{
  "id": "R45220",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R45220",
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  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 584317,
      "date": "2018-06-08",
      "retrieved": "2018-08-29T15:22:48.442789",
      "title": "The Federal \u201cCrime of Violence\u201d Definition: Overview and Judicial Developments",
      "summary": "In an effort to deter violent crime, and to limit the broad discretion accorded to federal judges with respect to prison sentencing, Congress in 1984 passed legislation that revised the federal criminal code. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA) aimed to substantially reform and improve federal criminal laws, and \u201cto restore a proper balance between the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness.\u201d To that end, the CCCA adopted new bail procedures, imposed mandatory minimum sentences for certain criminal offenses, increased the penalties for drug offenses and violent crimes, and created new federal criminal offenses. The term \u201ccrime of violence\u201d was used in various provisions of the CCCA that defined the elements of certain newly established criminal offenses, set forth conditions for bail, and provided for enhanced prison sentences when certain aggravating factors were met. Since the CCCA\u2019s enactment, several federal laws have incorporated the act\u2019s \u201ccrime of violence\u201d definition. For example, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a non-U.S. national who commits a \u201ccrime of violence\u201d for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year may face significant immigration consequences, including being subject to removal from the country and thereafter rendered generally ineligible for readmission.\nAs codified in 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 16, the CCCA contains a two-pronged definition of a crime of violence. Specifically, the term includes both (1) \u201can offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another\u201d; and (2) \u201cany other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing any offense.\u201d\nSince the CCCA\u2019s enactment, reviewing courts have had to interpret and apply the statutory definition of a crime of violence, sometimes reaching disparate conclusions over the scope of that term. For example, courts have differed regarding the degree of \u201cphysical force\u201d required for an offense to constitute a crime of violence. Courts have also reached conflicting rulings on whether a crime of violence encompasses only intentional or deliberate acts, or whether the term also covers offenses involving gross negligence or pure recklessness. Moreover, courts have sometimes looked to the crime of violence definition (and jurisprudence interpreting that provision) for guidance in interpreting similarly worded provisions found elsewhere in the federal criminal code, such as those provisions referencing a \u201cmisdemeanor crime of domestic violence\u201d or \u201cviolent felony.\u201d More recently, courts have addressed an entirely different question\u2014whether the crime of violence definition is unconstitutionally vague. In particular, litigants have challenged the second prong of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 16\u2019s crime of violence definition, arguing that there is no reliable standard to assess whether a criminal offense constitutes a crime of violence because it carries a \u201csubstantial risk\u201d of physical force. In its 2018 decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court held that the second prong of the crime of violence definition, as incorporated into the INA, was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. While the first prong of the crime of violence definition was not affected by the Dimaya ruling, the Court\u2019s invalidation of the second prong narrows the potential application of the crime of violence definition, possibly having far-reaching consequences for the application of numerous statutes that incorporate that definition.",
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      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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  "topics": [
    "Constitutional Questions"
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}