including FARC dissidents and transnational criminal groups), which seek to control drug cultivation and trafficking, illegal mining, and other illicit businesses that the demobilized FARC abandoned. The ongoing lack of governance in remote rural areas recalls the conditions that originally gave rise to the FARC and other armed groups.\nMany observers continue to raise concerns about the country\u2019s human-rights conditions, sharp increases in coca cultivation and cocaine production, and problems stemming from the failing authoritarian government of neighboring Venezuela, which shares a nearly 1,400-mile border with Colombia. Venezuela\u2019s humanitarian crisis has set in motion an exodus of migrants, many of whom have sought temporary residence (or extended stays) in Colombia. Government services in many receiving communities have been stretched thin, and some analysts foresee conflict between Venezuelan arrivals and Colombians living in remote or marginal areas.\nThe U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement went into force in May 2012. The United States remains Colombia\u2019s top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia grew by 1.8% in 2017 and is forecast to grow by 2.7% in 2018. The FARC-government peace accord is projected to cost more than $40 billion to implement over 15 years, adding to the polarization over the controversial peace process. \nFor additional background, see CRS In Focus IF10817, Colombia\u2019s 2018 Elections, CRS Report R44779, Colombia\u2019s Changing Approach to Drug Policy, CRS Report R42982, Colombia\u2019s Peace Process Through 2016, and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43813", "sha1": "8717f5a53644ca954769af082feababa67feb934", "filename": "files/20181214_R43813_8717f5a53644ca954769af082feababa67feb934.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/1.png": "files/20181214_R43813_images_d9adcb67cf4724589548c86f4f10e399b2199cb0.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/2.png": "files/20181214_R43813_images_ddb027db3764fa811c12d33866752d60fdbe6d83.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/3.png": "files/20181214_R43813_images_1da86cee8525e5a52e669efb7c6c7b799e599bde.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/0.png": "files/20181214_R43813_images_fb72680b6d4bfbb2f2b322f81145ac62f6cd7206.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43813", "sha1": "7ca78e0d52802ed33b8ae800ea031c880de54cea", "filename": "files/20181214_R43813_7ca78e0d52802ed33b8ae800ea031c880de54cea.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 576150, "date": "2017-11-14", "retrieved": "2018-05-10T12:07:26.598111", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin America, with roughly 49 million inhabitants. A key U.S. ally in the region, Colombia endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking has fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. In the late 1990s, some analysts feared Colombia\u2014threatened by a multisided, violent conflict\u2014would become a failed state. The Colombian government defied those predictions, however, through an evolving security strategy known as Plan Colombia. Originally designed as a six-year program, Plan Colombia ultimately became a 17-year U.S.-Colombian bilateral effort. \nColombia\u2019s current President Juan Manuel Santos, first elected in 2010, has made achieving peace the central goal of his two terms in office. To implement his goal, the Colombian government engaged in intense, formal peace talks from 2012 to 2016 with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest of Colombia\u2019s rebel groups, culminating in a peace accord approved in November 2016 by the Colombian congress. The Santos government launched formal peace talks in February 2017 with the country\u2019s second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), which agreed to a three-month ceasefire starting in October 2017. Despite this headway, Santos\u2019s peace legacy inside Colombia remains controversial. With his term ending in August 2018, following congressional and presidential elections, the future for consolidating peace remains uncertain.\nPresident Santos has continued the market-oriented economic policies of prior administrations. During his first term, the U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which went into force in May 2012. The United States remains Colombia\u2019s top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the strongest and steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia\u2019s growth rate declined to 2% in 2016 and is expected to be even lower in 2017. The FARC-government peace accord alone is projected to cost more than $40 billion over 15 years, adding to the polarization over the controversial peace accord in the midst of low to modest growth.\nThe U.S.-Colombian partnership initially focused on counternarcotics and later counterterrorism and has since broadened to include sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Some observers maintain that Colombian-citizen investment, through a security tax, and the commitment and vision of the country\u2019s leaders were critical to the plan\u2019s success. The government\u2019s long-term strategy has evolved from defeating insurgents to post-conflict stabilization. \nMany considered Plan Colombia and its successor strategies a remarkable advance, although recent developments have sparked renewed criticism. Despite Colombia\u2019s success in improving security and economic stability, many observers continue to raise concerns about the country\u2019s human-rights conditions and sharply rising cocaine exports destined mainly for the U.S. market. Those exports were estimated by U.S. authorities to exceed 900 metric tons of export-quality cocaine in 2016, the highest level ever recorded. On September 13, 2017, President Trump cited the recent spike in Colombia\u2019s cocaine production as the reason he was reserving the option to decertify Colombia as a cooperating partner in fighting illegal drugs, the first time such a move was considered in more than 20 years. \nColombia and the United States have had one of the closest partnerships in the Western Hemisphere. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. The FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure provided close to $300 million foreign aid from the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. In FY2017, U.S. assistance expanded to focus on implementation of the new peace accord with the FARC, an effort called Peace Colombia. In May 2017, Congress passed an omnibus appropriations measure, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), which essentially funded Peace Colombia at $391.3 million. The Trump Administration\u2019s proposed foreign aid for Colombia in FY2018 would reduce assistance to $251 million. The House passed an omnibus appropriations bill for FY2018 (H.R. 3354) that would fund bilateral programs for Colombia at $335.9 million. The Senate\u2019s Appropriations Committee\u2019s foreign aid bill for FY2018 would provide $391.3 million for Colombia, the same amount appropriated in FY2017.\nThis report analyzes the political and economic conditions in Colombia and examines major issues in U.S.-Colombian relations. For additional background, see CRS Report R42982, Colombia\u2019s Peace Process Through 2016, by June S. Beittel and CRS Report R44779, Colombia\u2019s Changing Approach to Drug Policy, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43813", "sha1": "f5a8106524ad481d387de8a7cb2e86d46c2c4254", "filename": "files/20171114_R43813_f5a8106524ad481d387de8a7cb2e86d46c2c4254.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/1.png": "files/20171114_R43813_images_7dc43f401210018ac0f0f7e7ef8c36f075a6aaa3.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/2.png": "files/20171114_R43813_images_1f920285db67c4a1ff54eb05251f8ad5bce246a1.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R43813_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171114_R43813_images_ddff9cf8a27ab5df874ba20e4d6346a23fc18cbc.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43813", "sha1": "130cd365ec87d3c04ab916dc7b4f689d7a747491", "filename": "files/20171114_R43813_130cd365ec87d3c04ab916dc7b4f689d7a747491.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 449820, "date": "2016-02-05", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T17:16:33.072158", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Colombia is the third-most-populous country in Latin America, with roughly 47 million inhabitants. A key U.S. ally in the region, Colombia has endured an internal armed conflict for half a century. Drug trafficking has fueled the violence by funding both left-wing and right-wing armed groups. In the late 1990s, some analysts feared Colombia\u2014threatened by a multi-sided, violent conflict\u2014would become a failed state. The Colombian government countered those predictions, however, through an evolving security strategy known as Plan Colombia, originally a six-year program, but now generally applied to Colombian initiatives carried out over 16 years in close cooperation with the United States.\nFocused initially on counternarcotics, and later counterterrorism, the partnership of Plan Colombia has broadened to include more robust efforts for sustainable development, human rights, trade, regional security, and many other areas of cooperation. Some observers maintain that citizen investment in Colombia\u2019s recovery, through such means as a security tax, and the commitment of the country\u2019s leaders were critical to the Plan\u2019s success. The government\u2019s long-term strategy has moved from defeating insurgents in combat and consolidating the government\u2019s gains with its \u201cwhole-of-government\u201d approach to a new stage of preparing for an anticipated post-conflict period. Colombia has achieved significant gains in citizen security and economic stability. Despite its progress, many observers continue to raise concerns about human rights conditions in the country.\nCurrent President Juan Manuel Santos, first elected in 2010, launched peace talks in 2012 with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the country\u2019s main leftist insurgent group and Latin America\u2019s best-financed guerrilla organization. Although previous negotiations with the FARC had failed, this effort with a militarily diminished FARC has endured over three years and more than 45 rounds of talks. By the end of 2015, negotiators had resolved four topics in a six-point agenda. In September 2015, negotiators announced that both teams had reached a mutually agreed deadline for signature on a final accord of March 23, 2016, and a breakthrough on transitional justice and victims\u2019 reparations that was finalized in December 2015. The remaining issues to be settled include the terms for a bilateral ceasefire and other steps to definitively end the conflict, and how the accord will be approved and verified. If the negotiating teams meet the spring 2016 deadline\u2014a goal that many continue to see as ambitious\u2014a plebiscite potentially would be held to sanction the accord. The FARC, however, has objected to this method to ratify the deal.\nColombia and the United States have one of the closest partnerships in the Western Hemisphere. Between FY2000 and FY2016, the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $10 billion to fund Plan Colombia and its follow-on programs. However, since FY2008, with the tightening of foreign aid budgets and the planned nationalization of Plan Colombia-related programs by the Colombian government, U.S. assistance levels have declined. In the FY2016 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 114-113), foreign aid from the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development amounted to about $300 million, nearly identical to the estimated level in FY2015. If a peace accord is concluded, Members of Congress may have to consider whether aid should be increased or distributed differently. For some, building a sustainable peace in Colombia may require U.S. support for land restitution, aid to conflict victims, and efforts to fully bring the Colombian government into formerly lawless areas. On the other hand, some observers, weighing the global demands for U.S. assistance, could determine that Colombia, as a middle income country with considerable capacity, could undertake such reconstruction activities on its own.\nPresident Santos has continued the market-oriented, economic policies of prior administrations. During his first term, the U.S. Congress approved the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement, which went into force in April 2012. The United States remains Colombia\u2019s top trade partner. After several years of annual growth exceeding 4%, one of the strongest and steadiest expansion rates in the region, Colombia\u2019s growth rate declined to slightly less than 3% in 2015 by most estimates. The decline is largely attributed to lower earnings from energy exports, as Colombia is Latin America\u2019s fourth-largest oil producer. Colombia\u2019s uneven development, continued high levels of rural poverty, and concentrated land ownership have contributed to internal conflict. Precise costs of any post-peace accord development remain uncertain.\nIn 2016, the chance that the Colombian public may approve a peace deal has raised expectations of the potential benefits of ending the half-century armed conflict. The effort to demobilize the FARC and begin their eventual reintegration into Colombian society was spurred in January 2016 by the U.N. Security Council vote to send a monitoring team to oversee disarmament activities if a peace accord is signed. A campaign to block approval of a peace accord by former president \u00c1lvaro Uribe, his followers, and other peace accord opponents makes it difficult to predict how or if a peace accord will ultimately be ratified. Some observers warn of several other obstacles to a sustainable peace that still remain. However, the proposed foreign assistance program announced by the Obama Administration in early February known as Paz Colombia suggests that the U.S. government is optimistic that the accord will take effect. On February 4, 2016, President Obama met with President Santos at the White House and called for a new era of partnership between the two nations.\nThis report analyzes the political and economic conditions in Colombia and examines major issues in U.S.-Colombian relations that are of interest to Congress. See also CRS Report R42982, Peace Talks in Colombia.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43813", "sha1": "8d7bedfa22d8624a24fececcea3f76a0a49673bd", "filename": "files/20160205_R43813_8d7bedfa22d8624a24fececcea3f76a0a49673bd.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43813", "sha1": "45909d44e336402981ebc00413ac1b6f3e12d154", "filename": "files/20160205_R43813_45909d44e336402981ebc00413ac1b6f3e12d154.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 281, "name": "Latin America and the Caribbean" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc805901/", "id": "R43813_2014Dec08", "date": "2014-12-08", "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26", "title": "Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": null, "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20141208_R43813_45017e6ec99b47a02a75333587e7a11513d411ba.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20141208_R43813_45017e6ec99b47a02a75333587e7a11513d411ba.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "Latin American Affairs", "National Defense" ] }