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      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record. Current President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro in April 2018, although Castro is continuing as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but critics maintain that it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate major policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term; the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the economy and responding to desires for greater freedom. \nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes. \nIn June 2017, President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba that increased sanctions and partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. The most significant changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds; the reduction has affected embassy operations, especially visa processing, and made bilateral engagement more difficult. \nLegislative Activity\nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy continued, especially with regard to economic sanctions. The 2018 farm bill, P.L. 115-334 (H.R. 2), enacted in December 2018, has a provision permitting funding for two U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba. Two FY2019 House appropriations bills, Commerce (H.R. 5952) and Financial Services (H.R. 6258 and H.R. 6147), had provisions that would have tightened economic sanctions, but final action was not completed by the end of the 115th Congress. Other bills were introduced, but not acted upon, that would have eased or lifted sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). \nCongress continued to provide funding for democracy and human rights assistance in Cuba and for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting. For FY2017, Congress provided $20 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-31). For FY2018, it provided $20 million for democracy assistance and $28.9 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-141; explanatory statement to H.R. 1625). For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s FY2019 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 6385, would have provided $30 million for democracy programs, whereas the Senate version, S. 3108, would have provided $15 million; both bills would have provided $29 million for broadcasting. The 115th Congress approved a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 115-245 and P.L. 115-298 ) that continued FY2019 funding at FY2018 levels through December 21, 2018, but did not complete action on FY2019 appropriations, leaving the task to the 116th Congress. \nIn other action, several approved measures\u2014P.L. 115-232, P.L. 115-244, and P.L. 115-245\u2014have provisions extending a prohibition on FY2019 funding to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference report to P.L. 115-232 also requires a report on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) requires the Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress on certain aspects of Cuban airport security and efforts to better track public air charter flights between the United States and Cuba. In April 2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Pay\u00e1. For more on legislative initiatives in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "date": "2018-10-31",
      "retrieved": "2018-10-31T14:16:50.079577",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record. Current President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro on April 19, 2018, although Castro is continuing in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but critics maintain that it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate significant policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term, but the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the economy and responding to desires for greater freedom. \nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes. \nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in June 2017 that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. The most significant regulatory changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy and in September 2017 and subsequently ordered the departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC in October 2017.\nLegislative Activity\nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to economic sanctions. Several bills have been introduced to ease or lift sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). Two pending FY2019 House appropriations bills, Commerce (H.R. 5952) and Financial Services (H.R. 6258 and H.R. 6147), have provisions that would tighten economic sanctions.\nCongress has continued to provide funding for democracy and human rights assistance in Cuba and for U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting. For FY2017, Congress provided $20 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-31). For FY2018, it provided $20 million for democracy assistance and $28.9 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 115-141; explanatory statement to H.R. 1625). For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 6385, would provide $30 million for democracy programs, whereas the Senate version, S. 3108, would provide $15 million; both bills would provide $29 million for broadcasting. \nIn other action, several approved measures\u2014P.L. 115-232, P.L. 115-244, and P.L. 115-245\u2014have provisions extending a prohibition on the use of funds in FY2019 to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference report to P.L. 115-232 also requires a report on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, P.L. 115-254, requires the Transportation Security Administration to brief Congress on certain aspects of Cuban airport security and to develop and implement a mechanism to better track public air charter flights between the United States and Cuba. The Senate version of the 2018 farm bill, H.R. 2, approved in June 2018, would permit funding for certain U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba. In April 2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Pay\u00e1. For more on legislative action and initiatives in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "id": 584896,
      "date": "2018-09-01",
      "retrieved": "2018-10-05T22:32:13.538928",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro on April 19, 2018, although Castro is continuing in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but critics maintain that it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate significant policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term, but the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the moribund economy and responding to desires for greater freedom. \nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes. \nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in June 2017 that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. The most significant regulatory changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel from Cuba in September 2017 and subsequently ordered the departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC, in October.\nLegislative Activity\nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). For FY2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31) provided $20 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting.\nFor FY2019, the Trump Administration is requesting $10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 6385, would provide $30 million for Cuba democracy programs while the Senate version, S. 3108, would provide $15 million; both bills would provide $29 million for broadcasting. Two other House appropriations bills, Commerce (H.R. 5952) and Financial Services (H.R. 6258 and H.R. 6147), have provisions that would tighten sanctions. \nIn other action, the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019, P.L. 115-232 (H.R. 5515), signed into law August 13, 2018, extends a prohibition on the use of funds in FY2019 to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the conference report to the bill also requires a report on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba. The Senate version of the 2018 farm bill, H.R. 2, approved in June 2018, would permit funding for certain U.S. agricultural export promotion programs in Cuba. In April 2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Pay\u00e1. The House passed H.R. 3328 in October 2017, which would, among other provisions, require information on Cuba\u2019s airport security measures. For more on legislative action and initiatives in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "id": 582647,
      "date": "2018-06-29",
      "retrieved": "2018-07-10T20:13:55.647602",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro on April 19, 2018, although Castro is continuing in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but critics maintain that it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate significant policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term, but the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the moribund economy and responding to desires for greater freedom. \nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes. \nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in June 2017 that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. The most significant regulatory changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel from Cuba in September 2017 and subsequently ordered the departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC, in October.\nLegislative Activity\nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). For FY2017, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31) provided $20 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting. For FY2018, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141) provides $20 million in democracy assistance and $28.9 million for broadcasting; the omnibus measure did not include policy provisions tightening sanctions that had been included in several FY2018 House appropriations measures.\nFor FY2019, the Trump Administration is requesting $10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill (unnumbered) would provide $30 million for Cuba democracy programs while the Senate version, S. 3108, would provide $15 million; both bills would provide $29 million for broadcasting. Two other House appropriations bills, Commerce (H.R. 5952) and Financial Services (H.R. 6258), have provisions that would tighten sanctions. \nIn other action, the Senate version of the 2018 farm bill, H.R. 2, approved June 28, 2018, would permit funding for certain U.S. export promotion programs for U.S. agricultural products in Cuba.\nThe Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019, H.R. 5515, approved June 18, 2018, would require a report on security cooperation between Russia and Cuba. In April 2018, the Senate approved S.Res. 224, commemorating the legacy of Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo Pay\u00e1. The House passed H.R. 3328 in October 2017, which would, among other provisions, require information on Cuba\u2019s airport security measures. For more on legislative action and initiatives in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 581008,
      "date": "2018-05-11",
      "retrieved": "2018-05-15T12:58:42.564016",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro on April 19, 2018. Castro had announced in 2013 that he would step down after his second term. D\u00edaz-Canel, who had been serving as First Vice President, was widely viewed as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, even though Ra\u00fal is continuing in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government did not take enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate significant policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term, but the new president faces two enormous challenges\u2014reforming the moribund economy and responding to desires for greater freedom. \nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times, in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. \nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in June 2017 that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. The most significant regulatory changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel from Cuba in September 2017 and subsequently ordered the departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC, in October. \nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. In the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). Among its provisions, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31) provided $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2017. \nThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 1625, P.L. 115-141) provides $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba and $28.9 million for Cuba broadcasting. The Trump Administration did not request any democracy assistance for Cuba for FY2018, but it requested $23.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The omnibus measure did not include policy provisions tightening sanctions or limiting funding for a U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba that had been included in several FY2018 House appropriations measures (Commerce, H.R. 3267; Financial Services, H.R. 3280; Homeland Security, H.R. 3355; and State Department and Foreign Operations, H.R. 3362\u2014all of which had been incorporated into House-passed H.R. 3354). H.R. 3362 also would have provided $30 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting, whereas the Senate Appropriations Committee\u2019s bill, S. 1780, would have provided $15 million in democracy assistance and $28.6 million for Cuba broadcasting. For FY2019, the Trump Administration is requesting $10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting.\nAmong other measures, the Senate approved S.Res. 224 in April 2018 commemorating the legacy of democracy activist Oswaldo Pay\u00e1 and calling on the Cuban government to cease violating human rights and begin providing democratic freedoms to Cuban citizens. H.R. 3328, passed by the House in October 2017, and S. 2023 would require information on security measures at Cuba\u2019s international airports and disclosure of U.S. air carriers\u2019 agreements with Cuban government entities. H.Res. 664 and S.Res. 391 would call for the extradition or rendering to the United States of all fugitives from U.S. justice in Cuba. For more on legislative action and initiatives in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "id": 578819,
      "date": "2018-02-27",
      "retrieved": "2018-05-10T11:15:38.088100",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Ra\u00fal Castro succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, and he is expected to step down in April 2018. Most observers see First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, although Ra\u00fal likely will continue in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, especially as the country approaches its political succession in 2018. \nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times, in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. \nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in June 2017 that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. The most significant regulatory changes (effective November 9, 2017) include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel from Cuba in September 2017 and subsequently ordered the departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC, in October. \nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. In the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). Among its provisions, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31), provided $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2017.\nFor FY2018, the Trump Administration did not request any democracy assistance for Cuba, but it requested $23.7 million for Cuba broadcasting; for FY2019, it is requesting $10 million in democracy assistance and $13.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s FY2018 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 3362 (incorporated into the House-passed full-year FY2018 omnibus appropriations measure, H.R. 3354) would provide $30 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting and would prohibit funding for a U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba beyond that in place in December 2014. The Senate Appropriations Committee\u2019s version of the measure, S. 1780, would provide $15 million in democracy assistance and $28.6 million for Cuba broadcasting. \nSeveral other House appropriations bills have Cuba policy provisions that would tighten sanctions: H.R. 3267, Commerce; H.R. 3280, Financial Services; and H.R. 3355, Homeland Security\u2014all of which were incorporated into House-passed H.R. 3354. House-passed H.R. 3328 and S. 2023 would require information on security measures at Cuba\u2019s international airports and disclosure of U.S. air carriers\u2019 agreements with Cuban government entities. H.Res. 664 and S.Res. 391 would call for the extradition or rendering to the United States of all fugitives from U.S. justice in Cuba. For more on bills in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "id": 575859,
      "date": "2017-11-22",
      "retrieved": "2017-11-28T14:31:41.886798",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Ra\u00fal Castro succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, and he is expected to step down in February 2018. Most observers see First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, although Ra\u00fal likely will continue in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, especially as the country approaches its political succession in 2018. \nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place and can be lifted only with congressional action or if the President determines and certifies to Congress that certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place.\nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in June 2017 that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. The most significant regulatory changes (effective November 9, 2017) include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. In response to unexplained injuries of U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the State Department ordered the departure of nonemergency personnel from Cuba in September 2017 and subsequently ordered the departure of 15 Cuban diplomats from the Cuban Embassy in Washington, DC, in October. \nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. In the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel); H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions); H.R. 498 (telecommunications); H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment); H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); H.R. 574, H.R. 2966, and S. 1699 (overall embargo); and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). Among its provisions, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31), provided $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2017.\nFor FY2018, the Trump Administration did not request any democracy assistance for Cuba, but it requested $23.7 million for Cuba broadcasting. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s FY2018 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3362, incorporated into the House-passed full-year FY2018 omnibus appropriations measure, H.R. 3354, would provide $30 million in democracy assistance and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting and would prohibit funding for a U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba beyond that in place in December 2014. The Senate Appropriations Committee\u2019s State Department and Foreign Operations bill, S. 1780, would provide $15 million in democracy assistance and $28.6 million for Cuba broadcasting.\nSeveral other House appropriations bills have Cuba policy provisions that would tighten sanctions: H.R. 3267, Commerce; H.R. 3280, Financial Services; and H.R. 3355, Homeland Security\u2014all of which were incorporated into House-passed H.R. 3354. House-passed H.R. 3328 and S. 2023 would require information on security measures at Cuba\u2019s international airports and disclosure of U.S. air carriers\u2019 agreements with Cuban government entities. For more on bills in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "id": 462877,
      "date": "2017-07-26",
      "retrieved": "2017-08-22T13:44:41.637602",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Ra\u00fal Castro succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, and the succession was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Ra\u00fal began his second and final five-year term as president in 2013, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Most observers see First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, although Ra\u00fal likely will continue in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party (PCC). Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, especially as the country approaches its political succession in 2018. Short-term detentions and harassment against democracy and human rights activists have increased over the past several years.\nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, when the United States first imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can be lifted only with congressional action or if the President determines and certifies to Congress that certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place.\nAfter the Trump Administration conducted a review of U.S. policy toward Cuba, the President unveiled a new policy on June 16, 2017, that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. The most significant forthcoming changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. Notably, the policy leaves most Obama-era policy changes in place.\nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. Numerous legislative initiatives and provisions in appropriations bills in the 114th Congress would have further eased or lifted the embargo, whereas other initiatives would have blocked efforts toward normalization. Ultimately, none of these initiatives were enacted. \nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel), H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions), H.R. 498 (telecommunications), H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment), H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel), H.R. 574 and H.R. 2966 (overall embargo), and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31), signed into law May 5, 2017, provided $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba for FY2017, provided $28.1 million for broadcasting to Cuba, and prohibited funding to carry out the closure or realignment of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. \nSeveral FY2018 House appropriations bills have Cuba policy provisions: H.R. 2998 (Military Construction) and H.R. 3219 (Defense), with provisions related to the U.S. naval station; H.R. 3267 (Commerce), H.R. 3280 (Financial Services), and H.R. 3355 (Homeland Security), with provisions tightening economic sanctions; and H.R. 3362 (State Department and Foreign Operations), which would provide $30 million in democracy assistance (the Administration had zeroed this out) and $28.1 million for Cuba broadcasting ($4.4 million more than requested) and would prohibit funding for a U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba beyond that in place in December 2014. For more on bills introduced in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "id": 462349,
      "date": "2017-06-29",
      "retrieved": "2017-07-17T16:38:17.341366",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Ra\u00fal Castro succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, and the succession was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Ra\u00fal began his second and final five-year term as president in 2013, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Most observers see First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, although Ra\u00fal likely will continue in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party (PCC). Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, especially as the country approaches its political succession in 2018. Short-term detentions and harassment against democracy and human rights activists have increased over the past several years.\nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, when the United States first imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can be lifted only with congressional action or if the President determines and certifies to Congress that certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place.\nAfter the Trump Administration conducted a review of U.S. policy toward Cuba, the President unveiled a new policy on June 16, 2017, that partially rolls back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. The most significant forthcoming changes include restrictions on transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel and the elimination of individual people-to-people travel. Notably, the policy leaves most Obama-era policy changes in place.\nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. Numerous legislative initiatives and provisions in appropriations bills in the 114th Congress would have further eased or lifted the embargo, whereas other initiatives would have blocked efforts toward normalization. Ultimately, none of these initiatives were enacted. \nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy is continuing, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel), H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions), H.R. 498 (telecommunications), H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment), H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel), H.R. 574 and H.R. 2966 (overall embargo), and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31), signed into law May 5, 2017, provides $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba for FY2017 ($5 million more than requested) and $28.1 million for broadcasting to Cuba ($1 million more than requested). The measure did not include other Cuba provisions (some that would have blocked Cuba policy changes and others that would have eased sanctions further) contained in House and Senate versions of several FY2017 appropriations bills in the 114th Congress. For more on bills introduced in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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          "id": 4847,
          "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada"
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      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 461558,
      "date": "2017-05-26",
      "retrieved": "2017-06-07T15:33:25.816118",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Ra\u00fal Castro succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, and the succession was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Ra\u00fal began his second and final five-year term as president in 2013, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Most observers see First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, although Ra\u00fal likely will continue in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party (PCC). Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, especially as the country approaches its political succession in 2018. Short-term detentions and harassment against democracy and human rights activists have increased over the past several years.\nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, when the United States first imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can be lifted only with congressional action or if the President determines and certifies to Congress that certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place.\nThe outlook for U.S. policy toward Cuba under the Trump Administration is uncertain. According to U.S. officials, the Administration is conducting a full review of U.S. policy toward Cuba, with human rights at the forefront of those discussions. Statements by President Trump before his inauguration suggest that he could reverse some of the policy changes taken by the Obama Administration to normalize relations.\nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. Numerous legislative initiatives and provisions in appropriations bills in the 114th Congress would have further eased or lifted the embargo, whereas other initiatives would have blocked efforts toward normalization. Ultimately, none of these initiatives were enacted. \nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy likely will continue, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 and S. 1287 (travel), H.R. 442/S. 472 and S. 1286 (some economic sanctions), H.R. 498 (telecommunications), H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment), H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel), H.R. 574 (overall embargo), and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31), signed into law May 5, 2017, provides $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba for FY2017 ($5 million more than requested) and $28.1 million for broadcasting to Cuba ($1 million more than requested). The measure did not include other Cuba provisions (some that would have blocked Cuba policy changes and others that would have eased sanctions further) contained in House and Senate versions of several FY2017 appropriations bills in the 114th Congress. For more on bills introduced in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 461420,
      "date": "2017-05-19",
      "retrieved": "2017-05-24T16:16:21.682070",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Ra\u00fal Castro succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, and the succession was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Ra\u00fal began his second and final five-year term as president in 2013, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Most observers see First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, although Ra\u00fal likely will continue in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party (PCC). Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, especially as the country approaches its political succession in 2018. Short-term detentions and harassment against democracy and human rights activists have increased over the past several years.\nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, when the United States first imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can be lifted only with congressional action or if the President determines and certifies to Congress that certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place.\nThe outlook for U.S. policy toward Cuba under the Trump Administration is uncertain. According to U.S. officials, the Administration is conducting a full review of U.S. policy toward Cuba, with human rights at the forefront of those discussions. Statements by President Trump before his inauguration suggest that he could reverse some of the policy changes taken by the Obama Administration to normalize relations.\nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. Numerous legislative initiatives and provisions in appropriations bills in the 114th Congress would have further eased or lifted the embargo, whereas other initiatives would have blocked efforts toward normalization. Ultimately, none of these initiatives were enacted. \nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy likely will continue, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 (travel), H.R. 442/S. 472 (some economic sanctions), H.R. 498 (telecommunications), H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment), H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel), H.R. 574 (overall embargo), and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (H.R. 244, P.L. 115-31), signed into law May 5, 2017, provides $20 million in democracy assistance for Cuba for FY2017 ($5 million more than requested) and $28.1 million for broadcasting to Cuba ($1 million more than requested). The measure did not include other Cuba provisions (some that would have blocked Cuba policy changes and others that would have eased sanctions further) contained in House and Senate versions of several FY2017 appropriations bills in the 114th Congress. For more on bills introduced in the 115th Congress, see Appendix A.",
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      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 460542,
      "date": "2017-04-21",
      "retrieved": "2017-04-21T14:54:51.584760",
      "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress",
      "summary": "Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a poor record on human rights. Current President Ra\u00fal Castro succeeded his long-ruling brother Fidel Castro in 2006, and the succession was characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. Ra\u00fal began his second and final five-year term as president in 2013, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Most observers see First Vice President Miguel Diaz-Canel as the \u201cheir apparent\u201d as president, although Ra\u00fal likely will continue in his position as first secretary of Cuba\u2019s Communist Party (PCC). Under Ra\u00fal, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes over the past decade, but critics maintain that the government has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the political system, especially as the country approaches its political succession in 2018. Although the government has released numerous political prisoners in recent years, it still holds an estimated 75-95 political prisoners. Moreover, short-term detentions and harassment against democracy and human rights activists have increased over the past several years.\nU.S. Policy\nCongress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. Since the early 1960s, when the United States first imposed a trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. In December 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a major Cuba policy shift, moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba. To implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel, remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however, remains in place, and can be lifted only with congressional action or if the President determines and certifies to Congress that certain conditions in Cuba are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place.\nThe outlook for U.S. policy toward Cuba under the Trump Administration is uncertain. According to U.S. officials, the Administration is conducting a full review of U.S. policy toward Cuba, with human rights at the forefront of those discussions. Statements by President Trump before his inauguration suggest that he could reverse some of the policy changes taken by the Obama Administration to normalize relations.\nLegislative Activity\nThere are contrasting congressional views on the appropriate U.S. policy approach toward Cuba. Numerous legislative initiatives and provisions in appropriations bills in the 114th Congress would have further eased or lifted the embargo, whereas other initiatives would have blocked efforts toward normalization. Ultimately, none of these initiatives were enacted. \nIn the 115th Congress, debate over Cuba policy likely will continue, especially with regard to U.S. economic sanctions. To date, several bills have been introduced to ease or lift economic sanctions altogether: H.R. 351 (travel), H.R. 442/S. 472 (some economic sanctions), H.R. 498 (telecommunications), H.R. 525 (agricultural exports and investment), H.R. 572 (agricultural and medical exports and travel), H.R. 574 (overall embargo), and S. 275 (private financing for U.S. agricultural exports). For more on these and other bills, see Appendix A.",
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  "topics": [
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    "Appropriations",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Immigration Policy",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "Latin American Affairs",
    "National Defense"
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}