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      "title": "Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends",
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      "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov",
      "title": "Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends",
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      "id": 584336,
      "date": "2018-04-05",
      "retrieved": "2018-08-29T15:39:09.874621",
      "title": "Statutory Interpretation: Theories, Tools, and Trends",
      "summary": "In the tripartite structure of the U.S. federal government, it is the job of courts to say what the law is, as Chief Justice John Marshall announced in 1803. When courts render decisions on the meaning of statutes, the prevailing view is that a judge\u2019s task is not to make the law, but rather to interpret the law made by Congress. The two main theories of statutory interpretation\u2014purposivism and textualism\u2014disagree about how judges can best adhere to this ideal of legislative supremacy. The problem is especially acute in instances where it is unlikely that Congress anticipated and legislated for the specific circumstances being disputed before the court. While purposivists argue that courts should prioritize interpretations that advance the statute\u2019s purpose, textualists maintain that a judge\u2019s focus should be confined primarily to the statute\u2019s text.  \nRegardless of their interpretive theory, judges use many of the same tools to gather evidence of statutory meaning. First, judges often begin by looking to the ordinary meaning of the statutory text. Second, courts interpret specific provisions by looking to the broader statutory context. Third, judges may turn to the canons of construction, which are presumptions about how courts ordinarily read statutes. Fourth, courts may look to the legislative history of a provision. Finally, a judge might consider how a statute has been\u2014or will be\u2014implemented. Although both purposivists and textualists may use any of these tools, a judge\u2019s theory of statutory interpretation may influence the order in which these tools are applied and how much weight is given to each tool.\nThis report begins by discussing the general goals of statutory interpretation, reviewing a variety of contemporary as well as historical approaches. The report then briefly describes the two primary theories of interpretation employed today, before examining the main types of tools that courts use to determine statutory meaning. The report concludes by exploring developing issues in statutory interpretation.",
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          "name": "Judicial Branch"
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  "topics": [
    "Constitutional Questions",
    "Health Policy"
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}