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Brief", "summary": "U.S.-Turkey tensions have raised questions about the future of bilateral relations and have led to congressional action against Turkey, including the specter of possible sanctions. Nevertheless, both countries\u2019 officials emphasize the importance of continued U.S.-Turkey cooperation and Turkey\u2019s membership in NATO. Observers voice concerns about the largely authoritarian rule of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. They also question how he can govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey\u2019s regional security and financial solvency. The global COVID-19 outbreak has implications for Turkish political developments and existing economic vulnerabilities. The following are some key points of concern in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.\nTurkey\u2019s strategic orientation and U.S.-NATO defense cooperation. A number of complicated situations in Turkey\u2019s surrounding region\u2014including those involving Syria, Libya, and Eastern Mediterranean energy exploration near Cyprus\u2014could affect its foreign relationships, as Turkey seeks a more independent role on regional and global matters. Traditionally, Turkey has relied closely on the United States and NATO for defense cooperation, European countries for trade and investment, and Russia and Iran for energy imports. While Turkey-Russia cooperation on some issues may not reflect a general Turkish realignment toward Russia, Russia may be content with helping weaken Turkey\u2019s ties with the West to reduce obstacles to Russian actions and ambitions. Given U.S.-Turkey tensions and questions about the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets\u2014including a possible arsenal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base\u2014some observers have advocated that the United States explore alternative basing arrangements.\nRussian S-400 purchase and U.S. response (F-35 and possible sanctions). Turkey\u2019s purchase of a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system and its exploration of possibly acquiring Russian fighter aircraft may raise the question: If Turkey transitions to major Russian weapons platforms with multi-decade lifespans, how can it stay closely integrated with NATO on defense matters? After Russia began delivering S-400 components to Turkey in July 2019, the United States announced that Turkey would not receive the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft it had planned to purchase and would no longer manufacture components for F-35s. Additionally, Section 1245 of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 116-92) prohibits the use of U.S. funds to transfer F-35s to Turkey unless the Secretaries of Defense and State certify that Turkey no longer possesses the S-400. \nThe S-400 deal also could trigger U.S. sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA, title II of the Countering America\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA; P.L. 115-44). President Trump has reportedly delayed CAATSA sanctions while seeking to persuade Turkey to return the S-400 to Russia or limit its use. It is unclear how sanctions against Turkey could affect its economy, trade, and defense procurement. How the United States responds to Turkey\u2019s acquisition of the S-400 could affect U.S. arms sales and sanctions with respect to other key partners who have purchased or may purchase advanced weapons from Russia\u2014including India, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.\nSyria: Kurdish-led militias and refugees. U.S.-Turkey tensions in Syria have largely focused on Kurdish-led militias that have partnered with the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey\u2019s strong objections. These Kurdish-led militias have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq. In October 2019, after U.S. troops pulled back from the area, Turkey\u2019s military (and allied Syrian opposition groups) occupied parts of northeastern Syria to thwart Syrian Kurdish aspirations for autonomy. The October 2019 operation was the third Turkish-led incursion into northern Syria; the others took place in 2016-2017 and 2018. The Turkish military remains in a standoff with Russia and the Syrian government over the future of Syria\u2019s Idlib province, where the main remnants of Sunni Arab opposition to the regime of Bashar al Asad reside. Turkey seeks to protect Idlib\u2019s population, partly because of domestic concerns that new influxes of Syrian refugees could add to the approximately 3.6 million Turkey already hosts.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "1c8681d6b7159a98e02f454aeffd90558c94f7e7", "filename": "files/20200407_R44000_1c8681d6b7159a98e02f454aeffd90558c94f7e7.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20200407_R44000_images_a7789b11ccad986ca538b80258a8c19d6a769ff2.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20200407_R44000_images_f5656d56c658a269ea6aa68f57a48beb36813cc2.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/3.png": "files/20200407_R44000_images_5d3f557dc4bc5d3b21f0039d76b80fbb61259d6d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/2.png": "files/20200407_R44000_images_67ac1da046b981fabcdf60dd3df8e908600e0b15.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "f580682eadbb40d9ae872f15c8d6b369d828f151", "filename": "files/20200407_R44000_f580682eadbb40d9ae872f15c8d6b369d828f151.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 610005, "date": "2019-11-08", "retrieved": "2019-12-13T15:26:56.487325", "title": "Turkey: Background, U.S. Relations, and Sanctions In Brief", "summary": "Some specific Turkish actions have raised questions about Turkey\u2019s commitment to NATO and overall strategic orientation. In 2019, Turkey\u2019s incursion into northeastern Syria and acceptance of components for a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system have brought bilateral tensions to crisis levels, and contributed to the possibility of sanctions or other actions from Congress. Events in Syria and a 2016 coup attempt in Turkey appear to have led Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to act more independently from the United States and cultivate closer ties with Russia and its President Vladimir Putin.\nTurkey faces a number of political and economic challenges that inform its relations with the United States. Observers voice concerns about Erdogan\u2019s growing authoritarianism, and question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey\u2019s financial solvency and regional security. To meet its security, economic, and energy needs, Turkey cooperates with the United States and several other countries whose respective interests may conflict. Without significant rents from natural resources, Turkey\u2019s economic performance is largely dependent on maintaining diversified global trade and investment ties, including with the West. The following are major points of concern in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.\nTurkey\u2019s October 2019 incursion into northeastern Syria. Events in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias that partnered with the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey\u2019s strong objections. Those Kurdish-led militias have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using refuges in both Syria and Iraq. In October 2019, Turkey\u2019s military (and allied Syrian opposition groups) entered northeastern Syria after President Trump ordered a pullback of U.S. Special Forces shortly after a call with President Erdogan. The declared aims of what Turkey called Operation Peace Spring (OPS) were to target \u201cterrorists\u201d\u2014both the Kurdish-led militias and the Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS)\u2014and create a \u201csafe zone\u201d for the possible return of some of the approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. After Turkish-led forces gained control of some largely Arab-populated sectors of Syria previously controlled by Kurdish-led militias, a U.S.-facilitated cease-fire and Turkey-Russia agreement have provided for a primarily Turkish-patrolled safe zone in those sectors, as well as Russian-Syrian help in removing Kurdish-led militias from other border areas east of the Euphrates, raising several questions about Syria\u2019s future.\nU.S. sanctions and other U.S./NATO actions or options in light of OPS. The Trump Administration imposed sanctions on some Turkish cabinet ministries and ministers in response to OPS, but lifted them upon announcing a permanent cease-fire on October 23. The executive order authorizing sanctions against Turkey remains in effect. On October 29, the House passed the Protect Against Conflict by Turkey Act (H.R. 4695) by a vote of 403-16. H.R. 4695 could require the imposition of sanctions on some Turkish officials, U.S. and foreign arms transactions with Turkey, and Turkish financial institutions. On the same day, the House (by a vote of 405-11) also passed a nonbinding resolution characterizing actions by the Ottoman Empire (Turkey\u2019s predecessor state) against Armenians from 1915 to 1923 as genocide. The prospects of sanctions legislation in the Senate are unclear, as is how sanctions might affect Turkey\u2019s economy, public sentiment, and patterns of trade and defense procurement. The crisis over OPS has fueled speculation about the future of allied cooperation with Turkey within NATO, including the status of reported U.S. military assets\u2014such as possible tactical nuclear weapons\u2014in Turkey. Separately, on October 16, a U.S. Attorney\u2019s office indicted Turkey\u2019s Halkbank (which is majority-owned by Turkey\u2019s government) for violations of U.S. laws relating to Iran sanctions, in a case that has been pending for years and is sensitive for President Erdogan.\nS-400 acquisition from Russia, removal from the F-35 program and possible sanctions. Shortly after Russia began delivering an S-400 air defense system to Turkey in July 2019, the United States announced that Turkey would not receive the 100 F-35 aircraft it had planned to purchase and would no longer manufacture components for F-35s. U.S.-Turkey tensions on the issue could have broad implications for defense cooperation, bilateral relations, and Turkey\u2019s role in NATO. The S-400 deal also could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law. According to some reports, President Trump may delay sanctions while pursuing a deal potentially allowing Turkey to remain in the F-35 program if it (1) agrees not to use the S-400 and (2) acquires a U.S. Patriot air defense system. In July, President Erdogan reportedly threatened to retaliate against S-400-related sanctions, including by withdrawing Turkey from NATO and ejecting the United States from Incirlik Air Base.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "1481764462a31ce922b9c8e82f384b1286aee0e6", "filename": "files/20191108_R44000_1481764462a31ce922b9c8e82f384b1286aee0e6.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20191108_R44000_images_0e4935453e15dcdb66a4e0422a415ffbfe4270ca.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20191108_R44000_images_f5656d56c658a269ea6aa68f57a48beb36813cc2.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/2.png": "files/20191108_R44000_images_cff3865a31d9af065c2ec04f6820c3930245f51e.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "c2278d9955902252df60c3d80a4e6e3c17b2d189", "filename": "files/20191108_R44000_c2278d9955902252df60c3d80a4e6e3c17b2d189.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 606442, "date": "2019-10-18", "retrieved": "2019-10-21T22:16:55.457643", "title": "Turkey: Background, U.S. Relations, and Sanctions In Brief", "summary": "Some specific Turkish actions have raised questions about Turkey\u2019s commitment to NATO and overall strategic orientation. In 2019, Turkey\u2019s incursion into northeastern Syria and acceptance of components for a Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system have brought bilateral tensions to crisis levels, and contributed to Trump Administration sanctions on Turkey and the possibility of additional sanctions or other actions from Congress. Events in Syria and a 2016 coup attempt in Turkey appear to have led Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to act more independently from the United States and cultivate closer ties with Russia and its President Vladimir Putin.\nTurkey faces a number of political and economic challenges that inform its relations with the United States. Observers voice concerns about Erdogan\u2019s growing authoritarianism, and question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey\u2019s financial solvency and regional security. To meet its security, economic, and energy needs, Turkey cooperates with the United States and several other countries whose respective interests may conflict. Without significant rents from natural resources, Turkey\u2019s economic performance is largely dependent on maintaining diversified global trade and investment ties, including with the West. The following are major points of concern in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.\nTurkey\u2019s October 2019 incursion into northeastern Syria. Events in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias that partnered with the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey\u2019s strong objections. Those Kurdish-led militias have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and has waged an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using refuges in both Syria and Iraq. In October 2019, Turkey\u2019s military (and allied Syrian opposition groups) entered northeastern Syria after President Trump ordered a pullback of U.S. Special Forces shortly after a call with President Erdogan. The declared aims of what Turkey calls Operation Peace Spring (OPS) are to target \u201cterrorists\u201d\u2014both the Kurdish-led militias and the Islamic State, or (IS/ISIL/ISIS)\u2014and create a \u201csafe zone\u201d for the possible resettlement of some of the approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. After Turkey gained control of some largely Arab-populated sectors of Syria previously controlled by Kurdish-led militias, the Kurds reportedly reached arrangements with Syria\u2019s government that may allow it to regain control over much of northeastern Syria\u2014raising several questions about Syria\u2019s future, including how to prevent an IS resurgence.\nU.S. sanctions and other U.S./NATO actions or options in light of OPS. Via Executive Order 13894 on October 14, the Trump Administration authorized various sanctions on Turkey and actors transacting with it in connection with OPS. The Treasury Department designated for sanctions key Turkish ministers and ministries (including defense and energy), and it has broad authority to designate other actors. This authority, along with other U.S. actions affecting bilateral trade, may be intended to encourage a diplomatic resolution. Vice President Pence helped arrange for a conditional pause in OPS on October 17 that, if it becomes a permanent halt, would allow for a Turkish-patrolled safe zone and a reversal of U.S. sanctions designations. Some Members of Congress have introduced bills seeking stronger sanctions against Turkey in response to OPS, including on U.S. and foreign arms transactions and on Turkish financial institutions. On October 16, the House passed H.J.Res. 77\u2014a resolution condemning both OPS and some Administration actions\u2014by a vote of 354-60. The crisis over OPS has fueled speculation about the future of allied cooperation with Turkey within NATO, specifically regarding the status of reported U.S. military assets\u2014such as possible tactical nuclear weapons\u2014in Turkey. Separately, on October 16, a U.S. Attorney\u2019s office indicted Turkey\u2019s Halkbank for violations of U.S. laws relating to Iran sanctions, in a case that has been pending for years and is sensitive for President Erdogan.\nS-400 acquisition from Russia, removal from the F-35 program and possible sanctions. Shortly after Russia began delivering an S-400 air defense system to Turkey in July 2019, the United States announced that Turkey would not receive the 100 F-35 aircraft it had planned to purchase and would no longer manufacture components for F-35s. U.S.-Turkey tensions on the issue could have broad implications for defense cooperation, bilateral relations, and Turkey\u2019s role in NATO. The S-400 deal also could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law. According to some reports, President Trump may delay sanctions while pursuing a deal potentially allowing Turkey to remain in the F-35 program if it (1) agrees not to use the S-400 and (2) acquires a U.S. Patriot air defense system. In July, President Erdogan reportedly threatened to retaliate against S-400-related sanctions, including by withdrawing Turkey from NATO and ejecting the United States from Incirlik Air Base.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "c11774ef1a6bbd56805cae18b4430f5eff956059", "filename": "files/20191018_R44000_c11774ef1a6bbd56805cae18b4430f5eff956059.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20191018_R44000_images_0e4935453e15dcdb66a4e0422a415ffbfe4270ca.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20191018_R44000_images_69c1e175b553c163705de099908b4cb77e5135a9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/3.png": "files/20191018_R44000_images_e253d15c2b31038e76e7d0510010e5308b906673.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/2.png": "files/20191018_R44000_images_cb3d4d0252b500ac7a3f35f9dcf7f3b3bb8a85d0.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "8d85f8c90ee97b1a1ee718b4d260d8874a715a8a", "filename": "files/20191018_R44000_8d85f8c90ee97b1a1ee718b4d260d8874a715a8a.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 603714, "date": "2019-08-14", "retrieved": "2019-08-16T22:12:21.209509", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Recent U.S.-Turkey tensions and increased Turkish cooperation with Russia have raised questions about Turkey\u2019s commitment to NATO and overall strategic orientation. To meet its security, economic, and energy needs, Turkey cooperates with the United States and several other countries whose respective interests may conflict. Events in Syria and a 2016 coup attempt in Turkey appear to have led Turkey\u2019s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to act more independently from the United States and cultivate closer ties with Russia and its President Vladimir Putin. Turkey\u2019s large, diversified economy and increased political and military profile gives it significant regional influence, but also has contributed to rivalries with other U.S. partners such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. \nThe following are some current points of concern in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.\nS-400 acquisition from Russia, removal from the F-35 program, and possible CAATSA sanctions. Shortly after Russia began delivering an S-400 air defense system to Turkey in July 2019, the United States announced that Turkey would not receive the 100 F-35 aircraft it had planned to purchase and would no longer manufacture components for F-35s. U.S.-Turkey tensions on the issue\u2014particularly in light of Russia\u2019s involvement\u2014could have broad implications for defense cooperation, bilateral relations, and Turkey\u2019s role in NATO. The S-400 deal also could trigger U.S. sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America\u2019s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44), possibly exacerbating difficulties in Turkey\u2019s economy. According to some reports, President Trump may delay sanctions while pursuing a deal potentially allowing Turkey to remain in the F-35 program if it (1) agrees not to use the S-400 and (2) acquires a U.S. Patriot air defense system. Based on a July 2019 statement from Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, Turkish activation of the S-400 may trigger sanctions. Some Members of Congress have urged President Trump to impose CAATSA sanctions on Turkey without delay. Reportedly, Turkish President Erdogan has threatened to retaliate against any sanctions, including by withdrawing Turkey from NATO and kicking the United States out of Incirlik Air Base. Pending legislation would prohibit the transport of F-35s to Turkey absent an executive branch certification indicating that Turkey does not plan to take delivery of or keep the S-400.\nSyria and the Kurds. Turkey\u2019s political stances and military operations in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias supported by the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey\u2019s strong objections. Those Kurdish-led militias have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and wages an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq. President Trump announced in December 2018 that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria, but subsequent adjustments to the size and scope of a continued U.S. military presence have complicated efforts to coordinate U.S. and Turkish actions. In August 2019, the United States and Turkey agreed to set up a joint operations center to manage a safe zone along Syria\u2019s border with Turkey, though questions remain about the zone\u2019s geographical scope, who will patrol it, its effect on Syrian Kurds, and whether some portion of the 3.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey will be able to resettle there.\nTurkey\u2019s domestic trajectory and financial distress. Although Turkey retains democratic institutions, President Erdogan rules in a largely authoritarian manner, with his formal powers further consolidated in June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. A number of developments (a globally stronger dollar, rule of law concerns and political uncertainty, significant corporate debt) led to a precipitous drop in the value of Turkey\u2019s currency during 2018, around the same time the country entered into a recession. The economy has continued to struggle in 2019, amid concerns about Turkey\u2019s financial position and Erdogan\u2019s influence over Turkey\u2019s central bank. Local elections in March and June 2019 against the backdrop of these economic concerns yielded some significant losses for Erdogan\u2019s political party, especially in Istanbul (Turkey\u2019s largest city), though it is unclear what the practical impact will be on Erdogan\u2019s rule.\nGoing forward, relations between the United States and Turkey will take place with Turkey facing a number of political and economic challenges. Observers question how Erdogan will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey\u2019s financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey\u2019s complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "ada4507991e3e472e0eec5ded08576ceaf6c4526", "filename": "files/20190814_R44000_ada4507991e3e472e0eec5ded08576ceaf6c4526.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190814_R44000_images_7b3397cbb30dd6801dbcee85b80f5ffd10bba50a.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190814_R44000_images_69c1e175b553c163705de099908b4cb77e5135a9.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "eca2dd1a7de528a637faddbdd415b1ddd23981e9", "filename": "files/20190814_R44000_eca2dd1a7de528a637faddbdd415b1ddd23981e9.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 601888, "date": "2019-07-09", "retrieved": "2019-07-11T22:21:46.504101", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "The United States and Turkey have been NATO allies since 1952 and share some vital interests, but harmonizing their priorities has been particularly difficult in recent years. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on contrasting geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles. \nTurkey\u2019s core security and economic relationships and institutional links remain with Western nations, as reflected by some key U.S. military assets based in Turkey and Turkey\u2019s strong trade ties with the European Union. However, various factors complicate U.S.-Turkey relations. For example, Turkey relies to some degree on nations such as Russia and Iran for domestic energy needs and coordination on regional security, and therefore balances diplomatically between various actors. Additionally, Turkey\u2019s president and longtime leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expressed concerns that the United States and some other Western countries harbor sympathies for some of the groups that have been marginalized domestically under Erdogan. Also, Turkey has played a larger role in the Middle East since the 2000s, but has faced a number of setbacks and has problematic relations with Israel and most Sunni Arab countries other than Qatar. \nBilateral relations between the Trump Administration and the Erdogan government have faced a number of recent challenges. The following are current points of interest or concern in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.\nF-35 aircraft acquisition endangered by possible S-400 acquisition from Russia. Turkey\u2019s planned purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law and may prevent Turkey from acquiring U.S.-origin F-35 aircraft. U.S.-Turkey tensions on the issue\u2014particularly in light of Russia\u2019s involvement\u2014could have broad implications for defense cooperation, bilateral relations, and Turkey\u2019s role in NATO. In June 2019, then-Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan sent a letter warning Turkey that its participation in the F-35 program would end if it did not make a change by July 31, 2019, to its plans to take delivery of the S-400. U.S. officials seek to prevent the deal by offering Patriot air defense systems as an alternative to the S-400. Pending legislation proposes to prevent the transfer of F-35s to Turkey absent an executive branch certification indicating in some manner that Turkey does not plan to take delivery of or keep the S-400.\nSyria and the Kurds. Turkey\u2019s political stances and military operations in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias supported by the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey\u2019s strong objections. Those Kurdish-led militias have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and wages an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq. President Trump announced in December 2018 that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria, but subsequent adjustments to the size and scope of a continued U.S. and perhaps allied European military presence have complicated efforts to coordinate U.S. and Turkish actions. A de-escalation zone in the Syrian rebel-held province of Idlib also is under strain, raising questions about the viability of continued Turkey-Russian coordination in Syria and increasing the risk of additional refugee flows to Turkey (which hosts 3.6 million Syrian refugees).\nTurkey\u2019s domestic trajectory and financial distress. President Erdogan rules in an increasingly authoritarian manner, with his formal powers further consolidated in June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. A number of developments (a globally stronger dollar, rule of law concerns and political uncertainty, significant corporate debt) led to a precipitous drop in the value of Turkey\u2019s currency during 2018, contributing to a recession in late 2018. After stabilizing somewhat, the currency has continued to struggle in 2019, amid concerns about Turkey\u2019s financial position and the possible consequences that higher interest rates might have for economic growth. Local elections in March and June 2019 against the backdrop of these economic concerns yielded some significant losses for Erdogan\u2019s political party, though it is unclear what the practical impact will be on Erdogan\u2019s rule.\nThe next phase in relations between the United States and Turkey will take place with Turkey facing a number of political and economic challenges. Observers question how Erdogan will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey\u2019s financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey\u2019s complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "3b205504b9914abfaad0101276be7cfb3dd353f7", "filename": "files/20190709_R44000_3b205504b9914abfaad0101276be7cfb3dd353f7.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190709_R44000_images_7b3397cbb30dd6801dbcee85b80f5ffd10bba50a.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190709_R44000_images_69c1e175b553c163705de099908b4cb77e5135a9.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "517ca26413eee02680200bdaace2a77566a167de", "filename": "files/20190709_R44000_517ca26413eee02680200bdaace2a77566a167de.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 591153, "date": "2019-02-08", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T14:20:48.201208", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "The United States and Turkey have been NATO allies since 1952 and share some vital interests, but harmonizing their priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on contrasting geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles. \nTurkey\u2019s core security and economic relationships and institutional links remain with Western nations, as reflected by some key U.S. military assets based in Turkey and Turkey\u2019s strong trade ties with the European Union. However, various factors complicate U.S.-Turkey relations. For example, Turkey relies to some degree on nations such as Russia and Iran for domestic energy needs and coordination on regional security, and therefore balances diplomatically between various actors. Additionally, Turkey\u2019s president and longtime leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to be concerned that the United States and some other Western countries harbor sympathies for some of the groups that have been marginalized domestically under Erdogan. Also, Turkey has played a larger role in the Middle East since the 2000s, but has faced a number of setbacks and has problematic relations with Israel and most Sunni Arab countries other than Qatar. \nBilateral relations between the Trump Administration and the Erdogan government have been difficult, but have improved somewhat since October 2018, when a Turkish court allowed Pastor Andrew Brunson to return to the United States after a two-year imprisonment. The following are current points of tension in the U.S.-Turkey relationship.\nF-35 aircraft acquisition endangered by possible S-400 acquisition from Russia. Turkey\u2019s planned purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law and decrease Turkey\u2019s chances of acquiring U.S.-origin F-35 aircraft. The possible S-400 transaction has sparked broader concern over Turkey\u2019s relationship with Russia and implications for NATO. U.S. officials seek to prevent the deal by offering Patriot air defense systems as an alternative to the S-400.\nSyria and the Kurds. Turkey\u2019s political stances and military operations in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias supported by the United States against the Islamic State over Turkey\u2019s strong objections. President Trump\u2019s announcement in December 2018 that U.S. troops would withdraw from Syria came after a call with President Erdogan in which Erdogan accepted responsibility for countering the Islamic State in Syria. Efforts to coordinate U.S. and Turkish actions related to a U.S. withdrawal have triggered debate about the possible consequences of Turkish intervention in northeast Syria, especially for those Kurdish-led militias, which have links with the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party). The PKK is a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that originated in Turkey and wages an on-and-off insurgency against the Turkish government while using safe havens in both Syria and Iraq.\nCongressional initiatives. Within the tense bilateral context, the 115th Congress required the Trump Administration\u2014in the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232)\u2014to report on the status of U.S.-Turkey relations, with particular emphasis on the possible S-400 deal and its implications. The Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a mostly classified report to Congress in November 2018. Appropriations legislation proposed for FY2019 in the 116th Congress (H.R. 648) would require an update to the DOD report. \nTurkey\u2019s domestic trajectory and financial distress. President Erdogan rules in an increasingly authoritarian manner, with his power further consolidated in June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. A number of developments (a globally stronger dollar, rule of law concerns and political uncertainty, significant corporate debt) led to a precipitous drop in the value of Turkey\u2019s currency during 2018. A major September 2018 interest rate hike by Turkey\u2019s central bank helped reverse some of the currency\u2019s downward slide, but concerns remain about Turkey\u2019s financial position and the possible consequences that higher interest rates might have for economic growth. Local elections are scheduled for March 2018 against the backdrop of these economic concerns.\nThe next steps in relations between the United States and Turkey will take place with Turkey facing a number of political and economic challenges. Given Erdogan\u2019s consolidation of power, observers now question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey\u2019s financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey\u2019s complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "9893fdc03970e1d9a0f0e81d939b15f4802add62", "filename": "files/20190208_R44000_9893fdc03970e1d9a0f0e81d939b15f4802add62.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190208_R44000_images_fd7c35ec9de9989967b2f300267a20e1f6f9a8a4.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190208_R44000_images_69c1e175b553c163705de099908b4cb77e5135a9.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "eee38eb91c1f2a766e9caa023773beb5faecb49f", "filename": "files/20190208_R44000_eee38eb91c1f2a766e9caa023773beb5faecb49f.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 584693, "date": "2018-08-31", "retrieved": "2018-10-05T22:33:40.679412", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "This is an abbreviated version of CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.\nTurkey, a NATO ally since 1952, significantly affects a number of key U.S. national security issues in the Middle East and Europe. U.S.-Turkey relations have worsened throughout this decade over several matters, including Syria\u2019s civil war, Turkey-Israel tensions, Turkey-Russia cooperation, and various Turkish domestic developments. The United States and NATO have military personnel and key equipment deployed to various sites in Turkey, including at Incirlik air base in the southern part of the country. Bilateral ties have reached historic lows in the summer of 2018. The major flashpoint has been a Turkish criminal case against American pastor Andrew Brunson. U.S. sanctions on Turkey related to the Brunson case and responses by Turkey and international markets appear to have seriously aggravated an already precipitous drop in the value of Turkey\u2019s currency. Amid this backdrop, Congress has actively engaged on several issues involving Turkey, including the following:\nTurkey\u2019s possible S-400 air defense system acquisition from Russia.\nTurkey\u2019s efforts to acquire U.S.-origin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and its companies\u2019 role in the international F-35 consortium\u2019s supply chain.\nComplex U.S.-Turkey interactions in Syria involving several state and non-state actors, including Russia and Iran. Over strong Turkish objections, the United States continues to partner with Syrian Kurds linked with Kurdish militants in Turkey, and Turkey\u2019s military has occupied large portions of northern Syria to minimize Kurdish control and leverage.\nTurkey\u2019s domestic situation and its effect on bilateral relations. In addition to Pastor Brunson, Turkey has detained a number of other U.S. citizens (most of them dual U.S.-Turkish citizens) and Turkish employees of the U.S. government. Turkish officials and media have connected these cases to the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and to Fethullah Gulen, the U.S.-based former cleric whom Turkey\u2019s government has accused of involvement in the plot.\nIn the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232) enacted in August 2018, Congress has required a comprehensive report from the Trump Administration on (1) U.S.-Turkey relations, (2) the potential S-400 deal and its implications for U.S./NATO activity in Turkey, (3) possible alternatives to the S-400, and (4) various scenarios for the F-35 program with or without Turkey\u2019s participation. Other proposed legislation would condition Turkey\u2019s acquisition of the F-35 on a cancellation of the S-400 deal (FY2019 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, S. 3180), place sanctions on Turkish officials for their role in detaining U.S. citizens or employees (also S. 3180), and direct U.S. action at selected international financial institutions to oppose providing assistance to Turkey (Turkey International Financial Institutions Act, S. 3248). The S-400 deal might also trigger sanctions under existing law (CAATSA).\nThe next steps in the fraught relations between the United States and Turkey will take place in the context of a Turkey in political transition and growing economic turmoil. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan won reelection to an empowered presidency in June 2018. Given Erdogan\u2019s consolidation of power, observers now question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey\u2019s financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey\u2019s complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "90e18ceca3f51141741e2e19b57f8ebbc6892265", "filename": "files/20180831_R44000_90e18ceca3f51141741e2e19b57f8ebbc6892265.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "fa20833ac4614065b815cdc4d79449beda1bc9d8", "filename": "files/20180831_R44000_fa20833ac4614065b815cdc4d79449beda1bc9d8.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 581741, "date": "2018-06-06", "retrieved": "2018-06-12T14:06:02.883741", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, is significant for U.S. interests. It is a constitutional republic with a large, diversified economy and a Muslim-majority population that straddles Europe and the Middle East. \nThe history of the U.S.-Turkey relationship is complicated. Although the United States and Turkey support each other\u2019s interests in some vital ways, harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads each of the two countries, based on contrasting geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles.\nSignificant challenges to bilateral relations include the following: \nQuestions about Turkey\u2019s ally status that fuel action in Congress. The long history of U.S.-Turkey cooperation has had several high and low points. Since a failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, several differences and greater public acrimony between the two countries have fueled concern about their relationship. In this charged environment, some Members of Congress have proposed legislation to limit arms sales and strategic cooperation\u2014particularly regarding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter\u2014or to place sanctions on Turkish officials. While Turkish leaders, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (last name pronounced \u201cair-doe-wan\u201d), have sharply criticized U.S. policies on many issues, questions in U.S. public debate about Turkey\u2019s status as an ally and its relationship with Russia have intensified. \nPossible S-400 acquisition from Russia. Turkey\u2019s planned purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law. U.S. officials seek to prevent the transaction, perhaps by offering alternatives to Turkey.\nSyria and the Kurds. Turkey\u2019s political stances and military operations in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias supported by the United States against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL) over Turkey\u2019s strong objections.\nTurkey\u2019s domestic trajectory. President Erdogan rules in an increasingly authoritarian manner under a state of emergency that parliament has approved every three months since shortly after the July 2016 coup attempt. Presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for June 24, 2018, could consolidate constitutional powers under Erdogan pursuant to changes approved in a controversial 2017 referendum. Meanwhile, Turkey\u2019s currency has fallen about 20% in value during 2018 amid concerns about rule of law, regional and domestic political uncertainty, significant corporate debt, and a stronger U.S. dollar.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "931db862c7f8197428021742a6be57aa5d6e24ee", "filename": "files/20180606_R44000_931db862c7f8197428021742a6be57aa5d6e24ee.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "d5303ebfae94f73a7c2469576a4315ef372931e2", "filename": "files/20180606_R44000_d5303ebfae94f73a7c2469576a4315ef372931e2.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 579559, "date": "2018-03-23", "retrieved": "2018-05-10T10:59:27.705375", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, is significant for U.S. interests. It is a constitutional republic with a large, diversified economy and a Muslim-majority population that straddles Europe and the Middle East. \nThe history of the U.S.-Turkey relationship is complicated. Although the United States and Turkey support each other\u2019s interests in some vital ways, harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on U.S.-Turkey contrasts in geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles. \nTurkish leaders, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (pronounced air-doe-wan), may be contributing to problems between the United States and Turkey by ruling in an increasingly authoritarian manner and apparently encouraging strong criticism of U.S. policy in Turkish public discourse. Conflict around Turkey\u2019s borders with Syria and Iraq, particularly since 2011, has also fed U.S.-Turkey tensions. \nWithin this challenging environment, two specific points of bilateral contention arguably stand out: \nSyria and the Kurds. Turkey\u2019s military operations in Syria against largely Kurdish militias supported by the United States over Turkey\u2019s strong objections.\nPossible S-400 acquisition from Russia. Turkey\u2019s planned purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia, which has possible implications for Turkey\u2019s future in NATO.\nTrump Administration officials have expressed significant concern about the possibility of direct conflict between Turkey and U.S. or U.S.-supported forces in Syria. Turkish officials assert that their military operations in Syria are primarily for self-defense, given links between the Syrian Kurdish YPG (People\u2019s Protection Units) and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization). The PKK has significantly challenged the Turkish government\u2019s control over parts of southeastern Turkey since the 1980s. \nU.S. officials and lawmakers also have voiced opposition to Turkey\u2019s planned acquisition of S-400 systems from Russia and have acknowledged that the acquisition could trigger U.S. sanctions on Turkey under existing law.\nDespite bilateral tensions, Turkey continues to allow the United States and other members of the coalition assembled to fight the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL or by the Arabic acronym Daesh) to use Turkish territory for operations against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The United States and NATO continue to base key defense installations in Turkey.\nOther ongoing U.S.-Turkey controversies attract attention from Congress and add to concerns about the future of bilateral relations. Many of these are connected to a failed July 2016 coup attempt and how the government\u2019s response to the plot has affected rule of law in Turkey. The coup attempt came from a group within Turkey\u2019s military that is widely believed by analysts to have some links with the Fethullah Gulen movement. Gulen\u2019s U.S. residency fuels Turkish speculation about a possible U.S. connection to the plot; U.S. officials deny any such connection. Turkey\u2019s government has called for Gulen\u2019s extradition, and the matter remains pending before U.S. officials.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "044163a9e40542a99361b0c6f2da74f563e9329c", "filename": "files/20180323_R44000_044163a9e40542a99361b0c6f2da74f563e9329c.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20180323_R44000_images_7b99a3100123a5fb5ff20ff5306de9317b99dc31.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180323_R44000_images_cf141d8fd5351d8ac2cb1aa7ed2adc010e499a5a.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "de0367ae9c29df0f26e3b11f4123a1dbce586c30", "filename": "files/20180323_R44000_de0367ae9c29df0f26e3b11f4123a1dbce586c30.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 575364, "date": "2017-11-09", "retrieved": "2017-11-14T14:19:38.013699", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Turkey, a longtime NATO ally, is significant to U.S. interests. It is a constitutional republic with a large, diversified economy and a Muslim-majority population that straddles Europe and the Middle East. The history of the U.S.-Turkey relationship is complicated. Bilateral ties have been particularly strained over the past five years in connection with conflict in Syria and Iraq, increasing domestic contention in Turkey, and the continuing consolidation of power by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP). \nIn late 2017, several ongoing U.S.-Turkey controversies and persistent anti-American rhetoric from Turkish leaders and media have fueled concerns about the future of the bilateral relationship, in parallel with similar problems in Turkey-European Union (EU) relations. Nevertheless, Turkey continues to allow the United States and other members of the coalition assembled to fight the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL or by the Arabic acronym Daesh) to use Turkish territory for airstrikes against IS targets. \nA number of considerations drive the complicated dynamics behind Turkey\u2019s relationship with the West. Turkey\u2019s history as both a regional power and an object of great power aggression translates into wide popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse. Given this nationalistic sentiment, Turkey\u2019s partial reliance on other key countries (for example, the United States for security, European Union countries for trade, and Russia and Iran for energy) may generate some resentment among Turks. Turkey\u2019s maintenance of cooperative relationships with these countries, even while their respective interests may conflict, involves a balancing act. The pressure on Turkey to manage this balance is currently increased by Turkey\u2019s vulnerability to threats from Syria and Iraq. Involvement in Syria and Iraq by the United States, Russia, and Iran further complicates Turkey\u2019s situation. \nTurkey\u2019s location near several global hotspots makes the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. NATO\u2019s traditional value for Turkey has been to help mitigate the concerns about security it has from surrounding geopolitical dangers. Turkey turned to the West largely as a reaction to aggressive post-World War II posturing by the Soviet Union. \nThe cost to the United States of finding a temporary or permanent replacement for Incirlik air base would likely depend on variables, including the functionality and location of alternatives, the location of future U.S. military engagements, and the political and economic difficulty involved in moving or expanding U.S. military operations elsewhere.\nAny reevaluation of the U.S./NATO presence in and relationship with Turkey would take a number of political considerations into account alongside strategic and operational ones. Certain differences between Turkey and its NATO allies may persist irrespective of who leads these countries given their varying geographical positions, threat perceptions, and roles in regional and global political and security architectures. \nSome analysts posit that given geopolitical realities involving Syria and increasing public contention between Turkey\u2019s leaders and the West, Erdogan may opt to seek closer relations with Russia. Some observers speculate that a \u201cEurasianist\u201d faction has gained ascendancy in Turkey\u2019s military following the failed coup at the expense of \u201cAtlanticists,\u201d with the Eurasianists apparently favoring strengthened ties with Russia, Iran, and even China. \nOver almost 15 years, President (and formerly Prime Minister) Erdogan has increased his control over key national institutions, including the military and Turkey\u2019s national intelligence agency. The Turkish parliament voted within days of the July 2016 coup attempt to approve a three-month state of emergency, and has extended it every three months since, most recently on October 17, 2017. This allows the government to rule by decree. During the ongoing state of emergency, Turkey\u2019s economy has experienced fluctuations. \nIn an April 16, 2017, nationwide referendum, constitutional changes to establish a \u201cpresidential system\u201d in Turkey were adopted via a 51.4% favorable vote. The changes alter the country\u2019s system of governance to an extent that possibly represents a pivotal moment for the future of democracy in Turkey. Most of the changes will take effect after Turkey's next presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for November 2019, but could take place earlier if parliament calls for them.\nUnder the post-coup-attempt state of emergency, Turkey\u2019s government has cracked down on domestic political opponents. A primary focus, in addition to the Gulen movement, appears to be Turkey\u2019s Kurdish minority. Heightened ethnic Turkish-Kurdish tensions predated the attempted coup, having been exacerbated since mid-2015 by renewed conflict between government forces and the PKK. Key Kurdish political leaders have been imprisoned since late 2016. \nThe future trajectory of Turkey-PKK violence and political negotiation may depend on a number of factors, including the extent to which the United States and European actors offer incentives to or impose costs on Turkey and the PKK in efforts to mitigate violence and promote political resolution of the parties\u2019 differences.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "6506004c62eadf1696f0ca9a497a393eb6b17f22", "filename": "files/20171109_R44000_6506004c62eadf1696f0ca9a497a393eb6b17f22.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171109_R44000_images_9a4417f11b8a36a4859600496aaddb99ab41f861.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "adae9db9fe217cc49b47d6e33bed4546fdb62d9b", "filename": "files/20171109_R44000_adae9db9fe217cc49b47d6e33bed4546fdb62d9b.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 465994, "date": "2017-09-19", "retrieved": "2017-10-02T22:17:32.350145", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Turkey, a longtime NATO ally, is of significant relevance to U.S. interests, largely owing to its status as a constitutional republic with a large, diversified economy and a Muslim-majority population that straddles Europe and the Middle East. The history of the U.S.-Turkey relationship is replete with complications. Bilateral ties have experienced a period of particular stress over the past five years in connection with conflict in Syria and Iraq, increasing domestic contention in Turkey, and the continuing consolidation of power by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Nevertheless, Turkey continues to allow the United States and other members of the coalition assembled to fight the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL) to use Turkish territory for airstrikes against IS targets.\nSince 2014, the United States has openly assisted Kurdish militias in Syria (known as the People\u2019s Protection Units, or YPG) who are fighting the Islamic State but have links with the Kurdish militant group PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization that has waged a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish government. The YPG plays a leading role in the U.S.-partnered umbrella group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which also includes Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements. In May 2017, U.S. officials announced a decision to arm YPG elements directly to counter the Islamic State, while contemplating measures to limit the prospect of YPG use of U.S.-provided arms against Turkey. Turkey, whose military has intervened in Syria since 2016 to counter both the YPG and the Islamic State, has protested U.S. support for the YPG. \nTurkey appears to view the YPG as the top threat to its security, given the operational and moral support its military and political success could provide to the PKK\u2019s insurgency within Turkey. At the same time, the United States has partnered with the YPG because\u2014with the possible exception of certain forces aligned with the Syrian regime\u2014it has arguably been the most successful anti-IS ground force in Syria. This has led to a challenging and sensitive situation in which U.S. officials and military commanders seek to assist both Turkey and the YPG, and also to rein them in from activities that could lead them into direct conflict with each other.\nBy launching operations in Syria in late 2016, Turkey apparently adopted a more independent and flexible stance regarding (1) outcomes in Syria and (2) actors it can work with to achieve those outcomes. During the first few years of Syria\u2019s civil war, Turkey permitted Islamist and other Syrian opposition groups to use its territory to undermine Asad politically and militarily, but sought to avoid direct military action in Syria. The change in Turkey\u2019s willingness to use its military in late 2016\u2014with or without U.S. help\u2014may indicate that Turkish leaders decided to accept the risks of establishing and maintaining a zone of control or strong influence near their border.\nIn an April 16, 2017, nationwide referendum, constitutional changes to establish a \u201cpresidential system\u201d in Turkey were adopted via a 51.4% favorable vote. The changes alter the country\u2019s system of governance to an extent that possibly represents a threshold moment for the future of democracy in Turkey. When, how, and by whom the constitutional amendments will be implemented remains unclear. Erdogan has dominated Turkish electoral politics since 2002 and it is uncertain whether viable opposition could materialize in the next two years. However, his dominance could change if key constituencies\u2019 attitudes shift as a result of political or economic developments. For example, Turkey\u2019s economic well-being depends on foreign exchange and investment, and the flow of capital could decrease if international investors have less confidence in the Turkish market under increased state controls. \nUnder the post-coup-attempt state of emergency, Turkey\u2019s government has cracked down on domestic political opponents. A primary focus, in addition to the Gulen movement, appears to be Turkey\u2019s Kurdish minority. Heightened ethnic Turkish-Kurdish tensions predated the attempted coup, having been exacerbated since mid-2015 by renewed conflict between government forces and the PKK. Key Kurdish political leaders have been imprisoned since late 2016.\nPresident Erdogan\u2019s consolidation of power amid challenges to Turkey\u2019s national security and economy has attracted criticism from some governments and other sectors of society in the United States and Europe who view Erdogan as increasingly authoritarian and anti-Western. Criticism of Erdogan among some Members of Congress spiked after an incident during Erdogan\u2019s May 2017 visit to Washington, DC, in which members of his security detail appear to have assaulted individuals protesting near the Turkish ambassador\u2019s residence.\nSome analysts posit that in light of geopolitical realities involving Syria and increasing public contention between Turkey\u2019s leaders and the West (including in the aftermath of the July 2016 failed coup), Erdogan may opt to seek closer relations with Russia, possibly at the expense of Turkey\u2019s long-term ties with the United States and Europe. However, Turkey also has a long history of tension with Russia. Russia and Turkey reportedly reached a preliminary $2.5 billion agreement in July 2017 under which Turkey would receive two S-400 missile batteries within a year and then produce two others domestically. Turkish Defense Minister Fikri Isik announced in July that the S-400 deal would \u201cmeet Turkey\u2019s urgent requirements,\u201d but also that Turkey anticipates cultivating a more long-term missile defense relationship with the French-Italian consortium Eurosam in the wake of a preliminary Turkey-Eurosam deal on joint research, development, and production. President Erdogan confirmed the S-400 preliminary deal in September 2017.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "290c837cb34cfbe95b070adc494f4c0c42a262ee", "filename": "files/20170919_R44000_290c837cb34cfbe95b070adc494f4c0c42a262ee.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20170919_R44000_images_d1613659c4c13f5d1af4cfe418a9fa0fa4bf8621.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170919_R44000_images_8f13c36fa79346c7ab87715a1ae9bffea08c7b2f.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "2f4dd463c206b615a5ecb847538f9d906b529ade", "filename": "files/20170919_R44000_2f4dd463c206b615a5ecb847538f9d906b529ade.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461097, "date": "2017-05-11", "retrieved": "2017-08-22T14:50:07.152203", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Turkey faces a range of foreign and domestic challenges, several of which have largely intensified since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements from within the military. These challenges have significant relevance for U.S. interests and the active role Congress plays in shaping and overseeing bilateral relations. Turkish leaders reportedly expect or hope for an improvement in certain aspects of its relations with the United States under the Trump Administration, but early indications are unclear on whether significant changes are forthcoming.\nThis report provides information and analysis on key issues with implications for the U.S.-Turkey relationship, including\nSyria. Turkish efforts to counter the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or by the Arabic acronym Da\u2019esh) in concert with the United States, and complicated dynamics in the region involving several state (i.e., Russia and Iran) and nonstate actors, including U.S. efforts to partner with Syrian Kurds linked to the Turkish-origin Kurdish militant group PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).\nApril 2017 Constitutional Referendum, Its Implementation, and Other Domestic Issues. Various political and economic developments, including (1) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan\u2019s narrow and contested victory in an April 2017 constitutional referendum aimed at formally consolidating presidential power and significantly changing Turkey\u2019s system of governance; (2) intensifying concerns regarding rule of law and freedom of expression; and (3) ongoing contention between Turkey\u2019s government and its Kurdish minority. \nU.S. and NATO Strategic Cooperation with Turkey.\nBy launching a military intervention in Syria (known in its early stages as Operation Euphrates Shield), Turkey apparently adopted a more independent and flexible stance regarding (1) outcomes in Syria and (2) actors it can work with to achieve those outcomes. After permitting Islamist groups to use its territory to politically and militarily undermine Syrian President Bashar al Asad during the first few years of Syria\u2019s civil war, while also seeking to avoid direct military action in Syria, Turkey\u2019s willingness to undertake operations with or without U.S. help may indicate that Turkish leaders decided to accept the risks of establishing and maintaining a zone of control or strong influence near its border in order to address the following threats:\nYPG territorial gains in Syria that could undermine Turkey\u2019s political and economic influence there and the Turkish government\u2019s political and military leverage over the PKK in Turkey.\nIS cross-border activity that exacerbated the threat of terrorism within Turkey. \nGreater Iranian influence in the region via Alawite and Shia allies in Syria and Iraq, possibly at the expense of a Turkish sphere of influence in both countries.\nCross-border refugee flows that had already brought approximately 3 million people from Syria into Turkey since 2011.\nIn an April 16, 2017, nationwide referendum, constitutional changes to establish a \u201cpresidential system\u201d in Turkey appear to have been adopted via a 51.4% favorable vote, in what possibly represents a threshold moment for the future of democracy in Turkey. The changes significantly alter the country\u2019s system of governance, with probable ripple effects for its dealings with the outside world. The contentious campaign and close vote, accompanied by allegations of fraud and other irregularities, threaten to deepen ongoing instability in Turkish society. Assuming that the outcome holds, most of the changes will take effect after Turkey's next presidential and parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for November 2019 but could take place earlier if parliament calls for them.\nWhen, how, and by whom the constitutional amendments will be implemented remain unclear. Erdogan has dominated Turkish electoral politics since 2002 and it is uncertain whether viable opposition could materialize in the next two years. However, his dominance could change if key constituencies\u2019 attitudes shift as a result of the referendum or other factors. For example, Turkey\u2019s economic well-being depends on foreign exchange and investment, and the flow of capital could decrease if international investors have less confidence in the Turkish market under increased state controls.\nUnder the state of emergency that parliament approved shortly after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey\u2019s government has cracked down on domestic political opponents. A primary focus, in addition to the Gulen movement, appears to be Turkey\u2019s Kurdish minority. Heightened ethnic Turkish-Kurdish tensions predated the attempted coup, having been exacerbated since mid-2015 by renewed conflict between government forces and the PKK.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "afa6b3f76af21f8859060da84dd0c9eaeda49d27", "filename": "files/20170511_R44000_afa6b3f76af21f8859060da84dd0c9eaeda49d27.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/1.png": "files/20170511_R44000_images_a41203e01509b82bdd9c6321b7139a4fade9e323.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44000_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170511_R44000_images_c91ee42138e6f5b3b33cd18c33e326d69cea530c.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "ce4f61c9ef227d49a9d9e3d006b1c152c016a085", "filename": "files/20170511_R44000_ce4f61c9ef227d49a9d9e3d006b1c152c016a085.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 459880, "date": "2017-03-21", "retrieved": "2017-03-22T18:25:12.604662", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Turkey faces a range of foreign and domestic challenges, several of which have largely intensified since a failed July 2016 coup attempt by elements from within the military. These challenges have significant relevance for U.S. interests and the active role Congress plays in shaping and overseeing bilateral relations. Turkish leaders reportedly expect or hope for an improvement in certain aspects of its relations with the United States under the Trump Administration, but early indications are unclear on whether significant changes are forthcoming.\nThis report provides information and analysis on key issues with implications for the U.S.-Turkey relationship, including\nSyria. Turkish efforts to counter the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or by the Arabic acronym Da\u2019esh) in concert with the United States, and complicated dynamics in the region involving several state (i.e., Russia and Iran) and non-state actors, including U.S. efforts to partner with Syrian Kurds linked to the Turkish-origin Kurdish militant group PKK (Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party or Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization).\nApril 2017 Constitutional Referendum and Other Domestic Issues. Various political and economic developments, including (1) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan\u2019s controversial initiative toward formally consolidating power and significantly changing Turkey\u2019s system of governance via a constitutional referendum scheduled for April 16, 2017; (2) intensifying concerns regarding rule of law and freedom of expression; and (3) ongoing contention between Turkey\u2019s government and its Kurdish minority. \nU.S. and NATO Strategic Cooperation with Turkey.\nBy launching Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey apparently adopted a more independent and flexible stance regarding (1) outcomes in Syria and (2) actors it can work with to achieve those outcomes. After permitting Islamist groups to use its territory to politically and militarily undermine Asad during the first few years of Syria\u2019s civil war, while also seeking to avoid direct military action in Syria, Turkey\u2019s willingness to pursue OES with or without U.S. help may indicate that Turkish leaders decided to accept the risks of establishing and maintaining a zone of control or strong influence near its border in order to address the following threats:\nYPG territorial gains in Syria that could undermine Turkey\u2019s political and economic influence there and the Turkish government\u2019s political and military leverage over the PKK in Turkey.\nIS cross-border activity that exacerbated the threat of terrorism within Turkey. \nGreater Iranian influence in the region via Alawite and Shia allies in Syria and Iraq, possibly at the expense of a Turkish sphere of influence in both countries.\nCross-border refugee flows that had already brought approximately 3 million people from Syria into Turkey since 2011.\nIn January 2017, Turkey\u2019s parliament submitted a draft package of amendments to the country\u2019s 1982 constitution for a nationwide referendum that is scheduled for April 16, 2017, and could represent a threshold moment for the future of democracy in Turkey. If approved via the April referendum, the constitutional proposals would significantly alter Turkey\u2019s system of governance, with probable ripple effects for its dealings with the outside world.\nUnder the state of emergency that parliament approved shortly after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey\u2019s government has cracked down on domestic political opponents. A primary focus, in addition to the Gulen movement, appears to be Turkey\u2019s Kurdish minority. Heightened ethnic Turkish-Kurdish tensions predated the attempted coup, having been exacerbated since mid-2015 by renewed conflict between government forces and the PKK.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "08fc5de9a7392a23f7563fd88ef362fbd61e556a", "filename": "files/20170321_R44000_08fc5de9a7392a23f7563fd88ef362fbd61e556a.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "474e26fe0a296a0cc3a2a0316de505d28d9c4b6e", "filename": "files/20170321_R44000_474e26fe0a296a0cc3a2a0316de505d28d9c4b6e.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 455370, "date": "2016-08-26", "retrieved": "2016-10-17T19:32:53.817124", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "Several Turkish foreign and domestic policy issues have significant relevance for U.S. interests, and Congress plays an active role in shaping and overseeing U.S. relations with Turkey. \nThis report provides information and analysis on key issues in the aftermath of the failed July 15-16, 2016, coup attempt, including\nthe response of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Turkish government\u2014including significant personnel and institutional changes, and calls for the United States to extradite Fethullah Gulen (see below)\u2014amid Turkey\u2019s continuing domestic and regional challenges; \nimplications for Turkey\u2019s cooperation with the United States and NATO; \nU.S.-Turkey dealings and other aspects regarding Syria that involve the Islamic State organization (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or the Arabic acronym Da\u2019esh) and Kurdish groups.\nThe July 2016 failed coup and Turkey\u2019s trajectory in its aftermath could significantly impact U.S.-Turkey relations given Turkey\u2019s regional importance and membership in NATO. Among NATO allies, only the U.S. military has more active duty personnel than Turkey\u2019s. \nSpecific issues of concern with implications for U.S. policy going forward include\nTurkey\u2019s NATO Role. U.S./NATO basing and operations in Turkey, joint exercises and expeditionary missions, and NATO assistance (including air defense batteries and AWACS aircraft) to address Turkey\u2019s external threats.\nArms Sales and Bilateral Military Cooperation. U.S. arms sales or potential sales to Turkey include F-35 next-generation fighter aircraft. The United States provides annual security-related aid to Turkey of approximately $3-$5 million. \nSyria and Iraq Issues and Anti-IS Coalition. Including U.S.-Turkey dynamics involving the Islamic State, Kurds within and outside Turkey, other state and non-state actors, and contested territory in northern Syria.\nDomestic Stability, Human Rights, and Kurdish Issues. Including the government\u2019s approach to rule of law, civil liberties, terrorist threats, Kurds and other minorities, and nearly 3 million refugees and migrants from Syria and elsewhere. \nBorder Concerns. Turkey\u2019s ability and willingness, in concert with other international actors, to control cross-border flows of refugees, migrants, and possible foreign fighters and terrorists.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "dc4260dbc7c4c2f454baf5db5c07f4b75f6b4633", "filename": "files/20160826_R44000_dc4260dbc7c4c2f454baf5db5c07f4b75f6b4633.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "81072458e0dc812219a81d481c49186464ebd6de", "filename": "files/20160826_R44000_81072458e0dc812219a81d481c49186464ebd6de.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4758, "name": "Middle East & North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4786, "name": "Europe, Russia, & Eurasia" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc944814/", "id": "R44000_2016Aug04", "date": "2016-08-04", "retrieved": "2017-01-15T21:55:28", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "This report provides information and analysis on key issues related to Turkish foreign and domestic policy issues, particularly regarding the aftermath of the failed July 15-16, 2016 coup attempt.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20160804_R44000_386d080a5da5ac34157ed5cfcbbb7ec8e7b9e639.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20160804_R44000_386d080a5da5ac34157ed5cfcbbb7ec8e7b9e639.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Turkey -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Turkey -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Turkey", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Turkey" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "NATO countries", "name": "NATO countries" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 450901, "date": "2016-03-18", "retrieved": "2016-03-24T16:50:59.588492", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "There have been many situations in which the United States and Turkey have cooperated during their decades-long alliance in NATO, but at many times they have also been at odds. Differences have stemmed largely from on divergences in leaders\u2019 assessments of respective interests given their differing (1) geographical positions, (2) threat perceptions, and (3) roles in regional and global political and security architectures. Nonetheless, both countries have continued to affirm the importance of an enduring strategic relationship.\nA number of developments, such as international jihadist terror incidents and refugee flows, particularly in the past year, have driven U.S. expectations regarding Turkish cooperation with respect to Syria and Iraq. Such expectations seem to center on Turkey\u2019s willingness and ability to:\nprevent the flow of fighters, weapons, oil, and other non-humanitarian supplies into and out of Syria from benefitting the Islamic State and other global jihadist movements; and\nclearly prioritize anti-IS efforts in relation to other strategic concerns regarding Kurdish groups and the Asad regime in Syria.\nThough some observers alleged that Turkey had been slow in 2013 and 2014 to curtail activities involving its territory that were seen as bolstering ISIS and other Sunni extremist groups, Turkey has partnered with the U.S.-led anti-IS coalition, including through hosting coalition aircraft (since summer 2015) that strike targets in Syria and Iraq. Other regional U.S. partners include several Arab states, Iraq\u2019s central government, and Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria. \nBut Turkish leaders still confront domestic pressures and security vulnerabilities. They have sought greater intelligence sharing from foreign fighters\u2019 countries of origin, with some success. Turkey also faces the significant burden of hosting refugees from Syria and elsewhere; more than two million refugees have entered Turkey since 2011, and they are particularly concentrated in its southeast and its main urban centers. Turkish priorities for Syria and Iraq seem to include\ncountering threats to Turkish security, territorial integrity, and domestic stability;\nreducing Turkey\u2019s responsibilities for refugees; and\nachieving lasting resolutions in order to relieve refugee flows and other challenges to Turkey, promote Turkey\u2019s regional influence, and provide substantive political empowerment for Sunni Arabs and Turkmen. \nTurkish domestic politics feature controversies regarding power, constitutional democracy, corruption, and civil liberties. Contentious discussions also focus on ongoing Turkey-PKK conflict with the potential to destabilize significant areas of the country, security concerns regarding Syria and Iraq, and economic issues. Recently, the government has reportedly intimidated or arrested several Turkish journalists with a history of criticizing Erdogan and the AKP, and has taken over a number of media outlets. It is unclear whether non-Turkish actors will play a significant role in resolving questions about Turkey\u2019s commitment to democracy and limited government, its secular-religious balance, and its Kurdish question. Erdogan and his supporters periodically resort to criticism of Western countries in apparent efforts to galvanize domestic political support against outside influences.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44000", "sha1": "18d4921747356ba248cdd346bf76ebf1cdda7898", "filename": "files/20160318_R44000_18d4921747356ba248cdd346bf76ebf1cdda7898.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44000", "sha1": "8ad764da07cb6f6793c0e39f0d7e7d6ef158881a", "filename": "files/20160318_R44000_8ad764da07cb6f6793c0e39f0d7e7d6ef158881a.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 282, "name": "Middle East and North Africa" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4636, "name": "Europe: Regional Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Key Issues" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc795877/", "id": "R44000_2015Nov13", "date": "2015-11-13", "retrieved": "2016-01-13T14:26:20", "title": "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", "summary": "This report provides information and analysis relevant for Congress on the following: Assessments of U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey's strategic orientation, Turkish efforts to cooperate with the United States against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and key issues regarding Turkey's domestic politics.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20151113_R44000_fa50621ef0811f016c2154b65f8bfb2b497e62d0.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20151113_R44000_fa50621ef0811f016c2154b65f8bfb2b497e62d0.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Turkey -- U.S.", "name": "Foreign relations -- Turkey -- U.S." }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Turkey", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Turkey" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "NATO countries", "name": "NATO countries" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Politics and government", "name": "Politics and government" } ] }, { "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department", "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc627098/", "id": "R44000_2015Apr23", "date": "2015-04-23", "retrieved": "2015-06-15T14:46:40", "title": "Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive", "summary": "This report provides information and analysis relevant for Congress on the following: Assessments of U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey's strategic orientation.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORT", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "filename": "files/20150423_R44000_dbaa3b980772c0790fa6e61287ec306c4da78742.pdf" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20150423_R44000_dbaa3b980772c0790fa6e61287ec306c4da78742.html" } ], "topics": [ { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign policy", "name": "Foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Domestic politics and foreign policy", "name": "Domestic politics and foreign policy" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Turkey", "name": "Foreign relations -- U.S. -- Turkey" }, { "source": "LIV", "id": "Foreign relations -- Turkey -- US", "name": "Foreign relations -- Turkey -- US" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "Middle Eastern Affairs", "National Defense" ] }