{
  "id": "R44103",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R44103",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 442890,
      "date": "2015-06-24",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T18:53:12.171010",
      "title": "U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization: Background and Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "Determining the future role of U.S. nuclear weapons within the U.S. national security strategy is currently a topic of much debate. Many senior leaders are determined to design a strategy that defines a new role for U.S. nuclear weapons and makes those weapons responsive and relevant in today\u2019s global threat environment. The current U.S. nuclear enterprise consists of a triad of options: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers. All three legs of the nuclear triad are aging, since they were largely built to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. Policymakers in Congress and the Executive Branch are now deciding whether to modernize or replace parts of each leg.\nThe Obama Administration\u2019s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines its approach to reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted the current nuclear dangers in the global environment and declared the United States will \u201cseek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.\u201d The Nuclear Posture Review provides the roadmap for implementing President Obama\u2019s agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the international community.\nThis raises several issues for Congress particularly regarding the Triad\u2019s ICBM component. First, Congress may consider whether the current plans for the nuclear enterprise are sufficient to address the problems within the ICBM force or whether there may be other ways to sustain the current force. Second, Congress may consider whether the United States should continue to deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear force structure, particularly in light of expected financial constraints. It may consider whether nuclear weapons modernization programs will compete with each other, or with conventional weapons programs, for scarce resources. Finally, Congress may address questions about whether the United States can afford to forgo ICBM sustainment and modernization programs in an era of changing national security challenges.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": true,
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      "topics": []
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  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}