{ "id": "R45033", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "R", "number": "R45033", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea", "retrieved": "2024-01-04T04:04:04.914983", "id": "R45033_10_2023-12-11", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2023-12-11_R45033_5ff83b9dc939295153d70a0b0c851d10b3336d65.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45033/10", "sha1": "5ff83b9dc939295153d70a0b0c851d10b3336d65" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2023-12-11_R45033_5ff83b9dc939295153d70a0b0c851d10b3336d65.html" } ], "date": "2023-12-11", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R45033", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea", "retrieved": "2024-01-04T04:04:04.913255", "id": "R45033_8_2021-05-04", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2021-05-04_R45033_538c9da0237e873197cf78b83b9e7f9fe6ded69a.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45033/8", "sha1": "538c9da0237e873197cf78b83b9e7f9fe6ded69a" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-05-04_R45033_538c9da0237e873197cf78b83b9e7f9fe6ded69a.html" } ], "date": "2021-05-04", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R45033", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 579465, "date": "2018-03-14", "retrieved": "2019-12-20T21:43:15.657232", "title": "Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea", "summary": "This report summarizes past nuclear and missile negotiations between the United States and North Korea, also known by its formal name, the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and highlights some of the lessons and implications from these efforts. Some analysts have suggested that, in response to the accelerated pace of North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile testing programs and its continued threats against the United States and U.S. allies, the United States might engage in an aggressive negotiation strategy with Pyongyang. In March 2018, President Trump agreed to hold a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. According to a high-level South Korean government delegation that brokered the agreement, Kim said that he was willing to discuss denuclearization and the normalization of U.S.-DPRK relations, and that he would refrain from testing while dialogue continues. Many details remain unclear, including the timing, location, and agenda of the summit and the extent to which Kim\u2019s conception of denuclearization matches the U.S. conception. \nPreviously, the United States has engaged in four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea: the bilateral Agreed Framework (1994-2002), the bilateral missile negotiations (1996-2000), the multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), and the bilateral Leap Day Deal (2012). In general, the formula for these negotiations has been for North Korea to halt, and in some cases disable, its nuclear or missile programs in return for economic and diplomatic incentives. \nAt least three features of the current situation differ from the previous rounds of diplomacy. First, Pyongyang may feel it is now in a better negotiating position because of advances in its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Second, international sanctions against North Korea, buttressed by many countries\u2019 unilateral restrictions, have become much more onerous. By some estimates, over 75% of North Korea\u2019s former exports, as well as many of its imports, have been banned since 2017. Third, President Trump has talked openly about launching a preventive military attack against North Korea. Although Trump\u2019s talk of an attack may have persuaded North Korea to ask for talks and convinced China to vote for expanded international sanctions, they also may push the South Korean government\u2014in an effort to avoid war\u2014to pursue engagement with North Korea even at the expense of Seoul-Washington relations. \nCongress possesses a number of tools to influence how the Administration pursues negotiations with North Korea, including oversight hearings, resolutions expressing congressional sentiment, restrictions on the use of funds for negotiations and the required diplomatic team through the appropriations process, and legislation that attaches or relaxes conditions and requirements for implementation of agreements. Past Congresses have influenced U.S.-DPRK talks and in several cases affected the implementation of the negotiated agreements. Congress\u2019s role has been particularly significant in negotiations over the provision of U.S. energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea through the appropriations process.\nOther CRS products related to North Korea include\nCRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery \nCRS In Focus IF10467, Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mark E. Manyin\nCRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack \nCRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis CRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis \nCRS Report R44912, North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief, by Emma Chanlett-Avery et al. \nCRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea\u2019s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, by Steven A. Hildreth and Mary Beth D. Nikitin", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45033", "sha1": "1d17443d9325c13cf8717517617c97bb3e1ed49a", "filename": "files/20180314_R45033_1d17443d9325c13cf8717517617c97bb3e1ed49a.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45033", "sha1": "53719f32769f5fbcf84a88a09f005c64993c49c4", "filename": "files/20180314_R45033_53719f32769f5fbcf84a88a09f005c64993c49c4.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4911, "name": "East Asia & Pacific" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 576985, "date": "2017-12-04", "retrieved": "2018-01-03T13:55:51.543679", "title": "Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea: In Brief", "summary": "Some analysts have suggested that, in response to the accelerated pace of North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile testing programs and its continued threats against the United States and U.S. allies, the United States might engage in an aggressive negotiation strategy. Since the early 1990s, successive U.S. Presidents have faced the question of whether to negotiate with the North Korean government to halt Pyongyang\u2019s nuclear program and ambitions. Questions for policymakers include the utility, timing, scope, and goals of diplomatic talks with Pyongyang. \nThe United States has engaged in four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea: the bilateral Agreed Framework (1994-2002), the bilateral missile negotiations (1996-2000), the multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), and the bilateral Leap Day Deal (2012). In general, the formula for these negotiations has been for North Korea to halt, and in some cases disable, its nuclear or missile programs in return for economic and diplomatic incentives. While some of the negotiations have shown progress, North Korea has continued to advance its nuclear and missile programs. \nCongress possesses a number of tools to influence whether and how intensely the Administration pursues negotiations with North Korea. The tools include oversight hearings, resolutions expressing congressional sentiment, restrictions on the use of funds for negotiations and the required diplomatic team through the appropriations process, and legislation that attaches or relaxes conditions and requirements for implementation of agreements. \nPast Congresses have influenced U.S.-DPRK talks and in several cases affected the implementation of the negotiated agreements. Congress\u2019s role has been particularly significant in negotiations over the provision of U.S. energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea through the appropriations process.\nThis report summarizes past nuclear and missile negotiations between the United States and North Korea, also known by its formal name, the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and highlights some of the lessons and implications that can be drawn from these efforts. Other CRS products address various aspects of U.S. policy toward North Korea, including those listed below.\nCRS Report R41259, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery \nCRS In Focus IF10467, Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea, by Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mark E. Manyin\nCRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by Dianne E. Rennack \nCRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin \nCRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis \nCRS Report R44912, North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief, by Emma Chanlett-Avery et al. \nCRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea\u2019s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, by Steven A. Hildreth and Mary Beth D. Nikitin", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45033", "sha1": "e9bfb30261f230e3e59d3422f3f6af3d99234ca1", "filename": "files/20171204_R45033_e9bfb30261f230e3e59d3422f3f6af3d99234ca1.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45033", "sha1": "7d0da629accf15751f79b06bd9d0d0e7ad7ab319", "filename": "files/20171204_R45033_7d0da629accf15751f79b06bd9d0d0e7ad7ab319.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4873, "name": "Strategic Forces, CBRN, & Nonproliferation" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4911, "name": "East Asia & Pacific" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Asian Affairs", "Economic Policy", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }