{ "id": "R44573", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R44573", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 454577, "date": "2016-07-27", "retrieved": "2016-10-17T19:40:44.240963", "title": "Overview of the Prudential Regulatory Framework for U.S. Banks: Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act", "summary": "The Basel III international regulatory framework, which was produced in 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) at the Bank for International Settlements, is the latest in a series of evolving agreements among central banks and bank supervisory authorities to promote standardized bank prudential regulation (e.g., capital and liquidity requirements, transparency, risk management) to improve resiliency during episodes of financial distress. Because prudential regulators are concerned that banks might domicile in countries with the most relaxed safety and soundness requirements, capital reserve requirements are internationally harmonized, which also reduces competitive disadvantages for some banks with competitors in other countries.\nCapital serves as a cushion against unanticipated financial shocks (such as a sudden, unusually high occurrence of loan defaults), which can otherwise lead to insolvency. Holding sufficient amounts of liquid assets serves as a buffer against sudden reversals of cash flow. Hence, the Basel III regulatory reform package revises the definition of regulatory capital, increases capital requirements, and introduces new liquidity requirements for banking organizations. The quantitative requirements and phase-in schedules for Basel III were approved by the 27 member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities on September 12, 2010, and endorsed by the G20 leaders on November 12, 2010. Basel III recommends that banks fully satisfy these enhanced requirements by 2019. The Basel agreements are not treaties; individual countries can make modifications to suit their specific needs and priorities when implementing national bank capital requirements.\nIn the United States, Congress mandated higher bank capital requirements as part of financial-sector reform in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203, 124 Stat.1376). Specifically, the Collins Amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act amends the definition of capital and establishes minimum capital and leverage requirements for banking subsidiaries, bank holding companies, and systemically important non-bank financial companies. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act requires greater prudential requirements on larger banking institutions.\nThis report summarizes the higher capital and liquidity requirements for U.S. banks regulated for safety and soundness. Federal banking regulators announced the final rules for implementation of Basel II.5 on June 7, 2012, and for the implementation of Basel III on July 9, 2013. On April 8, 2014, federal regulators adopted the enhanced supplementary leverage ratio for bank holding companies with more than $700 billion of consolidated assets or $10 trillion in assets under custody as a covered bank holding company. On October 10, 2014, the federal banking agencies (i.e., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) announced a final rule to strengthen liquidity regulations for banks with $50 billion or more in assets. Additional requirements that have since been proposed or finalized particularly for the larger and more complex financial institutions are described in various appendices of this report. In addition, the 114th Congress is considering bills that would affect the banking system\u2019s prudential regulation, including S. 1484, the Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, which would affect bank capital regulation. \nGreater prudential requirements for most U.S. banking firms may reduce the insolvency risk of the deposit insurance fund, which is maintained by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), because more bank equity shareholders would absorb financial losses. A systemic-risk event, however, refers to multiple institutions simultaneously experiencing financial distress. For example, higher bank capital reserves may absorb greater losses associated with the financial distress of an individual institution, but a systemic-risk event exhausts the capital reserves of the industry, thus threatening the level of financial intermediation conducted by the banking system as a whole. Higher capital reserves in the banking industry are also incapable of buffering losses associated with financial activity that occurs outside of the banking system.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44573", "sha1": "0b814b906a01aeab0a08e6fe0696893a34c28b6d", "filename": "files/20160727_R44573_0b814b906a01aeab0a08e6fe0696893a34c28b6d.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44573", "sha1": "ff2b90197afa13f4f1aebee0054e676cbf591af4", "filename": "files/20160727_R44573_ff2b90197afa13f4f1aebee0054e676cbf591af4.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Economic Policy" ] }