{ "id": "R44754", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R44754", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 586724, "date": "2017-03-10", "retrieved": "2020-01-02T14:44:41.934506", "title": "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)", "summary": "In October 2013, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Bali, Indonesia, China proposed creating a new multilateral development bank (MDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As its name suggests, the Bank's stated purpose is to provide financing for infrastructure needs throughout Asia, as well as in neighboring regions. As of January 2017, the AIIB has approved nine projects, investing a total of $1.7 billion.\nThe AIIB commenced operations on January 16, 2016. Membership in the AIIB is open to all members of the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The AIIB\u2019s Articles of Agreement create two classes of membership: regional and non-regional members. According to the AIIB articles, regional members hold 75% of the total voting power in the Bank. Fourteen of the G-20 nations are AIIB members. The United States is not an AIIB member. \nThe AIIB was initially conceived as a regional financing mechanism for Chinese President Xi Jinping\u2019s \u201cOne Belt, One Road (OBOR)\u201d initiative. This initiative is a central component of President Xi\u2019s regional economic and foreign policy and aims to boost economic connectivity from China to Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and, along a maritime route, from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). President Xi, more than previous Chinese leaders, has pursued policies to establish new China-led trade and financial institutions, as well as to further integrate China within the existing international financial institutions. President Xi said that the AIIB would \u201cpromote interconnectivity and economic integration in the region\u201d and \u201ccooperate with existing multilateral development banks,\u201d including the World Bank and the ADB.\nAs AIIB membership has expanded to include developed countries in Asia and Europe (and possibly Canada), China has since tried to distance the AIIB from the OBOR initiative through co-financing arrangements for its initial loans. It is uncertain how China will balance its stated goal of establishing an independent and high-standard MDB, while pursuing China\u2019s own economic and national security priorities.\nThe AIIB's initial total capital is $100 billion, with 20% paid-in and 80% callable. China has subscribed to $29.7 billion as authorized under the Articles. India is the second-largest shareholder, contributing $8.4 billion. The Bank is based in Beijing, China, and headed by Jin Liqun, a former Chinese vice minister of finance, Chinese sovereign wealth fund chairman, and ADB vice president. \nChina's voting share at the AIIB (28.7%) is substantially larger than that of the second-largest AIIB member nation, India (8.3%). This is the largest gap between the first- and second-largest shareholders at any existing MDB. Voting share will reduce as remaining capital is subscribed by remaining permanent founding members and any new members. The AIIB has a governance structure similar to other MDBs. \nThe AIIB presents several policy issues for Members of Congress to consider, including \nthe future direction of the AIIB and potential U.S. role, including the question of whether the United States should join and U.S. policy toward the new institution;\nindependence, transparency, and governance of the bank and implications for other MDBs, particularly projects that are co-financed with other MDBs; and\ncommercial implications for U.S. firms, including procurement opportunities.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44754", "sha1": "042f8c1dec3600b4fbef8b12fd8c210823910415", "filename": "files/20170310_R44754_042f8c1dec3600b4fbef8b12fd8c210823910415.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44754_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170310_R44754_images_5a2ea5566900289e4a9088657d79a157c843b325.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44754_files&id=/2.png": "files/20170310_R44754_images_a4a3e421524576a2647c0205f827e706720f9ce4.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44754_files&id=/1.png": "files/20170310_R44754_images_e903f6c25fe25edf6ca53f7bf563fc27bed489f1.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44754", "sha1": "cf7442d443ddf470618a45c023e34f807352f18c", "filename": "files/20170310_R44754_cf7442d443ddf470618a45c023e34f807352f18c.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4854, "name": "International Financial Institutions" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4923, "name": "International Financial Markets" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 458734, "date": "2017-02-03", "retrieved": "2017-02-10T18:23:42.596795", "title": "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)", "summary": "In October 2013, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Bali, Indonesia, China proposed creating a new multilateral development bank (MDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As its name suggests, the Bank's stated purpose is to provide financing for infrastructure needs throughout Asia, as well as in neighboring regions. As of January 2017, the AIIB has approved nine projects, investing a total of $1.7 billion.\nThe AIIB was formally established in late 2015 with 57 founding members. Membership in the AIIB is open to all members of the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The AIIB\u2019s Articles of Agreement create two classes of membership: regional and non-regional members. According to the AIIB articles, regional members hold 75% of the total voting power in the Bank. Fourteen of the G-20 nations are AIIB members. The United States is not an AIIB member. \nThe AIIB was initially conceived as a regional financing mechanism for Chinese President Xi Jinping\u2019s \u201cOne Belt, One Road (OBOR)\u201d initiative. This initiative is a central component of President Xi\u2019s regional economic and foreign policy and aims to boost economic connectivity from China to Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and, along a maritime route, from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). President Xi, more so than previous Chinese leaders, has pursued policies to establish new China-led trade and financial institutions, as well as to further integrate China within the existing international financial institutions. President Xi said that the AIIB would \u201cpromote interconnectivity and economic integration in the region\u201d and \u201ccooperate with existing multilateral development banks,\u201d including the World Bank and the ADB.\nAs AIIB membership has expanded to include developed countries in Asia and Europe (and possibly Canada), China has since tried to distance the AIIB from the OBOR initiative through co-financing arrangements for its initial loans. It is uncertain how China will balance its stated goal of establishing an independent and high-standard MDB, while pursuing China\u2019s own economic and national security priorities.\nThe AIIB's initial total capital is $100 billion, with 20% paid-in and 80% callable. China is contributing $50 billion, half of the initial subscribed capital. India is the second-largest shareholder, contributing $8.4 billion. The Bank is based in Beijing, China, and headed by Jin Liqun, a former Chinese vice minister of finance, Chinese sovereign wealth fund chairman, and ADB vice president. \nChina's voting share at the AIIB (28.7%) is substantially larger than that of the second-largest AIIB member nation, India (8.3%). This is the largest gap between the first- and second-largest shareholders at any existing MDB. The AIIB has a governance structure similar to other MDBs, with two key differences: (1) it does not have a resident board of executive directors that represents member countries' interests on a day-to-day basis; and (2) the AIIB gives more decisionmaking authority to regional countries and the largest shareholder, China.\nThe AIIB presents several policy issues for Members of Congress to consider, including \nthe future direction of the AIIB and potential U.S. role, including the question of whether the United States should join and U.S. policy toward the new institution;\nindependence, transparency, and governance of the bank and implications for other MDBs, particularly projects that are co-financed with other MDBs; and\ncommercial implications for U.S. firms, including procurement opportunities.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44754", "sha1": "a03d2883a116c385ff540d24f00067582a51d32e", "filename": "files/20170203_R44754_a03d2883a116c385ff540d24f00067582a51d32e.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44754", "sha1": "d78ffc1a1bae0625aae57b4013935b9b1d679763", "filename": "files/20170203_R44754_d78ffc1a1bae0625aae57b4013935b9b1d679763.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "African Affairs", "Foreign Affairs", "Industry and Trade" ] }