{ "id": "R44122", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R44122", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 443403, "date": "2015-07-24", "retrieved": "2016-04-06T18:44:09.216720", "title": "Charter-Time Warner Cable-Bright House Networks Mergers: Overview and Issues", "summary": "In May 2015, Charter Communications, Inc. announced that it reached agreements with Time Warner Cable Inc. (TWC) to merge the two companies in a deal valued at $78.7 billion, including the assumption of debt, and with Advance/Newhouse Partnership to acquire Bright House Networks (BHN) for $10.4 billion. The combination of Charter, TWC, and BHN would create a single entity providing cable television and broadband access service to 23.9 million customers in 41 states, making it the nation\u2019s second-largest cable television operator and broadband access provider. \nThe proposed merger raises a number of potential concerns, reflecting the complex structure of the television industry and substantial changes in the way consumers choose to receive video programming. The many firms involved in content ownership, aggregation and packaging, and distribution of video programming often must cooperate with one another at the same time they are competing. Companies in the television industry are in frequent negotiation with one another for the right to transmit programming, and the merger of three players into a very large one could change the relative bargaining power of other parties. At the same time, growing numbers of consumers are now viewing programs online at a time of their choosing rather than subscribing to traditional cable or satellite services or watching based on a broadcaster\u2019s schedule. The proposed Charter transactions have the potential to affect the development of this relatively new online video distribution industry by inhibiting distributors\u2019 access to programming or their ability to send programs to customers over the Internet.\nAt the federal level, both the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) must approve Charter\u2019s transactions before they can close. The DOJ will investigate whether the proposed transactions would reduce competition. The FCC will investigate whether the proposed transactions would, on balance, be in the public interest. \nAs regulatory authorities begin their review of Charter\u2019s proposed transactions, three key issues related to television industry competition may merit analysis: 1) whether the presence of members of Charter\u2019s board of directors on the boards of several companies that create television programming, including the cable networks Discovery and Starz and film and television studio Lions Gate, might impede competition in the distribution of television programming; 2) whether the fact that a major investor in Charter, John Malone, also controls some shares of a competitor to Charter, DIRECTV (whose proposed sale to AT&T has met federal regulatory approval), could reduce competition among video distributors to acquire programming from creators and to sell programming to consumers; and 3) whether Charter\u2019s assumption of TWC\u2019s various joint ventures and partnerships with Comcast Corporation, the largest cable television and broadband access provider in the United States, would reduce competition to acquire programming from creators and disadvantage online video distributors.\nIn addition, the agencies may evaluate whether Charter\u2019s proposed commitments regarding service quality and availability would be sufficient to mitigate potential harms. To obtain FCC approval, Charter is likely to make a number of commitments regarding service quality and availability. However, the company would assume more than $24 billion of debt through the transactions, and the FCC may be concerned that this debt could compromise Charter\u2019s ability to fulfil commitments to provide sufficient capacity to deliver online video and other services to its broadband subscribers.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44122", "sha1": "9f4423e80dc72b603216abc4cf7fb1f5353ce5aa", "filename": "files/20150724_R44122_9f4423e80dc72b603216abc4cf7fb1f5353ce5aa.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44122", "sha1": "257a0e62efcabf264b095fdb81ed29fb2224cbff", "filename": "files/20150724_R44122_257a0e62efcabf264b095fdb81ed29fb2224cbff.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 2111, "name": "Telecommunications and Media Convergence" } ] } ], "topics": [] }