{ "id": "R43832", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R43832", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, CRSReports.Congress.gov, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 603310, "date": "2019-08-02", "retrieved": "2019-08-12T22:10:02.788336", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km.\u201d In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia\u2019s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia\u2019s noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019. Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well. The treaty lapsed on August 2, 2019, six months after the United States submitted its notice of withdrawal.\nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program, and to debate funding for U.S. military responses. This report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "63adb0c9a3f2a3e593fb55907d0167be2b199ac8", "filename": "files/20190802_R43832_63adb0c9a3f2a3e593fb55907d0167be2b199ac8.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "fdb83c27fde53db213a5d860308500bf63015fcb", "filename": "files/20190802_R43832_fdb83c27fde53db213a5d860308500bf63015fcb.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 601461, "date": "2019-06-27", "retrieved": "2019-07-02T22:04:42.476795", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km.\u201d In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia\u2019s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia\u2019s noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019. Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well.\nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches. This report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "c86cbaac1f6e0c0e84d753006ec1348e4b6181ef", "filename": "files/20190627_R43832_c86cbaac1f6e0c0e84d753006ec1348e4b6181ef.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "7b6a724b056d93583f65efa0f25a635276a78753", "filename": "files/20190627_R43832_7b6a724b056d93583f65efa0f25a635276a78753.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 591142, "date": "2019-02-08", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T14:21:15.241118", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979 in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles. NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km.\u201d In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. Russia repeatedly denied that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia\u2019s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia\u2019s noncompliance as a key factor in that decision. The United States suspended its participation in the treaty and submitted its official notice of withdrawal February 2, 2019. Russia responded by suspending its participation on February 2, 2019, as well.\nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches. This report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "73df41b3dfd5716f0b510f385b41cb88e19788d2", "filename": "files/20190208_R43832_73df41b3dfd5716f0b510f385b41cb88e19788d2.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "83251a8946e8f82b7f59f9d5a895889a8c8af3c0", "filename": "files/20190208_R43832_83251a8946e8f82b7f59f9d5a895889a8c8af3c0.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "retrieved": "2020-09-05T09:14:16.816089", "id": "R43832_31_2019-01-18", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2019-01-18_R43832_8b8eea5687ccf3034c30683916a881e5f8e98b7d.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43832/31", "sha1": "8b8eea5687ccf3034c30683916a881e5f8e98b7d" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2019-01-18_R43832_8b8eea5687ccf3034c30683916a881e5f8e98b7d.html" } ], "date": "2019-01-18", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R43832", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 588358, "date": "2018-12-07", "retrieved": "2018-12-11T14:15:03.311209", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d In late 2017, the United States released the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. The United States has also noted that Russia has deployed several battalions with the missile. In late 2018, the Office of the Director for National Intelligence provided further details on the violation.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia\u2019s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia\u2019s noncompliance as a key factor in that decision.\nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.\nThis report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "e62e53d2715aa47d6fbd2fa99a40bdf829df218a", "filename": "files/20181207_R43832_e62e53d2715aa47d6fbd2fa99a40bdf829df218a.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "fe212fe2b9ba1870cb44be9e8db97dca51e9247b", "filename": "files/20181207_R43832_fe212fe2b9ba1870cb44be9e8db97dca51e9247b.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 587138, "date": "2018-10-29", "retrieved": "2018-11-02T13:14:15.884618", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The 2017 and 2018 compliance reports describe the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, including, in 2018, the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. Press reports also indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia\u2019s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. On October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from INF, citing Russia\u2019s noncompliance as a key factor in that decision.\nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.\nThis report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "7d86aceb85e572ab6b1414a0ccf9dbf63e8577d4", "filename": "files/20181029_R43832_7d86aceb85e572ab6b1414a0ccf9dbf63e8577d4.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "d5184dfb9a1159ae6ba11b4f723cc35eec35eb1f", "filename": "files/20181029_R43832_d5184dfb9a1159ae6ba11b4f723cc35eec35eb1f.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 586144, "date": "2018-10-05", "retrieved": "2018-10-05T22:05:42.630818", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The 2017 and 2018 compliance reports describe the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, including, in 2018, the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. Press reports also indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia\u2019s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.\nThis report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "79530714076e85b89f7544c26184755cf5fd9039", "filename": "files/20181005_R43832_79530714076e85b89f7544c26184755cf5fd9039.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "8bdd2884feaaedfe1248528a1079a9d3ce6ad08f", "filename": "files/20181005_R43832_8bdd2884feaaedfe1248528a1079a9d3ce6ad08f.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 584092, "date": "2018-04-25", "retrieved": "2018-08-27T15:17:33.194836", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The 2017 and 2018 compliance reports describe the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, including, in 2018, the Russian designator for the missile\u20149M729. Press reports also indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings since 2013. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. A second SVC meeting was held in December 2017. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new land-based INF-range systems or new sea-launched cruise missiles, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe Trump Administration conducted an extensive review of the INF Treaty during 2017 to assess the potential security implications of Russia\u2019s violation and to determine how the United States would respond going forward. On December 8, 2017\u2014the 30th anniversary of the date when the treaty was signed\u2014the Administration announced that the United States would implement an integrated response that included diplomatic, military, and economic measures. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.\nThis report will be updated as needed.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "913fb9033bb4e7df8942606317409c8919d8787c", "filename": "files/20180425_R43832_913fb9033bb4e7df8942606317409c8919d8787c.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "1a381ee69550b40c8c6e44af4b377d8a09d5c023", "filename": "files/20180425_R43832_1a381ee69550b40c8c6e44af4b377d8a09d5c023.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 576210, "date": "2017-12-06", "retrieved": "2017-12-07T14:05:23.993169", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The 2017 compliance report describes the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, but it does not share the details of that claim in the report. Press reports from February 2017 indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new INF-range systems, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond now that Russia has begun to deploy new INF-range cruise missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense.\nThe Trump Administration has not yet identified a path forward for the INF Treaty, although Secretary of Defense Mattis did address it during his nomination hearing. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "d0c16b46481a1342b3b8ce7ef790ba92c039eff5", "filename": "files/20171206_R43832_d0c16b46481a1342b3b8ce7ef790ba92c039eff5.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "b1e8d741d04c49596bf6006aebdc503450d553ce", "filename": "files/20171206_R43832_b1e8d741d04c49596bf6006aebdc503450d553ce.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 573802, "date": "2017-10-04", "retrieved": "2017-10-06T12:49:13.483606", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The 2017 compliance report describes the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, but it does not share the details of that claim in the report. Press reports from February 2017 indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new INF-range systems, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond now that Russia has begun to deploy new INF-range cruise missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense.\nThe Trump Administration has not yet identified a path forward for the INF Treaty, although Secretary of Defense Mattis did address it during his nomination hearing. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "faa34358384c41beef2387ea417abe48c85498de", "filename": "files/20171004_R43832_faa34358384c41beef2387ea417abe48c85498de.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "d32b2f753c858cd7de6804880747bd3dc60f74ec", "filename": "files/20171004_R43832_d32b2f753c858cd7de6804880747bd3dc60f74ec.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 460809, "date": "2017-04-28", "retrieved": "2017-08-22T14:58:23.061249", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The 2017 compliance report describes the types of information the United States has provided to Russia in pressing its claim of noncompliance, but it does not share the details of that claim in the report. Press reports from February 2017 indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new INF-range systems, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond now that Russia has begun to deploy new INF-range cruise missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense.\nThe Trump Administration has not yet identified a path forward for the INF Treaty, although Secretary of Defense Mattis did address it during his nomination hearing. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "0c03a00d6fd55cbed52dc95713a4102533783b8b", "filename": "files/20170428_R43832_0c03a00d6fd55cbed52dc95713a4102533783b8b.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "bd215d5f5cb868b9fa20e319de32a56c1f7fd297", "filename": "files/20170428_R43832_bd215d5f5cb868b9fa20e319de32a56c1f7fd297.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 459672, "date": "2017-03-15", "retrieved": "2017-03-22T18:28:01.770577", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The compliance reports did not offer further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. Press reports from February 2017 indicate that Russia has now begun to deploy the new cruise missile.\nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings made little progress because Russia continued to deny that it had violated the treaty. In October 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new INF-range systems, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond now that Russia has begun to deploy new INF-range cruise missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense.\nThe Trump Administration has not yet identified a path forward for the INF Treaty, although Secretary of Defense Mattis did address it during his nomination hearing. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "a67bac40cb2b6d4781cf226f9ca6613f9dfc6719", "filename": "files/20170315_R43832_a67bac40cb2b6d4781cf226f9ca6613f9dfc6719.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "f02bc1f6d3c3e472c0c1175dc67617767882e7d8", "filename": "files/20170315_R43832_f02bc1f6d3c3e472c0c1175dc67617767882e7d8.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 458487, "date": "2017-01-27", "retrieved": "2017-02-03T19:11:25.993892", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The compliance reports do not offer further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. \nThe Obama Administration raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings have made little progress because Russia continues to deny that it has violated the treaty. The United States could pursue a number of options that might move the diplomatic process forward and possibly lead to a resolution of the issue. In October 2016, it called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns. During this meeting, in mid-November, both sides raised their concerns, but they failed to make any progress in resolving them. The United States has also begun to consider a number of military responses, which might include new INF-range systems, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond if Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty and deploys new INF-range missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense. \nThe Trump Administration has not yet identified a path forward for the INF Treaty, although Secretary of Defense Mattis did address it during his nomination hearing. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "ee825ded79761d90d04cd87fb6bdcb8dc4f3990d", "filename": "files/20170127_R43832_ee825ded79761d90d04cd87fb6bdcb8dc4f3990d.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "2689aa11e78983eee09bc2e06b11966d8c015116", "filename": "files/20170127_R43832_2689aa11e78983eee09bc2e06b11966d8c015116.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 456631, "date": "2016-10-20", "retrieved": "2016-10-25T21:12:49.306127", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The compliance reports do not offer further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. \nThe United States has raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings have made little progress because Russia continues to deny that it has violated the treaty. The United States could pursue a number of options that might move the diplomatic process forward and possibly lead to a resolution of the issue. It could call a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns, so that both sides could raise their concerns and explain their programs. It could begin studies and research into new INF-range systems, which is permitted by the treaty, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond if Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty and deploys new INF-range missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense. \nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "e76ce6e2dd06478b9999ca65ddf0dc042f1acd07", "filename": "files/20161020_R43832_e76ce6e2dd06478b9999ca65ddf0dc042f1acd07.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "d645cfde6d2fc9210f36412cc22eef429858e91b", "filename": "files/20161020_R43832_d645cfde6d2fc9210f36412cc22eef429858e91b.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 451733, "date": "2016-04-13", "retrieved": "2016-10-17T20:09:05.392345", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in the 2014, 2015, and 2016 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2016 report, it noted that \u201cthe cruise missile developed by Russia meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used or tested to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.\u201d The compliance reports do not offer further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. \nThe United States has raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings have made little progress because Russia continues to deny that it has violated the treaty. The United States could pursue a number of options that might move the diplomatic process forward and possibly lead to a resolution of the issue. It could call a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns, so that both sides could raise their concerns and explain their programs. It could begin studies and research into new INF-range systems, which is permitted by the treaty, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond if Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty and deploys new INF-range missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense. \nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "f5a231ba65ed1bf1460506cd7179aabb7eb4d728", "filename": "files/20160413_R43832_f5a231ba65ed1bf1460506cd7179aabb7eb4d728.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "6ce333edff4b2ecce796f4e160ffeefe370ba871", "filename": "files/20160413_R43832_6ce333edff4b2ecce796f4e160ffeefe370ba871.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 446587, "date": "2015-10-13", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T18:12:17.648583", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a \u201cdual-track\u201d decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union\u2019s deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles.\nThe U.S. State Department, in both the 2014 and 2015 editions of its report Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, stated that the United States has determined that \u201cthe Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under the [1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles.\u201d In the 2015 report, it noted that \u201cthe United States determined the cruise missile developed by the Russian Federation meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km.\u201d Neither report offered further details about the offending missile or the evidence that the United States used to make this determination. \nThe United States has raised its concerns about Russian compliance with the INF Treaty in a number of meetings during the past few years. These meetings have made little progress because Russia continues to deny that it has violated the treaty. The United States could pursue a number of options that might move the diplomatic process forward and possibly lead to a resolution of the issue. It could call a meeting of the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the INF Treaty to address compliance concerns, so that both sides could raise their concerns and explain their programs. It could begin studies and research into new INF-range systems, which is permitted by the treaty, both to provide Russia with an incentive to reach a resolution and to provide the United States with options for future programs if Russia eventually deploys new missiles and the treaty regime collapses. It might also suspend or withdraw from arms control agreements, although several analysts have noted that this might harm U.S. security interests, as it would remove all constraints on Russia\u2019s nuclear forces.\nThe United States could also consider a number of options for how it might respond if Russia withdraws from the INF Treaty and deploys new INF-range missiles. It could develop and deploy new military capabilities\u2014including, possibly, new land-based INF-range missiles or new missile defense capabilities\u2014to offset the threat posed by new Russian INF-range missiles. The United States could also take other steps with its allies to assure them of the U.S. commitment to their defense. \nCongress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia\u2019s cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R43832", "sha1": "0440e56dbfca4b285d3dd0d751b8fdbd4323c7fd", "filename": "files/20151013_R43832_0440e56dbfca4b285d3dd0d751b8fdbd4323c7fd.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R43832", "sha1": "f9543040d17d606f0fe6cf84d0776264b72d9b42", "filename": "files/20151013_R43832_f9543040d17d606f0fe6cf84d0776264b72d9b42.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 3245, "name": "Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities and Nuclear Arms Control" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc689169/", "id": "R43832_2015Jun02", "date": "2015-06-02", "retrieved": "2015-08-03T15:06:47", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "This report describes the current status of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and highlights issues that Congress may address as the United States pursues its compliance concerns with Russia.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20150602_R43832_de0ef08f1ad0ceb95e98cb37fc9ee89a86ec9cc2.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20150602_R43832_de0ef08f1ad0ceb95e98cb37fc9ee89a86ec9cc2.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "International affairs", "name": "International affairs" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Russia", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Russia" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Russia -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Russia -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Treaties", "name": "Treaties" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc501880/", "id": "R43832_2014Dec16", "date": "2014-12-16", "retrieved": "2015-03-30T22:03:27", "title": "Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "This report describes the current status of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and highlights issues that Congress may address as the United States pursues its compliance concerns with Russia.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20141216_R43832_597f34e981002a7520af0003470bfc185b483943.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20141216_R43832_597f34e981002a7520af0003470bfc185b483943.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "International affairs", "name": "International affairs" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Russia", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Russia" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Russia -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Russia -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Treaties", "name": "Treaties" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }