{
  "id": "R44578",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R44578",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 604723,
      "date": "2016-07-29",
      "retrieved": "2019-09-16T22:27:50.660315",
      "title": "The Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce: Background, Analysis, and Questions for Congress",
      "summary": "Congress and the executive branch have long been frustrated with waste, mismanagement, and fraud in defense acquisitions and have spent significant resources seeking to reform and improve the process. Efforts to address wasteful spending, cost overruns, schedule slips, and performance shortfalls have continued unabated, with more than 150 major studies on acquisition reform since the end of World War II. Many of the most influential of these reports have articulated improving the acquisition workforce as the key to acquisition reform. In recent years, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have sought to increase the size and improve the capability of this workforce.\nThe acquisition workforce is generally defined as uniformed and civilian government personnel, who are responsible for identifying, developing, buying, and managing goods and services to support the military. According to DOD, as of December 31, 2015, the defense acquisition workforce consisted of 156,457 personnel, of which approximately 90% (141,089) were civilian and 10% (15,368) were uniformed. \nBetween FY1989 and FY1999, the acquisition workforce decreased nearly 50% to a low of 124,000 employees. This decline is attributable in large part to a series of congressionally mandated reductions between FY1996 and FY1999. These cuts reflected Congress\u2019s then-view that the acquisition workforce size was not properly aligned with the acquisition budget and the size of the uniformed force. A number of analysts believe that these cuts led to shortages in the number of properly trained, sufficiently talented, and experienced personnel, which in turn has had a negative effect on acquisitions.\nIn an effort to rebuild the workforce, between FY2008 and the first quarter of FY2016, the acquisition workforce grew by 24% (30,434 employees). According to DOD, the Department accomplished its strategic objective to rebuild the workforce. Officials stated that certification and education levels have improved significantly: currently, over 96% of the workforce meet position certification requirements and 83% have a bachelor\u2019s degree or higher. In addition, DOD officials stated that they have positioned the workforce for long-term success by strengthening early and mid-career workforce cohorts. \nThe increase in the size of the workforce has not kept pace with increased acquisition spending. According to DOD, from 2001 to 2015, the acquisition workforce increased by some 21%. Over the same period, contract obligations (adjusted for inflation) increased approximately 43%. While this increase in spending does not necessarily argue for increasing the size of the workforce, according to DOD officials, the increased spending has also corresponded to an increase in the workload and complexity of contracting. Four congressional efforts to improve the acquisition workforce are:\nthe Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (P.L. 101-510),\nhiring and pay flexibilities enshrined in numerous sections of law, \nthe Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (P.L. 110-181), and\nstrategic planning for the acquisition workforce (P.L. 111-84). \nThese four efforts seek to enhance the training, recruitment, and retention of acquisition personnel by, respectively, establishing (1) professional development requirements, (2) monetary incentives and accelerated hiring, (3) dedicated funding for workforce improvement efforts, and (4) formal strategies to shape and improve the acquisition workforce.",
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      "topics": [
        {
          "source": "IBCList",
          "id": 4872,
          "name": "Military Personnel, Compensation, & Health Care"
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          "id": 4925,
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