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Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (president, 1999-2013), began a second term on January 10, 2019, that is widely considered illegitimate. Since January 2019, Juan Guaid\u00f3, president of Venezuela\u2019s democratically elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, has sought to form a transition government to serve until internationally observed elections can be held. The United States and 57 other countries recognize Guaid\u00f3 as interim president, but he has been unable to wrest Maduro from power and has faced increased danger since returning home from a January-February 2020 tour, which included a meeting with President Trump. Some observers believe that National Assembly elections due this year might start an electoral path out of the current stalemate.\nVenezuela\u2019s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation, severe shortages of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, United Nations officials estimated that 90% of Venezuelans were living in poverty. Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for these problems, but observers cite economic mismanagement and corruption for the crisis. U.N. agencies estimate that 4.8 million Venezuelans had fled the country as of February 2020, primarily to neighboring countries.\nU.S. Policy\nSince recognizing the Guaid\u00f3 government in January 2019, the United States has coordinated its efforts with Interim President Guaid\u00f3. U.S. strategy has emphasized diplomatic efforts to bolster support for Guaid\u00f3; targeted sanctions and visa revocations to increase pressure on Maduro officials, along with broader sanctions on the state oil company and government; and humanitarian aid ($472 million to countries sheltering Venezuelans and $56 million for Venezuela from FY2017-FY2019). In October 2019, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) signed an agreement with the Guaid\u00f3 government enabling the provision of development assistance and increased democracy and human rights assistance. After announcing sanctions on a subsidiary of Rosneft (Russia\u2019s state oil company), which has transported Venezuela\u2019s oil, U.S. officials vowed to keep \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d on Maduro and his foreign backers until he agrees to allow a transition government to convene free and fair legislative and presidential elections. \nCongressional Action\nCongress has supported the Administration\u2019s efforts to support a restoration of democracy in Venezuela and provide humanitarian support to Venezuelans, although some Members have expressed concerns about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. In February 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-6, which provided $17.5 million in FY2019 assistance for democracy programs in Venezuela. In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which appropriates $30 million in FY2020 assistance for democracy programs in Venezuela and incorporates the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a comprehensive bill to address the crisis in Venezuela. The VERDAD Act incorporated House-passed measures authorizing FY2020 humanitarian aid to Venezuela (H.R. 854), restricting the export of defense articles to Venezuela (H.R. 920), and requiring a U.S. strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela (H.R. 1477). The Administration\u2019s FY2021 budget request proposes $200 million in democracy aid aimed to support a democratic transition in Venezuela and $5 million in global health assistance. In December 2019, Congress also enacted P.L. 116-92, which prohibits federal contracting with persons who do business with the Maduro government. In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 549, designating Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected status. On July 30, 2019, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549 by unanimous consent failed.\nAlso see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis; CRS Report R46213, Oil Market Effects from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "5355d8ebf1bd09b99d25244ead7702bcd9f0bb4a", "filename": "files/20200312_R44841_5355d8ebf1bd09b99d25244ead7702bcd9f0bb4a.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20200312_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/3.png": "files/20200312_R44841_images_bb938d321f4597a13cda1e5ecec74aac9c60c4fd.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/2.png": "files/20200312_R44841_images_e092c3130ba1096ecfdb373b8ebe3c5498b78d0d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20200312_R44841_images_d0fb0213fd40229577dda10a24e33f44b04833b8.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "d4977902d4fbedc88ea3d08af543fe5deb7d2ffb", "filename": "files/20200312_R44841_d4977902d4fbedc88ea3d08af543fe5deb7d2ffb.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 607504, "date": "2019-11-07", "retrieved": "2019-12-13T15:27:53.039248", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (president, 1999-2013), began a second term on January 10, 2019, that most Venezuelans and much of the international community consider illegitimate. Since January, Juan Guaid\u00f3, president of Venezuela\u2019s democratically elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, has sought to form an interim government to serve until internationally observed elections can be held. Although the United States and 56 other countries recognize Guaid\u00f3 as interim president, he has been unable to wrest Maduro from power. With Norway-backed negotiations between Maduro and Guaid\u00f3 suspended, prospects for a negotiated solution to the crisis are uncertain.\nVenezuela\u2019s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation, severe shortages of food and medicine, and electricity blackouts that have worsened an already dire humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, United Nations officials estimated that some 90% of Venezuelans are living in poverty. Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for these problems, but most observers cite economic mismanagement and corruption for the crisis. U.N. agencies estimate that 4.5 million Venezuelans had fled the country as of October 2019, primarily to Latin American and Caribbean countries.\nU.S. Policy\nAs the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated under Maduro, the Trump Administration has imposed targeted sanctions on Venezuelan officials responsible for antidemocratic actions, human rights violations, and corruption, as well as increasingly strong financial sanctions against the Maduro government and the state oil company, its main source of income. Since recognizing Guaid\u00f3 as interim president in January 2019, the Administration has increased sanctions on the Maduro government and encouraged other countries to do so. \nThe Administration has provided $472 million in humanitarian and development assistance to support countries sheltering Venezuelans, including $56 million for humanitarian relief activities in Venezuela. In October 2019, the U.S. Agency for International Development signed an agreement with the Guaid\u00f3 government that will enable the provision of $98 million in additional development assistance to expand programs that support human rights, independent media, the National Assembly, and electoral oversight and to start agriculture and health programs.\nCongressional Action\nCongress has supported the Administration\u2019s efforts to support a restoration of democracy in Venezuela and provide humanitarian support to Venezuelans, although some Members have expressed concerns about the humanitarian effects of sanctions and about potential unauthorized use of the U.S. military in Venezuela. In 2019, the House has approved H.R. 854, authorizing humanitarian assistance; H.R. 920, restricting the export of defense articles to Venezuela; H.R. 1477, requiring a strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela; and H.R. 549, designating Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected status (TPS). \nOn May 22, 2019, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ordered S. 1025 reported with an amendment to include the language of H.R. 854, H.R. 920, and H.R. 1477. S. 1025 would codify U.S. sanctions, authorize humanitarian aid, and authorize funds to support elections and a democratic transition in Venezuela.\nBoth the House and Senate versions of the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2500 and S. 1790) have similar provisions that would prohibit federal contracting with persons who do business with the Maduro government. \nThe Administration\u2019s FY2020 budget asked for $9 million in democracy aid and authority to transfer up to $500 million to support a transition or respond to a crisis in Venezuela. The House-approved version of the FY2020 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 2740, H.Rept. 116-78) would provide $17.5 million in democracy aid. The Senate-introduced version of the bill (S. 2583, S.Rept. 116-126) would provide $30 million. Because neither measure has been enacted, a continuing resolution (P.L. 116-59) is funding foreign assistance programs until November 21, 2019.\nAlso see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; and CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "823c3795246af2375fddc7dd9c2687ad5f34ed99", "filename": "files/20191107_R44841_823c3795246af2375fddc7dd9c2687ad5f34ed99.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20191107_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/3.png": "files/20191107_R44841_images_3f06b055d192e99a157ff7ab18442c4ba17a6e12.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/2.png": "files/20191107_R44841_images_e092c3130ba1096ecfdb373b8ebe3c5498b78d0d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20191107_R44841_images_d0fb0213fd40229577dda10a24e33f44b04833b8.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "05906f9f6ea43e8a59097b22fe035182ccafafc2", "filename": "files/20191107_R44841_05906f9f6ea43e8a59097b22fe035182ccafafc2.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 599883, "date": "2019-06-04", "retrieved": "2019-07-02T22:24:27.617885", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Venezuela remains in a deep political and economic crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (president, 1999-2013), began a second term on January 10, 2019, that most Venezuelans and much of the international community consider illegitimate. Since January, Juan Guaid\u00f3, president of Venezuela\u2019s democratically elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, has sought to form an interim government to serve until internationally observed elections can be held. Although the United States and 53 other countries recognize Guaid\u00f3 as interim president, the military high command, supported by Russia and Cuba, has remained loyal to Maduro. Venezuela is in a political stalemate as conditions in the country deteriorate.\nVenezuela\u2019s economy has collapsed. It is plagued by hyperinflation, severe shortages of food and medicine, and electricity blackouts that have worsened an already dire humanitarian crisis. In April 2019, United Nations officials estimated that some 90% of Venezuelans are living in poverty and 7 million need humanitarian assistance. Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for these problems, but most observers cite economic mismanagement and corruption under Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro for the current crisis. U.N. agencies estimate that 3.7 million Venezuelans had fled the country as of March 2019, primarily to other Latin American and Caribbean countries.\nU.S. Policy\nThe United States historically had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. oil supplier, but relations deteriorated under the Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro governments. The Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and corruption, as well as on individuals and entities engaged in drug trafficking. Since 2017, the Administration has imposed a series of broader economic sanctions on the Maduro government and state oil company Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S. A. (PdVSA). \nOn January 23, 2019, the Trump Administration recognized the Guaid\u00f3 government. It has imposed additional sanctions on Maduro officials, blocked Maduro and his government from benefitting from revenue from PdVSA, and imposed secondary sanctions on entities doing business with Maduro. The Administration has provided some $213 million in humanitarian assistance to countries sheltering Venezuelans and pre-positioned emergency supplies for Venezuelans at the country\u2019s borders.\nCongressional Action\nThe 116th Congress likely will fund foreign assistance to Venezuela and neighboring countries sheltering Venezuelans. Congress may consider additional steps to influence the Venezuelan government\u2019s behavior in promoting a return to democracy and to relieve the humanitarian crisis. In FY2019, Congress provided $17.5 million for democracy and rule of law programs in Venezuela (P.L. 116-6). The Administration\u2019s proposed FY2020 budget asks for $9 million in democracy aid and authority to transfer up to $500 million to support a transition or respond to a crisis in Venezuela. On May 20, 2019, the House Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2020 Department of State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 2389), which would provide $17.5 million in democracy and human rights aid to Venezuela.\nOn May 22, 2019, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee ordered S. 1025 reported with an amendment to include three House-passed measures: H.R. 854 would authorize expanded humanitarian aid, H.R. 920 would prohibit arms transfers to Maduro, and H.R. 1477 would require an assessment of Russian-Venezuelan security cooperation. S. 1025 would increase humanitarian assistance to Venezuela and countries sheltering Venezuelans and provide support for Venezuela\u2019s democratic transition. On May 22, 2019, the House Judiciary Committee ordered reported H.R. 549 to make certain Venezuelans in the United States eligible for Temporary Protected Status. On April 9, 2019, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs ordered reported H.R. 1004 to prohibit the use of U.S. military forces in combat operations in Venezuela.\nAlso see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis; and CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela: International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "9688940b3f18a92473d275ce9c37032398d911b3", "filename": "files/20190604_R44841_9688940b3f18a92473d275ce9c37032398d911b3.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190604_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/3.png": "files/20190604_R44841_images_12b340bbca5d8dc95c56dc8d2cc9c136ebb815ee.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/2.png": "files/20190604_R44841_images_e82f06d9e8b15d42673aa1d26c5d70c69cfb9849.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190604_R44841_images_2444a92f790cc730caaf346d9223492ee2d95d5f.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "2db4fd838481fee1332ea2fc69f1cfb1f454963b", "filename": "files/20190604_R44841_2db4fd838481fee1332ea2fc69f1cfb1f454963b.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 590290, "date": "2019-01-21", "retrieved": "2019-04-17T14:31:35.254151", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Venezuela remains in a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (1999-2013), is unpopular. Nevertheless, he has used the courts, security forces, and electoral council to repress the opposition. \nOn January 10, 2019, Maduro began a second term after winning reelection on May 20, 2018, in an unfair contest deemed illegitimate by the opposition-controlled National Assembly and most of the international community. The United States, the European Union, the Group of Seven, and most Western Hemisphere countries do not recognize the legitimacy of his mandate. They view the National Assembly as Venezuela\u2019s only democratic institution. \nMaduro\u2019s inauguration capped his efforts to consolidate power. In 2017, protesters called for Maduro to release political prisoners and respect the opposition-led National Assembly. Security forces quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands injured. Maduro then orchestrated the controversial July 2017 election of a National Constituent Assembly; this assembly has usurped most legislative functions. During 2018, Maduro\u2019s government arrested dissident military officers and others suspected of plotting against him. Efforts to silence dissent may increase, as the National Assembly (under its new president, Juan Guaid\u00f3), the United States, and the international community push for a transition to a new government. \nVenezuela also is experiencing a serious economic crisis, and rapid contraction of the economy, hyperinflation, and severe shortages of food and medicine have created a humanitarian crisis. President Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions for these problems, while conditioning receipt of food assistance on support for his government and increasing military control over the economy. He maintains that Venezuela will seek to restructure its debts, although that appears unlikely. The government and state oil company Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S. A. (PdVSA) defaulted on bond payments in 2017. Lawsuits over nonpayment and seizures of PdVSA assets are likely.\nU.S. Policy\nThe United States historically had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. oil supplier, but relations have deteriorated under the Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro governments. U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Venezuela and the country\u2019s lack of cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. U.S. democracy and human rights funding, totaling $15 million in FY2018 (P.L. 115-141), has aimed to support civil society. \nThe Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and corruption, as well as on individuals and entities engaged in drug trafficking. Since 2017, the Administration has imposed a series of broader sanctions restricting Venezuelan government access to U.S. financial markets and prohibiting transactions involving the Venezuelan government\u2019s issuance of digital currency and Venezuelan debt. The Administration provided almost $97 million in humanitarian assistance to neighboring countries sheltering more than 3 million Venezuelans.\nCongressional Action\nThe 115th Congress took several actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. In February 2017, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 35 (Cardin), which supported targeted sanctions. In December 2017, the House passed H.R. 2658 (Engel), which would have authorized humanitarian assistance for Venezuela, and H.Res. 259 (DeSantis), which urged the Venezuelan government to accept humanitarian aid. For FY2019, the Administration requested $9 million in democracy and human rights funds for Venezuela. The 115th Congress did not complete action on the FY2019 foreign assistance appropriations measure. The House version of the FY2019 foreign aid appropriations bill, H.R. 6385, would have provided $15 million for programs in Venezuela; the Senate version, S. 3108, would have provided $20 million. \nThe 116th Congress likely will fund foreign assistance to Venezuela and neighboring countries sheltering Venezuelans. Congress may consider additional steps to influence the Venezuelan government\u2019s behavior in promoting a return to democracy and to relieve the humanitarian crisis.\nAlso see CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political and Economic Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Migration Crisis.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "01751feeef096c5aeb2bb3d47c1a538d8f492a2f", "filename": "files/20190121_R44841_01751feeef096c5aeb2bb3d47c1a538d8f492a2f.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190121_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/4.png": "files/20190121_R44841_images_d83c008bc0c60575bdf6a41dcc4ff5f5cc45485d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/3.png": "files/20190121_R44841_images_e82f06d9e8b15d42673aa1d26c5d70c69cfb9849.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/2.png": "files/20190121_R44841_images_2a9ff6ee2c29db71b6d52c9057286b919037ef9a.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190121_R44841_images_f580eb14e8db287c5024af3217844c4c2e9d812e.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "24c171b46e54d2e3f6e4441f133eb351c8bb6e58", "filename": "files/20190121_R44841_24c171b46e54d2e3f6e4441f133eb351c8bb6e58.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 584081, "date": "2018-06-27", "retrieved": "2018-08-27T15:11:04.783196", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Venezuela remains in a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). On May 20, 2018, Maduro defeated Henri Falc\u00f3n, a former governor, in a presidential election boycotted by the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) of opposition parties and dismissed by the United States, the European Union, and 18 Western Hemisphere countries as illegitimate. Maduro, who was narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (1999-2013), is unpopular. Nevertheless, he has used the courts, security forces, and electoral council to repress the opposition. \nMaduro\u2019s reelection capped off his efforts since 2017 to consolidate power. From March to July 2017, protesters called for President Maduro to release political prisoners and respect the MUD-led National Assembly. Security forces quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands injured. Maduro then orchestrated the controversial July 2017 election of a National Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution; the assembly then assumed legislative functions. The PSUV dominated gubernatorial and municipal elections held in 2017, although fraud likely occurred in those contests. Maduro has arrested dissident military officers and others, but he also has released some political prisoners, including U.S. citizen Joshua Holt, since the May election. \nVenezuela also is experiencing a serious economic crisis, marked by rapid contraction of the economy, hyperinflation, and severe shortages of food and medicine. President Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions and corruption for these problems, while conditioning receipt of food assistance on support for his government and increasing military control over the economy. He maintains that Venezuela will seek to restructure its debts, although that appears unlikely. The government and state oil company Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S. A. (PdVSA) defaulted on bond payments in 2017. Lawsuits over nonpayment and seizures of PdVSA assets are likely.\nU.S. Policy\nThe United States historically had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. oil supplier, but relations have deteriorated under the Ch\u00e1vez and Maduro governments. U.S. policymakers have expressed concerns about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Venezuela and the lack of bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. U.S. democracy and human rights funding, which totaled $15 million for FY2018 (P.L. 115-141), has bolstered civil society in Venezuela. \nThe Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and corruption. In August 2017, President Trump imposed economic sanctions that restrict the ability of the government and PdVSA to access U.S. financial markets; he imposed new sanctions following the May 2018 election prohibiting U.S. purchases of Venezuelan debt. Additional sanctions on Venezuela\u2019s oil sector are possible but could hurt the Venezuelan people. The Trump Administration has announced the provision of $39.5 million in assistance for Venezuelans who have fled to other countries.\nCongressional Action\nThe 115th Congress has taken actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. In February 2017, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 35 (Cardin), which supports targeted sanctions. In December 2017, the House passed H.R. 2658 (Engel), which would authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela (a similar Senate bill, S. 1018 [Cardin], has been introduced) and H.Res. 259 (DeSantis), which urges the government to accept humanitarian aid. Some Members of Congress have called for an adjustment to permanent resident status for certain Venezuelans in the United States (H.R. 2161 [Curbelo]). S.Res. 363 (Nelson), introduced in December 2017, would express concern about the humanitarian crisis. S.Res. 414 (Durbin), introduced in February 2018, would condemn the undemocratic practices of the government. The Administration requested $9 million in democracy assistance for Venezuela in FY2019. The House Appropriation Committee\u2019s version of the State Foreign Operations measure would provide $15 million; the Senate Appropriations Committee\u2019s version (S. 3108) would provide $20 million.\nSee CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political and Economic Crisis and U.S. Policy; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions; CRS In Focus IF10857, Venezuela\u2019s Petroleum Sector and U.S. Sanctions; and CRS Report R45072, Venezuela\u2019s Economic Crisis: Issues for Congress.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "c99222db813e38eb54092471547012790e880a3b", "filename": "files/20180627_R44841_c99222db813e38eb54092471547012790e880a3b.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180627_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/3.png": "files/20180627_R44841_images_d83c008bc0c60575bdf6a41dcc4ff5f5cc45485d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/2.png": "files/20180627_R44841_images_07edf35f137d8469ba1fc2f8428a8bb2c7da609a.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20180627_R44841_images_c2ed9a7d2edc1e05f7ff5cd80a8eea0e38b49fd7.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "4acd4371a5487efbf880867aa02c1981a5e44bcb", "filename": "files/20180627_R44841_4acd4371a5487efbf880867aa02c1981a5e44bcb.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 578999, "date": "2018-03-09", "retrieved": "2018-03-12T03:34:03.306787", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations", "summary": "Venezuela is in the midst of a political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Narrowly elected to a six-year term in 2013 following the death of populist President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (1999-2013), Maduro is deeply unpopular. Nevertheless, he has used the courts, security forces, and electoral council to repress and divide the opposition, grouped in the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) coalition.\nFrom March through July 2017, protesters called for President Maduro to release political prisoners, respect the MUD-led National Assembly, and schedule elections. Security forces quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands injured. Maduro then orchestrated the controversial July 2017 election of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to rewrite the constitution. \nPresident Maduro has consolidated power over a divided opposition. The PSUV dominated gubernatorial and municipal elections held in 2017, although fraud likely occurred in both contests. In January 2018, the ANC called for presidential elections to be moved up from late 2018 (when they are customarily held) to April and barred many parties from participating. Most MUD parties are boycotting those elections, but Henri Falc\u00f3n of the Progressive Advance (AP) party broke with the coalition to run against Maduro. After negotiations, the election was moved to May 20, 2018. \nVenezuela also is experiencing a serious economic crisis, marked by rapid contraction of the economy, hyperinflation, and severe shortages of food and medicine. President Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions and corruption for the country\u2019s economic problems, while distributing food to critical voter blocks, increasing military control over the economy, and launching a digital currency to try to evade U.S. sanctions. He maintains Venezuela will seek to restructure its debts, although that appears unlikely. The government and Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the state oil company, defaulted on some bond payments in November 2017.\nU.S. Policy\nThe United States historically has had close relations with Venezuela, a major U.S. foreign oil supplier, but friction in relations increased under the Ch\u00e1vez government and has intensified under the Maduro regime. For more than a decade, U.S. policymakers have had concerns about the deterioration of human rights and democratic conditions in Venezuela and the lack of bilateral cooperation on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts. U.S. funding and political support have bolstered civil society in Venezuela and Organization of American States (OAS) efforts to address the country\u2019s crisis.\nAs the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated, the Trump Administration has employed targeted sanctions against Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and corruption. In August 2017, President Trump imposed economic sanctions that restrict the ability of the Venezuelan government and the PdVSA to access U.S. financial markets. Additional sanctions on Venezuela\u2019s oil sector are being considered but could hurt the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests. \nCongressional Action\nThe 115th Congress has taken actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. In February 2017, the Senate approved S.Res. 35 (Cardin), which, among other provisions, expresses support for targeted sanctions, dialogue, and OAS efforts. In December 2017, the House passed H.R. 2658 (Engel), which would authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela (a similar Senate bill, S. 1018 [Cardin], was introduced in May 2017), and H.Res. 259 (DeSantis), which would urge the Venezuelan government to hold open elections and accept humanitarian aid. Some Members of Congress have called for temporary protected status for Venezuelans in the United States (H.R. 2161 [Curbelo]). S.Res. 363 (Nelson), introduced in December 2017, expresses concern about the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. S.Res. 414 (Durbin), introduced in February 2018, condemns the undemocratic practices of the Venezuelan government and calls for a free and fair electoral process.\nCongress has appropriated funding to support democracy and human rights efforts in Venezuela ($7 million in FY2017). The Trump Administration did not request FY2018 assistance. However, the House Appropriations Committee\u2019s FY2018 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3362 (H.Rept. 115-253), incorporated into H.R. 3354, recommends $8 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee\u2019s version, S. 1780 (S.Rept. 115-152), recommends $15 million. The Administration requested $9 million in FY2019 assistance for Venezuela.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "2be9a2aa5a2e373df1eae7cd383abc452c9e9e04", "filename": "files/20180309_R44841_2be9a2aa5a2e373df1eae7cd383abc452c9e9e04.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180309_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/2.png": "files/20180309_R44841_images_c54913514aa91709dc5878b02d0575b73e82d1b6.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20180309_R44841_images_e4a09a5253217968e8ff5341d2b36c1a40c8218b.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "9bb563eaf0e3aa2f048245ab5b2abc30ab8de502", "filename": "files/20180309_R44841_9bb563eaf0e3aa2f048245ab5b2abc30ab8de502.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 576530, "date": "2017-12-11", "retrieved": "2017-12-14T14:15:59.100532", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy", "summary": "Venezuela is in a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Narrowly elected to a six-year term in 2013 following the death of populist President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (1999-2013), Maduro is unpopular. Nevertheless, he has used the courts, security forces, and electoral council to repress and divide the opposition, grouped in the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) coalition.\nFrom March through July 2017, protesters called for President Maduro to release political prisoners, respect the MUD-led National Assembly, and schedule elections. Security forces quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands injured. Maduro then orchestrated the controversial July election of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to rewrite the constitution. \nPresident Maduro and the ANC have since consolidated power over the opposition. After the PSUV won 18 of 23 gubernatorial elections in October, the opposition emerged divided and disillusioned. Although most opposition parties did not participate in municipal elections held on December 10 in which the PSUV dominated, some fielded candidates. The MUD has initiated dialogue with the government to try to secure humanitarian aid and establish parameters for 2018 presidential elections; some opposition figures oppose that process.\nPresident Maduro has blamed U.S. sanctions and corruption for the country\u2019s economic crisis. Venezuela is experiencing a rapid contraction of the economy, high inflation, shortages of consumer goods and medicines, and a humanitarian crisis. Maduro has arrested former executives at state oil company Petr\u00f3leos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) for alleged corruption and replaced them with military officers. He announced that Venezuela will seek to restructure and refinance its debts. With the government and PdVSA technically declared in default on some bond payments in November, it is unclear whether restructuring is possible.\nU.S. Policy\nThe United States has spoken out about setbacks to democracy and human rights in Venezuela, called for the release of political prisoners, expressed concern about the humanitarian situation, and supported dialogue. The U.S. government has employed targeted sanctions against Venezuelans responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and public corruption, as well as those accused of drug trafficking and terrorism. On August 25, 2017, President Trump imposed economic sanctions that restrict the ability of the Venezuelan government and PdVSA to access U.S. financial markets. Broader sanctions have been considered, but could have negative humanitarian impacts. The United States has supported efforts at the Organization of American States (OAS) to help resolve the situation in Venezuela, but those efforts have stalled. \nCongressional Action\nThe 115th Congress has taken actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. In February 2017, the Senate approved S.Res. 35 (Cardin), which, among its provisions, called for the release of political prisoners and support for dialogue and OAS efforts. On December 5, 2017, the House passed two measures: H.R. 2658 (Engel), the Venezuela Humanitarian Assistance and Defense of Democratic Governance Act, which would authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela (a similar but not identical bill, S. 1018 [Cardin], was introduced in the Senate in May 2017); and H.Res. 259 (DeSantis), which would urge the Venezuelan government to suspend the ANC, hold open elections, release political prisoners, and accept humanitarian aid. Some Members of Congress have called for temporary protected status for Venezuelans in the United States (H.R. 2161 [Curbelo]). \nCongress has appropriated funding for democracy and human rights in Venezuela ($7 million in FY2017). The Trump Administration did not request FY2018 assistance. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s FY2018 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3362 (H.Rept. 115-253), incorporated into the House-passed full-year FY2018 Omnibus Appropriations Measure, H.R. 3354, recommends $8 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee\u2019s version of the bill, S. 1780 (S.Rept. 115-152), recommends $15 million. \nFurther Reading\nCRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political and Economic Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Mark P. Sullivan \nCRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan \nCRS Insight IN10766, New Financial Sanctions on Venezuela: Key Issues, by Rebecca M. Nelson", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "da6cd9e43c04d9b9822937b1f83802af1e60e1d9", "filename": "files/20171211_R44841_da6cd9e43c04d9b9822937b1f83802af1e60e1d9.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171211_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/2.png": "files/20171211_R44841_images_c54913514aa91709dc5878b02d0575b73e82d1b6.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20171211_R44841_images_e4a09a5253217968e8ff5341d2b36c1a40c8218b.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "798ead1ccde22e5ac6afe37ef20924e22c2a0e65", "filename": "files/20171211_R44841_798ead1ccde22e5ac6afe37ef20924e22c2a0e65.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 574551, "date": "2017-10-18", "retrieved": "2017-10-24T13:15:47.885959", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy", "summary": "Venezuela is in a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela. Narrowly elected to a six-year term in 2013 following the death of populist President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez (1999-2013), Maduro is deeply unpopular. The Maduro government has used the courts and security forces to repress the political opposition, a coalition known as the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD). \nFrom March through July 2017, protests called for President Maduro to release political prisoners, respect the MUD-led National Assembly, and schedule elections. Security forces quashed protests, with more than 130 killed and thousands injured. Instead, Maduro orchestrated the controversial July election of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to rewrite the constitution. The ANC expelled Attorney General Luisa Ortega (a Maduro critic) and gave itself legislative power. Protests have diminished but may resume, as the MUD has rejected the results of regional elections held on October 15. The government claims it won 18 of 23 governorships, but few observers believe the results. \nVenezuela also faces crippling economic and social challenges. The economy has sharply contracted due to the decline in global oil prices and government mismanagement. Shortages of food and medicine have caused a humanitarian crisis. The government is struggling to raise the cash needed to make its debt payments and pay for imports. Some economists maintain that Venezuela is at risk of default.\nU.S. Policy\nThe United States has continued to speak out about setbacks to democracy and human rights in Venezuela, call for the release of political prisoners, express concern about the humanitarian situation, and support dialogue. The U.S. government has employed targeted sanctions against Venezuelans responsible for human rights violations, undermining democracy, and public corruption, as well as those accused of drug trafficking and terrorism. On August 25, 2017, President Trump imposed new economic sanctions through Executive Order 13808 that restrict the ability of the Venezuelan government and its state oil company to access U.S. financial markets. Broader sanctions are reportedly being considered by the Administration, but could have negative humanitarian impacts. \nThe United States has supported multilateral efforts at the Organization of American States (OAS) to help resolve the situation in Venezuela, but those efforts have not moved forward. Many Latin American governments do not oppose U.S. sanctions, but have rejected President Trump\u2019s threat to consider military options in Venezuela.\nCongressional Action\nThe 115th Congress has taken various actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. In February 2017, the Senate approved S.Res. 35 (Cardin), which, among its provisions, called for the release of political prisoners and support for dialogue and OAS efforts. In May 2017, two similar but not identical bills were introduced, S. 1018 (Cardin) and H.R. 2658 (Engel), which, among other provisions, would authorize humanitarian assistance. In July 2017, the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) approved H.Res. 259 (DeSantis), which would urge the Venezuelan government to suspend the ANC, hold open elections, release political prisoners, and accept humanitarian aid. HFAC approved H.R. 2658 in September. Some Members of Congress have called for temporary protected status for Venezuelans in the United States (H.R. 2161). \nCongress has appropriated funding for democracy and human rights in Venezuela (e.g., $7 million in FY2017). The Trump Administration did not request any FY2018 assistance. The House Appropriations Committee\u2019s FY2018 State Department and Foreign Operations appropriations bill, H.R. 3362 (H.Rept. 115-253), incorporated into the House-passed full-year FY2018 Omnibus Appropriations Measure, H.R. 3354, recommends $8 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee\u2019s version of the bill, S. 1780 (S.Rept. 115-152), recommends $15 million. \nFurther Reading\nCRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Mark P. Sullivan \nCRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan \nCRS Insight IN10766, New Financial Sanctions on Venezuela: Key Issues, by Rebecca M. Nelson\nCRS Insight IN10741, U.S. Petroleum Trade with Venezuela: Financial and Economic Considerations Associated with Possible Sanctions, by Phillip Brown and Clare Ribando Seelke", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "4272a94ad5001403fb7bd7a2d2fb1dc6b3eb90d7", "filename": "files/20171018_R44841_4272a94ad5001403fb7bd7a2d2fb1dc6b3eb90d7.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20171018_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20171018_R44841_images_e4a09a5253217968e8ff5341d2b36c1a40c8218b.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "4479e5b66b514ffc942589ecd43be26eed73924c", "filename": "files/20171018_R44841_4479e5b66b514ffc942589ecd43be26eed73924c.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 462684, "date": "2017-07-18", "retrieved": "2017-08-22T13:50:18.518232", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy", "summary": "Venezuela is in a political, economic, and social crisis. Following the March 2013 death of populist President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez, acting President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles of the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) to be elected to a six-year term in April 2013. President Maduro has less than 20% public approval, and fissures have emerged within the PSUV about the means he has used to maintain power. \nSince March 2017, protesters have called for President Maduro to release political prisoners, respect the separation of powers, and establish an electoral calendar. Instead, Maduro has scheduled July 30, 2017 elections to select delegates to a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution (the opposition is boycotting). Security forces have repressed protesters, with nearly 100 dead and thousands injured and jailed. Although the government recently transferred opposition leader Leopoldo L\u00f3pez to house arrest, prospects for dialogue appear dim. On July 16, 2017, the opposition organized an unofficial plebiscite in which more than 7 million people voted against Maduro\u2019s convening a constituent assembly.\nVenezuela also faces crippling economic and social challenges. An economic crisis, triggered by mismanagement and low oil prices, is worsening. In 2016, the economy contracted by 18% and inflation averaged 254% according to the International Monetary Fund. Shortages of food and medicine have caused a humanitarian crisis. The Maduro government is struggling to raise the cash needed to make its debt payments and pay for imports. Some economists maintain that Venezuela is at risk of default in 2017.\nInternational efforts to facilitate dialogue between President Maduro and the opposition have failed, due to the government\u2019s intransigence. In March 2017, Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) Luis Almagro called on member states to temporarily suspend Venezuela from the organization if the government did not take certain actions, including convening elections. The Maduro government reacted by initiating the two-year process required to leave the OAS. At the OAS General Assembly in June 2017, a majority of foreign ministers could not agree on a path forward to address the crisis. \nU.S. Policy\nU.S. policymakers have had concerns for more than a decade about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Venezuela and the government\u2019s lack of cooperation on security matters. The Obama Administration criticized the Maduro government\u2019s harsh response to protests in 2014, provided funds to civil society groups, and employed sanctions against Venezuelan officials linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, and human rights abuses. It also supported efforts at dialogue and OAS activities.\nThe Trump Administration has followed the same approach. In February 2017, the Department of the Treasury imposed drug-trafficking sanctions against Vice President Tareck el Aissami, and in May 2017 it imposed sanctions on eight Supreme Court judges that had dissolved the legislature. President Trump and the State Department have called for the release of all political prisoners. U.S. officials have condemned the Supreme Court\u2019s rulings, the repression of protests, attacks on the National Assembly, and the constituent assembly process. However, the Trump Administration\u2019s FY2018 budget request does not include funding in support of democracy and human rights programs in Venezuela.\n\n\nCongressional Action\nCongress has taken various actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. It enacted legislation in 2014 to impose sanctions on current and former Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights abuses (P.L. 113-278). In July 2016, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 114-194) extending sanctions through 2019.\nIn the 115th Congress, the Senate approved S.Res. 35 in February 2017, which expressed concern for the situation in Venezuela; called on the Venezuelan government to hold elections, release political prisoners, and accept humanitarian aid; and supported OAS efforts. A similar resolution, H.Res. 259, was introduced in the House in April. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), provides $7 million in democracy and human rights assistance to Venezuelan civil society. Legislation has been introduced in both chambers (H.R. 2658/ S. 1018) that would authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela and broaden the activities for which Venezuelans can be sanctioned to include engaging in undemocratic practices or public corruption.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "0a513d935803011c0382e6114096075ad46a35cf", "filename": "files/20170718_R44841_0a513d935803011c0382e6114096075ad46a35cf.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/0.png": "files/20170718_R44841_images_784b0d1a2513e555fa6f863d0c0613952afa51c9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R44841_files&id=/1.png": "files/20170718_R44841_images_c2dd4dd2d2dd5284fef3cf0aaa14bb1ccfa01d3b.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "af90576acc42bf2473313126b0827b348e05a657", "filename": "files/20170718_R44841_af90576acc42bf2473313126b0827b348e05a657.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461936, "date": "2017-06-14", "retrieved": "2017-06-16T16:00:35.260138", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy", "summary": "Venezuela is in an acute political, economic, and social crisis. Following the March 2013 death of populist President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez, acting President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles of the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) to be elected to a six-year term in April 2013. President Maduro now has less than 20% public approval, and fissures have emerged within the PSUV about the means that he has used to maintain power, including an aborted attempt to have the Supreme Court dissolve the MUD-dominated legislature. \nSince March 2017, large-scale protests have called for President Maduro to release political prisoners, respect the separation of powers, and establish an electoral calendar. Instead, Maduro has scheduled July 30, 2017, elections to select delegates to a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution (the opposition is boycotting). Security forces have repressed protesters, with some 70 dead and thousands injured and jailed.\nVenezuela also faces crippling economic and social challenges. An economic crisis, triggered by mismanagement and low oil prices, is worsening. In 2016, the economy contracted by 18% and inflation averaged 254% according to the International Monetary Fund. Shortages of food and medicine have caused a humanitarian crisis. The Maduro government is struggling to raise the cash needed to make its debt payments and pay for imports. Some economists maintain that Venezuela is at risk of default in 2017.\nInternational efforts to facilitate dialogue between President Maduro and the opposition have failed, due to the government\u2019s intransigence. In March 2017, Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) Luis Almagro called on member states to temporarily suspend Venezuela from the organization if the government did not take certain actions, including convening elections. The Maduro government reacted by initiating the two-year process required to leave the OAS. On May 31, 2017, the OAS convened a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss Venezuela, but the ministers failed to agree on a resolution to address the crisis. \nU.S. Policy\nU.S. policymakers have had concerns for more than a decade about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Venezuela and the government\u2019s lack of cooperation on antidrug and counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration strongly criticized the Maduro government\u2019s heavy-handed response to protests in 2014, provided assistance to civil society groups, and employed sanctions against Venezuelan officials linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, and human rights abuses. At the same time, it supported efforts at dialogue and OAS activities.\nThe Trump Administration has followed the same general approach. In February 2017, the Treasury Department imposed drug-trafficking sanctions against Vice President Tareck el Aissami, and in May 2017 it imposed sanctions on eight Supreme Court judges that had dissolved the legislature. President Trump and the State Department have called for the release of imprisoned opposition leader Leopoldo L\u00f3pez and all political prisoners. State Department officials have condemned the Supreme Court\u2019s rulings and the repression of protests. However, the FY2018 budget request does not include funding for democracy and human rights programs in Venezuela.\nCongressional Action\nCongress has taken various actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. It enacted legislation in 2014 to impose sanctions on current and former Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights abuses (P.L. 113-278). In July 2016, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 114-194) extending sanctions through 2019.\nIn the 115th Congress, the Senate approved S.Res. 35, expressing concern for the situation in Venezuela; calling on the government to hold elections, release political prisoners, and accept humanitarian aid; and supporting OAS efforts. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), provides $7 million in democracy and human rights assistance to Venezuelan civil society. Similar legislation has been introduced in both chambers (H.R. 2658/ S. 1018) that would, among other measures, authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela and broaden the activities for which Venezuelans can be sanctioned to include engaging in undemocratic practices or public corruption. H.Res. 259, introduced April 6, 2017, is similar to S.Res. 35.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "8eb26566fae517d86d136f223c3cb7ea2f8d79df", "filename": "files/20170614_R44841_8eb26566fae517d86d136f223c3cb7ea2f8d79df.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "7c1916519248c76f69b1d52199caa37b9b4def52", "filename": "files/20170614_R44841_7c1916519248c76f69b1d52199caa37b9b4def52.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 461044, "date": "2017-05-10", "retrieved": "2017-05-16T14:31:37.243076", "title": "Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy", "summary": "Venezuela is in the midst of an acute political, economic, and social crisis. Following the March 2013 death of populist President Hugo Ch\u00e1vez, acting President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles of the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) to be elected to a six-year term in April 2013. Four years later, President Maduro has less than 20% public approval and fissures have emerged within the PSUV about the means that he has used to maintain power, including a recent aborted attempt to have the Supreme Court dissolve the MUD-dominated legislature. Protests are escalating amid calls for the Maduro government to hold the regional elections that Maduro postponed last year rather than convene a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution, as he has proposed.\nVenezuela also is grappling with crippling economic and social challenges. It faces an increasingly unstable economic crisis, triggered by mismanagement and the global drop in oil prices. In 2016, the economy contracted by some 18% and inflation averaged 254%. In addition, massive shortages of food and medicine have caused a humanitarian crisis. The Maduro government is struggling to make debt payments and seeking loans from Russia, but economists maintain that Venezuela is at risk of default in 2017. \nInternational efforts to facilitate dialogue between President Maduro and the opposition have failed, due to the government\u2019s intransigence. In March 2017, Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) Luis Almagro called on member states to temporarily suspend Venezuela from the organization if the government did not take certain actions, including convening general elections. On April 26, 2017, the OAS Permanent Council approved a resolution to convene a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss Venezuela. In response, the Maduro government initiated the two-year process required to leave the OAS.\nU.S. Policy\nU.S. policymakers have had concerns for more than a decade about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Venezuela and the government\u2019s lack of cooperation on antidrug and counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration strongly criticized the Maduro government\u2019s heavy-handed response to protests in 2014 and employed sanctions against Venezuelan officials linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, and human rights abuses. At the same time, it supported efforts at dialogue and OAS activities.\nThe Trump Administration has followed the same general policy approach. In February 2017, the Treasury Department imposed drug-trafficking sanctions against Vice President Tareck el Aissami. President Trump and the State Department have called for the release of imprisoned opposition leader Leopoldo L\u00f3pez and all political prisoners. State Department officials have condemned the Venezuelan Supreme Court\u2019s recent rulings, expressed grave concern about a recent ban preventing Capriles from running for office, and called for prompt elections. \nCongressional Action\nCongress has taken various actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. It enacted legislation in 2014 to impose sanctions on current and former Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights abuses (P.L. 113-278). In July 2016, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 114-194) extending the ability to impose sanctions through 2019.\nIn the 115th Congress, the Senate approved S.Res. 35, expressing support for OAS efforts to hasten a return to electoral democracy in the country. The FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31), enacted on May 4, 2017, recommends providing $7 million in democracy and human rights assistance to Venezuela. Congress soon will have the opportunity to reexamine such aid to Venezuela as it considers the FY2018 request. On May 3, 2017, a bipartisan Senate bill was introduced, S. 1018, that would, among other measures, authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela and codify existing targeted sanctions on individuals undermining democratic governance and involved in corruption in Venezuela. H.Res. 259, introduced April 6, 2017, expresses concern about the crises that Venezuela is facing and urges the Venezuelan government to hold elections, release political prisoners, and accept humanitarian aid. \nThis report provides an overview of the political and economic challenges Venezuela is facing and efforts to respond to those challenges taken through the OAS. The report also analyzes U.S. policy concerns regarding democracy and human rights, drug trafficking, terrorism, and energy issues in Venezuela. See also CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Overview, and CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R44841", "sha1": "6190bf4f1f701d4cfe78b2cb8222c9f0e24475d4", "filename": "files/20170510_R44841_6190bf4f1f701d4cfe78b2cb8222c9f0e24475d4.html", "images": null }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R44841", "sha1": "fa3ec514ed07bb711220465fb833d0432061f98a", "filename": "files/20170510_R44841_fa3ec514ed07bb711220465fb833d0432061f98a.pdf", "images": null } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Energy Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "Industry and Trade", "Intelligence and National Security", "Latin American Affairs" ] }