{ "id": "R45252", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R45252", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 584847, "date": "2018-07-09", "retrieved": "2018-09-12T22:39:29.770336", "title": "United States Special Operations Command Acquisition Authorities", "summary": "United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is the Unified Combatant Command responsible for training, doctrine, and equipping all special operations forces of the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. SOCOM has been granted acquisition authority by Congress to procure special operations forces-peculiar equipment and services. \nThere is a perception among some observers and officials that SOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities that allow it to operate faster and more efficiently than the military departments. \nSOCOM possesses unique acquisition authorities when compared with other combatant commands. However, SOCOM is generally held to the same statutory and regulatory acquisition requirements as the military departments and, in some instances, has less acquisition authority. There are no unique authorities granting SOCOM exemptions or waivers from acquisition requirements. But when it comes to acquisition, SOCOM is different than the military services. \nSOCOM\u2019s acquisition performance is influenced by the size of the organization, focus of its acquisitions (which are limited to special operations-specific goods and services), and smaller size of its programs in terms of both scope of development and dollars. The current SOCOM Acquisition Executive reiterated these points when he reportedly stated that \u201c[SOCOM\u2019s] ability to move relatively fast is a function of scale.\u201d\nThese factors allow SOCOM to maintain the majority of its procurement programs at Category III levels, thereby reducing the oversight and bureaucratic burden, and allowing critical Milestone Decision Authority to remain at lower levels within the Command. As a result, some observers have argued that the SOCOM acquisition process is often capable of executing faster (and failing faster), maintaining closer communication between leadership and users, being more nimble, and fostering a culture willing to assume more risk.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45252", "sha1": "2e819dd6eb6084af1069b699b3a2a7aeff48f41b", "filename": "files/20180709_R45252_2e819dd6eb6084af1069b699b3a2a7aeff48f41b.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45252_files&id=/4.png": "files/20180709_R45252_images_a5170c33932455481a051f298cc27e932e49ffc9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45252_files&id=/0.png": "files/20180709_R45252_images_c579c6c454e82706d686303f37b9889c15c7eef6.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45252_files&id=/2.png": "files/20180709_R45252_images_ad487707bbd7b8baf2c2ac0d6c91f4551ac3d516.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45252_files&id=/1.png": "files/20180709_R45252_images_7b3929521a296b49e32e38e8c971c3ef10948096.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45252_files&id=/3.png": "files/20180709_R45252_images_9abcebcf101c6ca9e2f432c1e7514fca72633354.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45252", "sha1": "a1646a91482d42d169d377c30a754971a0decff3", "filename": "files/20180709_R45252_a1646a91482d42d169d377c30a754971a0decff3.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4925, "name": "Readiness, Training, Logistics, & Installations" } ] } ], "topics": [ "National Defense" ] }