{
  "id": "R44142",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R44142",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 448361,
      "date": "2015-08-06",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T18:38:22.518054",
      "title": "Iran Nuclear Agreement: Selected Issues for Congress",
      "summary": "The nuclear agreement between Iran and six negotiating powers (\u201cP5+1:\u201d United States, France, Britain, Germany, Russia, and China), finalized on July 14, 2015, raises a wide variety of issues as Congress undertakes a formal review under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17). The Administration submitted the 150+ page text (including annexes) of the \u201cJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action,\u201d (JCPOA) to Congress on July 19, 2015, and the period for congressional review under the act is to conclude on September 17. Should the agreement stand after review processes in Congress and in Iran\u2019s national security and legislative bodies, the JCPOA would enter into force 90 days from July 20, 2015, the date that U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231 was adopted. The Resolution endorsed the JCPOA and called on U.N. member states to assist in its implementation. \nBroadly, the accord represents an exchange of limitations on Iran\u2019s nuclear program for the lifting or suspension of U.S., U.N., and European Union (EU) sanctions. The text contains relatively complicated provisions for inspections of undeclared Iranian nuclear facilities, processes for adjudicating complaints by any of the parties for nonperformance of commitments, \u201csnap-back\u201d provisions for U.N. sanctions, finite durations for many of Iran\u2019s nuclear commitments, and broad U.N., E.U., and U.S. commitments to suspend or lift most of the numerous sanctions imposed on Iran since 2010. Many of the agreement\u2019s provisions have raised questions about the degree to which the accord can accomplish the P5+1 objectives that were stated when P5+1-Iran negotiations began in 2006. On the other hand, many have asserted that there is a lack of alternatives that could ensure that Iran\u2019s nuclear program is purely peaceful with greater certainty and with fewer risks. \nThe agreement could have significant implications for the Middle East region and for U.S.-Iran relations, the latter of which have been characterized primarily by animosity since Iran\u2019s 1979 Islamic revolution. The agreement also raises questions about the U.S. approach to regional security and the security of key U.S. allies, and the potential for resolving some of the region\u2019s many conflicts, including those generated by the Islamic State organization.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": true,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "encoding": "utf-8",
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44142",
          "sha1": "2fa2fca9fe023edf14dd230c798ff7147cbfeba8",
          "filename": "files/20150806_R44142_2fa2fca9fe023edf14dd230c798ff7147cbfeba8.html",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44142",
          "sha1": "1770ee4fd24081eecb4e47a3128e6af359cc9fdd",
          "filename": "files/20150806_R44142_1770ee4fd24081eecb4e47a3128e6af359cc9fdd.pdf",
          "images": null
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economic Policy",
    "Energy Policy",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "Middle Eastern Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}