{ "id": "R44563", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R44563", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 454473, "date": "2016-07-14", "retrieved": "2016-11-28T21:55:28.203684", "title": "Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa", "summary": "The pace of high-profile terrorist attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa has intensified in recent years, and the death toll now rivals that of other regions where violent Islamist extremist groups are active. This report provides context for these trends, including a summary of sub-regional dynamics, factors affecting radicalization, and U.S. responses. It focuses primarily on Sunni Islamist terrorism, given the ideological underpinnings of the African groups currently designated by the U.S. State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Select issues for Congress are also explored. Information on the major Africa-based groups is provided in an Appendix.\nOver the past two decades, Congress has appropriated increasing funding to counter terrorism in Africa and has demonstrated interest in the nature of terrorist threats and efforts to counter them. Members have raised questions regarding\nthe threat violent extremist groups in Africa may pose to U.S. citizens and U.S. interests; \nthe counterterrorism capacities of African countries and the impact of U.S. efforts to bolster them;\nthe role of the U.S. military in countering violent extremist groups in Africa; \nthe level of U.S. funding and personnel dedicated to these efforts; and\nthe extent to which U.S. programs are successful in seeking to prevent or mitigate radicalization, recruitment, and support for violent extremist groups.\nSome Africa-based groups have affiliated with Al Qaeda or the self-proclaimed Islamic State, but many seem to operate autonomously. While many extremists on the continent appear to be driven primarily by local political and socioeconomic dynamics, some African groups have sought to attack Western interests in Africa, and some, like Somalia\u2019s Al Shabaab, apparently seek to inspire or carry out attacks in the United States and elsewhere. The spillover effects from areas where terrorist groups operate\u2014most notably Libya, Mali, northeast Nigeria, and Somalia\u2014are of increasing concern to neighboring states and the broader region.\nSeveral emerging trends in violent Islamist extremist activity on the continent are impacting how governments in the region, local communities, and international actors respond:\nProliferation of African-Led Groups. Al Qaeda\u2019s first avowed African affiliate, Algerian-led Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), was long assumed to have limited appeal among West African Muslims, and its interest in criminal activities often seemed to eclipse its ideological commitment. However, the rise of relatively potent, locally led violent Islamist groups in Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali over the past decade challenges past assumptions about the limited prospects for Islamist terrorism on the continent. Africa also appears to have become an arena for competition between Al Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State over recruits, affiliates, and perceived legitimacy.\nThe Push and Pull of North Africa. State collapse in Libya and political transitions in Tunisia and Egypt have provided new opportunities for armed groups to establish safe havens for training, expand their geographic reach, recruit followers, and equip themselves. Protecting and sustaining Tunisia\u2019s nascent democratic government has become a focus for U.S. policymakers in light of these trends. Contrary to some hopes, however, increased political openness has not inoculated Tunisia against domestic radicalization and recruitment. Conflict in Libya has spilled over its borders, generating new flows of arms and combatants into Tunisia and West Africa\u2019s Sahel region. Instability in North Africa has also drawn African recruits seeking to join groups based in Libya, or seeking to transit through North Africa en route to other global hotspots. Mutual distrust among North and Sub-Saharan African governments has inhibited counterterrorism cooperation, as have bureaucratic divisions within some donor governments.\nFrom Holding Territory to Asymmetric Attacks. Years before the \u201cIslamic State\u201d announced its caliphate in Iraq and Syria in 2014, Islamist extremist groups in Africa sought to hold, and in some cases govern, territory. Al Shabaab began to assert territorial control in Somalia in the mid-2000s, as did AQIM and two local affiliates in Mali in 2012, followed by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Islamic State-linked groups in Libya in 2014. Military offensives by regional forces (in Somalia, Nigeria, and Libya) and French forces (in Mali) have reversed this trend, but gains are fragile. In response, extremists have reverted to asymmetric tactics and expanded the scope of their targets. \nAttacks on Urban \u201cSoft Targets\u201d by a Resurgent AQIM. For much of the past decade, AQIM focused primarily on lucrative kidnap-for-ransom operations, attacks on local military and police posts, and insurgent operations in remote areas. As of 2013, the group appeared to have been weakened by internal divisions and by French military operations in Mali that killed or captured several key figures. However, three recent AQIM-linked attacks on hotels and restaurants popular with Western expatriates\u2014in Mali (November 2015), Burkina Faso (January 2016), and C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire (March 2016)\u2014were among the group\u2019s deadliest ever, killing dozens of Western civilians and placing AQIM back at the center of regional terrorism dynamics. AQIM and its former rival splinter movement Al Murabitoun jointly claimed responsibility, signaling their apparent renewed merger. These attacks also appeared to signal a shift in tactics, piquing concerns about the vulnerability of cosmopolitan cities with large expatriate communities, such as Dakar, Accra, and Abidjan. As a result, local governments and donors, including the United States, are considering new programs to bolster West African urban crisis response capabilities, in addition to ongoing military train-and-equip counterterrorism programs.\nChallenges. African-led responses to terrorist threats have been constrained by limited resources and capacity, institutional weaknesses, conflicting political agendas, corruption, sensitivities over domestic sovereignty, regional rivalries, and uneven engagement among affected states. These challenges have also undermined the effectiveness of efforts by concerned international actors and donors\u2014including the United States\u2014to respond. U.S. policymakers face a number of dilemmas, including how to prioritize U.S. counterterrorism activities in Africa (both within the continent and compared to other regions); how to define a threshold for the use of U.S. military force against terrorist groups on the continent; whether and how to balance a large infusion of military aid to affected African countries with investments in law enforcement, development, and governance; and how to measure and assess the impact of U.S. efforts. The question of how and when to partner with authoritarian states for counterterrorism purposes\u2014and what consequences this may have on long-term regional stability and the pursuit of other U.S. policy objectives\u2014is particularly thorny. \nFurther CRS Reading: CRS In Focus IF10172, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al Murabitoun; CRS In Focus IF10170, Al Shabaab; CRS Report R43558, Nigeria\u2019s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions; CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10116, Mali: Transition from Conflict?; CRS In Focus IF10155, Somalia; CRS Report RL33964, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy; CRS Report R42967, U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues; CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report R44313, What Is \u201cBuilding Partner Capacity?\u201d Issues for Congress.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44563", "sha1": "8b24d6ba0c16413e9a72aa1cdd5a939ffcb32685", "filename": "files/20160714_R44563_8b24d6ba0c16413e9a72aa1cdd5a939ffcb32685.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44563", "sha1": "044e4e8d7e8401469235bb33afa99616dd43b688", "filename": "files/20160714_R44563_044e4e8d7e8401469235bb33afa99616dd43b688.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "African Affairs", "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }