{ "id": "R45196", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R45196", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 603440, "date": "2019-08-09", "retrieved": "2019-08-12T22:05:50.396018", "title": "Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for Congressional Oversight In Brief", "summary": "Since the mid-1970s, Congress\u2019s oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC) has been a fundamental component of ensuring that the IC\u2019s seventeen diverse elements are held accountable for the effectiveness of their programs supporting United States national security. This has been especially true for covert action and clandestine intelligence activities because of their significant risk of compromise and potential long-term impact on U.S. foreign relations. Yet, by their very nature, these and other intelligence programs and activities are classified and shielded from the public. Congressional oversight of intelligence, therefore, is unlike its oversight of more transparent government activities with a broad public following. In the case of the Intelligence Community, congressional oversight is one of the few means by which the public can have confidence that intelligence activities are being conducted effectively, legally, and in line with American values. \nCovert action is defined in statute (50 U.S.C. \u00a73093(e)) as \u201can activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.\u201d When informed of covert actions through Presidential findings prior to their execution\u2014as is most often the case\u2014Congress has a number of options: to provide additional unbiased perspective on how these activities can best support U.S. policy objectives; to express reservations about the plan and request changes; or withhold funding. Although Congress does not have the authority to approve or disapprove covert actions, it can have (and has had) influence on the President\u2019s decision. \nThe term clandestine describes a methodology for a range of activities wherein both the role of the United States and the activity itself are secret. Clandestine activities can involve traditional intelligence or unconventional military assets. Like covert action, their impact can be strategic even though a specific activity may be tactical in scope. Their secret character suggests the potential harm to sources and methods in the event of an unauthorized or unanticipated public disclosure. \nCongressional oversight of covert action can be organized around a framework of five issue areas: (1) the activity\u2019s statutory parameters, (2) U.S. national security interests, (3) U.S. foreign policy objectives, (4) funding and implementation, and (5) risk assessment. These categories enable Congress to analyze and assess the specific elements of each activity from a strategic point of view. By extension, Congressional oversight of anticipated clandestine intelligence activities that might also shape the political, economic or military environment abroad can apply the same framework and, as with covert action oversight, address the risk of compromise, unintended consequences, and loss of life. \nThis report is accompanied by two related reports: CRS Report R45175, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief, by Michael E. DeVine, and CRS Report R45191, Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Congressional Notification Requirements in Brief, by Michael E. DeVine.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45196", "sha1": "56ac421ea74277f919ac9d1d4825f84e9a1f2f7d", "filename": "files/20190809_R45196_56ac421ea74277f919ac9d1d4825f84e9a1f2f7d.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45196", "sha1": "6f186ddf8e0182440b715a8edd686b5de1c58cb1", "filename": "files/20190809_R45196_6f186ddf8e0182440b715a8edd686b5de1c58cb1.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4809, "name": "National & Military Intelligence" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 584039, "date": "2018-05-15", "retrieved": "2018-10-05T23:51:11.870406", "title": "Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for Congressional Oversight In Brief", "summary": "Since 9/11, a number of factors have complicated Congress\u2019s efforts to improve oversight of covert and clandestine activities of the intelligence community. Greater integration of military operations and intelligence activities has resulted in a blurring of authorities associated with Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. In addition, Congress has expressed concern that DOD\u2019s overuse of terms that are not defined in statute, such as traditional military activities and operational preparation of the environment (OPE), has allowed DOD to circumvent the more stringent oversight requirements of the congressional intelligence committees for activities that may bear close resemblance to covert action or clandestine intelligence collection. \nSelf-imposed limitations on how Congress conducts intelligence oversight may be inhibiting the oversight\u2019s effectiveness. The congressional intelligence committees\u2019 jurisdiction is limited to intelligence authorizations; the congressional defense sub-committees of the chambers\u2019 appropriations committees exercise sole jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations. There is also no natural public constituency for intelligence. Intelligence programs and analytical products are classified and generally removed from the public domain. In addition to not having to be responsive to a constituency for intelligence matters, term limits for Members of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), intended to prevent co-optation by the intelligence community (IC), may present an obstacle to the development of deep expertise. \nIn spite of these inhibiting factors, congressional oversight of intelligence is widely viewed as essential to the proper functioning of the government, especially the intelligence community. Highly classified covert action and clandestine intelligence programs do not often have visibility outside of Congress. Congressional oversight, therefore, may provide the only meaningful checks on the President\u2019s execution of intelligence policy and programs that may have significant bearing on U.S. national security. \nCongressional oversight of covert action can be organized around a framework of five issue areas: (1) the activity\u2019s statutory parameters, (2) U.S. national security interests, (3) U.S. foreign policy objectives, (4) funding and implementation, and (5) risk assessment. These categories enable Congress to analyze and assess the specific elements of each activity from a strategic point of view. By extension, Congressional oversight of anticipated clandestine intelligence activities that might also shape the political, economic or military environment abroad can apply the same framework and, as with covert action oversight, address the risk of compromise, unintended consequences, and loss of life.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45196", "sha1": "90745549d7483ce2d347e214c203d74e28c59859", "filename": "files/20180515_R45196_90745549d7483ce2d347e214c203d74e28c59859.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45196", "sha1": "160be65ffbda16ebeb36124c969637acefc20e52", "filename": "files/20180515_R45196_160be65ffbda16ebeb36124c969637acefc20e52.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4809, "name": "National & Military Intelligence" } ] } ], "topics": [ "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }