{ "id": "R45175", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "R", "number": "R45175", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions", "retrieved": "2022-12-28T04:04:05.240952", "id": "R45175_7_2022-11-29", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2022-11-29_R45175_465abbe375a3529e771ff84c131901615ad40fef.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45175/7", "sha1": "465abbe375a3529e771ff84c131901615ad40fef" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2022-11-29_R45175_465abbe375a3529e771ff84c131901615ad40fef.html" } ], "date": "2022-11-29", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R45175", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 600454, "date": "2019-06-14", "retrieved": "2019-12-20T18:14:48.597272", "title": "Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief", "summary": "This report provides background and definitions for covert action and clandestine activities carried out by the Intelligence Community (IC) and military. Congress has defined several of these terms in statute; others appear only in committee reports. Still others are military terms. These definitions describe activities that support U.S. national security policy, and are, therefore, important to Congress\u2019s intelligence and defense oversight responsibilities. \nConfusion over the proper jurisdiction for congressional oversight can occur when covert action or clandestine intelligence activities appear similar to certain military operations that may employ clandestine methodology or have objectives similar to those for covert action. Intelligence and military matters fall under different authorities of the U.S. Code, and have, as a result, different statutory requirements for providing notification to Congress. Applicable statutes that govern intelligence activities under Title 50 of the U.S. Code emphasize prior notification to the congressional intelligence committees for each separate activity. Under its Title 10 U.S. Code authorities, however, the Department of Defense generally provides notification of certain types of secret or clandestine military operations to the Armed Services committees after their commencement, often by briefing Congress as part of a larger, supported military operation or campaign. \nThe IC, for example, in conducting a covert action, must generally provide prior notification to the congressional intelligence committees by means of a presidential finding describing plans to have an intelligence operation influence political, military, or economic conditions abroad while concealing U.S. sponsorship. The military, on the other hand, under Title 10, has the implicit authority to conduct operations that resemble covert action, but that DOD classifies as operational preparation of the environment (OPE). OPE is handled differently for oversight purposes, despite sharing with covert action a number of characteristics that heighten Congress\u2019s interest: a serious risk of exposure, compromise of information, loss of life, and a possible requirement to conceal U.S. sponsorship.\nAn understanding of how these terms are used can help Congress navigate potential challenges in conducting oversight. This report is the first of three reports on covert action and clandestine activities of the IC. The second, CRS Report R45191, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Notification Requirements in Brief, by Michael E. DeVine, describes the different statutory requirements for keeping Congress informed of these activities. The third, CRS Report R45196, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for Congressional Oversight In Brief, by Michael E. DeVine, is intended to assist Congress in assessing the premises justifying covert action and clandestine activities, their impact on national security, operational viability, funding requirements, and possible long-term or unintended consequences.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45175", "sha1": "7d5910f21a70a4196b7a9b85f4862563bf5255e8", "filename": "files/20190614_R45175_7d5910f21a70a4196b7a9b85f4862563bf5255e8.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45175", "sha1": "a4dfe883f774cf838d85d0d17f006ce6db84e37e", "filename": "files/20190614_R45175_a4dfe883f774cf838d85d0d17f006ce6db84e37e.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4809, "name": "National & Military Intelligence" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 580525, "date": "2018-04-25", "retrieved": "2018-05-01T14:13:50.514445", "title": "Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief", "summary": "While not defined by statute, DOD doctrine describes clandestine activities as \u201coperations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment\u201d that may include relatively passive intelligence collection information gathering operations. Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a presidential finding but may require notification of Congress. This definition differentiates clandestine from covert, using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the activity. By comparison, covert operations are \u201cplanned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.\u201d \nSince the 1970s, Congress has established and continued to refine oversight procedures in reaction to instances where it had not been given prior notice of intelligence activities\u2014particularly covert action\u2014that had significant bearing on United States national security. Congress, for example, had no foreknowledge of the CIA\u2019s orchestration of the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran\u2019s only democratically elected government, or of the U-2 surveillance flights over the Soviet Union that ended with the Soviet shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. Eventually, media disclosures of the CIA\u2019s domestic surveillance of the anti-Vietnam War movement and awareness of the agency\u2019s covert war in Laos resulted in Congress taking action. In 1974, Congress began its investigation into the scope of past intelligence community activities that provided the basis for statutory provisions for intelligence oversight going forward. \nThe 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (\u00a732 of P.L. 93-559) provided the earliest provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. In the late 1970s, Congress established a permanent oversight framework, standing up the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). These committees were given exclusive oversight jurisdiction of the intelligence community.\nRecent events in North Korea, Yemen, and elsewhere have underscored the important function Congress can have in influencing the scope and direction of intelligence policy that supports United States national security. However, despite Congress\u2019s work during the past decades to establish statutory provisions for conducting intelligence oversight, those efforts have not always achieved Congress\u2019s desired result.\nFor example, there has been occasional confusion over whether the congressional intelligence or defense committees have jurisdiction for oversight purposes. This confusion is due in part to overlapping or mutually supporting missions of the military and intelligence agencies, particularly in the post-9/11 counterterrorism environment. Intelligence and military activities fall under different statutory authorities, but they may have similar characteristics that warrant congressional notification (e.g., a need to conceal United States sponsorship and serious risk of exposure, compromise, and loss of life).", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45175", "sha1": "eba57ec5cb34c962dc2e5565eaeb63f8d2163d81", "filename": "files/20180425_R45175_eba57ec5cb34c962dc2e5565eaeb63f8d2163d81.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45175", "sha1": "9afbcd6f7ba31742c789f9259dce666971b3e55c", "filename": "files/20180425_R45175_9afbcd6f7ba31742c789f9259dce666971b3e55c.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4809, "name": "National & Military Intelligence" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }