{
  "id": "R44273",
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      "date": "2016-10-26",
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      "title": "Federal Reserve: Legislation in the 114th Congress",
      "summary": "The Federal Reserve (Fed) is the subject of legislation being considered in the 114th Congress. These bills contain wide-ranging provisions that can be grouped into four broad categories:\nChanges to Fed governance. Some proposals would change the Fed\u2019s institutional structure. H.R. 22 (P.L. 114-94) reduced the dividend paid by the Fed to large commercial banks that hold stock in the Fed and permanently capped the Fed\u2019s surplus at $10 billion. H.R. 3189 would permanently eliminate the Fed\u2019s surplus. H.R. 26 (P.L. 114-1) required at least one nominee for the Fed\u2019s board of governors to have community banking experience. S. 1484/S. 1910 would make the New York Fed President a presidentially appointed position. H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983 would increase the voting weight of regional Fed presidents on the FOMC. S. 1484/S. 1910, H.R. 3189, H.R. 5983, and H.R. 2912 would create a congressional commission to recommend reforms to the Fed.\nChanges to oversight and disclosure. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress and the public. H.R. 24, S. 2232, H.R. 3189, and H.R. 5983 would require Government Accountability Office (GAO) audits of the Fed that are not subject to current statutory restrictions. H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983 would subject the Fed\u2019s rulemakings to cost-benefit analysis requirements and require the Fed to publicly disclose information on international negotiations and the salaries and personal finances of certain officials and employees. H.R. 3189, H.R. 5983, and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the FOMC to publicly release meeting transcripts. H.R. 5983 would subject the Fed\u2019s non-monetary policy functions to the congressional appropriations process. \nChanges involving monetary policy rules (the Taylor Rule). H.R. 3189, H.R. 5983, and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a policy rule (Taylor Rule) and report those findings to Congress. Policy deviations from the rule would trigger GAO audits and congressional testimony in H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983.\nChanges to the Fed\u2019s emergency lending powers. H.R. 3189 and H.R. 5983 would reduce the Fed\u2019s discretion to make emergency loans under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed used this authority to extend credit to non-bank financial firms during the financial crisis.\nThe proposals reviewed in this report are wide ranging and diverse; many are united by the goals of increasing the Fed\u2019s accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Although some provisions make very minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably somewhat reduce the Fed\u2019s independence from Congress. The Fed is more independent than most other agencies, which has traditionally been justified by its monetary policy responsibilities. Most research has found a positive relationship between monetary policy independence and economic outcomes. To some extent, a tradeoff between independence and accountability is unavoidable.\nThis report analyzes bills that have seen committee or floor action and the policy debate surrounding them.",
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      "id": 452717,
      "date": "2016-05-19",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T19:03:18.875941",
      "title": "Federal Reserve: Legislation in the 114th Congress",
      "summary": "The Federal Reserve (Fed) is the subject of legislation being considered in the 114th Congress. These bills contain wide-ranging provisions that can be grouped into four broad categories:\nChanges to Fed governance. Some proposals would change the Fed\u2019s institutional structure. H.R. 22 (P.L. 114-94) reduced the dividend paid by the Fed to large commercial banks that hold stock in the Fed and permanently capped the Fed\u2019s surplus at $10 billion. H.R. 3189 would permanently eliminate the Fed\u2019s surplus. H.R. 26 (P.L. 114-1) changed and H.R. 3189 would change the qualifications for selecting individuals to the Fed\u2019s board of governors and regional bank boards, respectively. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would make the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) responsible for setting the interest rate paid on bank reserves and provide each Fed governor with their own staff. S. 1484/S. 1910 would make the New York Fed President a presidentially appointed position. H.R. 3189 would change the voting privileges of FOMC members. S. 1484/S. 1910, H.R. 3189, and H.R. 2912 would create a congressional commission to recommend reforms.\nChanges to oversight and disclosure. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress and the public. H.R. 24 and S. 2232 would require a one-time Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Fed that is not subject to statutory restrictions. H.R. 3189 would require GAO to audit the Fed annually without statutory restrictions; subject the Fed\u2019s rulemakings to cost-benefit analysis requirements; create a blackout period surrounding FOMC meetings; and require the Fed to publicly disclose the salaries of certain officials and employees and more information on stress tests, supervisory letters, and international negotiations. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to report quarterly on monetary policy, require the FOMC to publicly release transcripts, and require the chair to testify semiannually on regulation when the vice chair for supervision position is vacant. S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the chair to testify quarterly on monetary policy, allow other members of the FOMC to submit dissenting opinions to Congress, require the governors to take a recorded vote on larger enforcement actions, and require the Fed to report on and GAO to conduct a study on the Fed\u2019s regulation of large financial firms.\nChanges involving the Taylor Rule. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a Taylor Rule and report those findings to Congress. Policy deviations from the rule would trigger GAO audits and congressional testimony in H.R. 3189.\nChanges to the Fed\u2019s emergency lending powers. H.R. 3189 would reduce the Fed\u2019s discretion to make emergency loans under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed used this authority to make loans to non-bank financial firms during the financial crisis.\nThe various proposals reviewed in this report are wide ranging and diverse; many are united by the goals of increasing the Fed\u2019s accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Although some provisions make very minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably somewhat reduce the Fed\u2019s independence from Congress. The Fed is more independent than most other agencies, which has traditionally been justified by its monetary policy responsibilities. To some extent, a tradeoff between independence and accountability is unavoidable.\nThis report analyzes these provisions and the policy debate surrounding them. It covers bills that have seen committee or floor action.",
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      "id": 448708,
      "date": "2016-01-13",
      "retrieved": "2016-04-06T17:30:12.226066",
      "title": "Federal Reserve: Legislation in the 114th Congress",
      "summary": "The Federal Reserve (Fed) is the subject of legislation being considered in the 114th Congress. These bills contain wide-ranging provisions that can be grouped into four broad categories:\nChanges to Fed governance. Some proposals would change the Fed\u2019s institutional structure. H.R. 22 (P.L. 114-94) reduced the dividend paid by the Fed to large commercial banks that hold stock in the Fed and permanently capped the Fed\u2019s surplus at $10 billion. H.R. 3189 would permanently eliminate the Fed\u2019s surplus. H.R. 26 (P.L. 114-1) changed and H.R. 3189 would change the qualifications for selecting individuals to the Fed\u2019s board of governors and regional bank boards, respectively. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would make the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) responsible for setting the interest rate paid on bank reserves and provide each Fed governor with their own staff. S. 1484/S. 1910 would make the New York Fed President a presidentially appointed position. H.R. 3189 would change the voting privileges of FOMC members. S. 1484/S. 1910, H.R. 3189, and H.R. 2912 would create a congressional commission to recommend reforms.\nChanges to oversight and disclosure. Some proposals aim to make the Fed more accountable to Congress by increasing congressional oversight or requiring the Fed to disclose more information to Congress and the public. S. 2232 would require a one-time Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit of the Fed that is not subject to statutory restrictions. H.R. 3189 would require GAO to audit the Fed annually without statutory restrictions, subject the Fed\u2019s rulemakings to cost-benefit analysis requirements; create a blackout period surrounding FOMC meetings; and require the Fed to publicly disclose the salaries of certain officials and employees and more information on stress tests, supervisory letters, and international negotiations. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to report quarterly on monetary policy, require the FOMC to publicly release transcripts, and require the chair to testify semiannually on regulation when the vice chair for supervision position is vacant. S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the chair to testify quarterly on monetary policy, allow other members of the FOMC to submit dissenting opinions to Congress, require the governors to take a recorded vote on larger enforcement actions, and require the Fed to report on and GAO to conduct a study on the Fed\u2019s regulation of large financial firms.\nChanges involving the Taylor Rule. H.R. 3189 and S. 1484/S. 1910 would require the Fed to compare its monetary policy decisions to those prescribed by a Taylor Rule and report those findings to Congress. Policy deviations from the rule would trigger GAO audits and congressional testimony in H.R. 3189.\nChanges to the Fed\u2019s emergency lending powers. H.R. 3189 would reduce the Fed\u2019s discretion to make emergency loans under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act. The Fed used this authority to make loans to non-bank financial firms during the financial crisis.\nThe various proposals reviewed in this report are wide ranging and diverse; many are united by the goals of increasing the Fed\u2019s accountability to Congress and decreasing Fed discretion. Although some provisions make very minor changes, taken together the proposals would arguably somewhat reduce the Fed\u2019s independence from Congress. The Fed is more independent than most other agencies, which has traditionally been justified by its monetary policy responsibilities. To some extent, a tradeoff between independence and accountability is unavoidable.\nThis report analyzes these provisions and the policy debate surrounding them. It covers bills that have seen committee or floor action.",
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      "id": "R44273_2015Dec15",
      "date": "2015-12-15",
      "retrieved": "2016-03-19T13:57:26",
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