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      "date": "2019-11-08",
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      "title": "Congressional Participation in Litigation: Article III and Legislative Standing",
      "summary": "Houses, committees, and Members of Congress periodically seek to initiate or participate in litigation for various purposes, such as advancing their legislative objectives, challenging alleged transgressions of their legislative prerogatives, or defending core institutional interests. However, the constitutionally based doctrine of \u201cstanding\u201d may prevent legislators from pursuing litigation in federal court. The standing doctrine requires a litigant seeking federal judicial relief to demonstrate (1) a concrete and particularized and actual or imminent injury-in-fact (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. The U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have issued several important opinions analyzing whether\u2014and under what circumstances\u2014a legislative entity has standing to seek judicial relief. \nAlthough legislative standing jurisprudence defies easy characterization, it is possible to distill several principles from existing precedent. For example, whereas courts commonly allow individual legislators to assert injuries to their own personal interests, following the Supreme Court\u2019s seminal opinion in Raines v. Byrd, lower courts have generally (though not universally) been less willing to permit individual legislators to seek redress for injuries to a house of Congress as a whole, at least in the absence of explicit authorization to do so from the legislative body itself. The Supreme Court\u2019s case Coleman v. Miller is generally understood as setting forth the lone exception, allowing legislators to sue when their vote has been \u201cnullified\u201d by some claimed illegal action. In addition, a congressional plaintiff generally cannot predicate a federal lawsuit solely on a complaint that the executive branch is misapplying or misinterpreting a statute. Legislative plaintiffs, like all litigants, must demonstrate concrete and particularized injury to themselves, as the Supreme Court explained in its recent decision in Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill. \nIn addition to initiating litigation, Congress also occasionally seeks to intervene in preexisting litigation. In cases in which the executive branch has declined to defend a federal statute from a constitutional challenge, for example, congressional entities have attempted to intervene as defendants in support of the law. The Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha and United States v. Windsor, allowed Congress to intervene to defend a law that the executive branch declined to defend but still enforced. Nonetheless, neither case resolved whether significant exceptions to this rule exist, let alone explored what rules are in place when the President both declines to defend and enforce a federal law. Moreover, in cases that do not involve the executive branch\u2019s refusal to defend a federal statute, Congress\u2019s ability to intervene as a full party to the case may be more circumscribed.\nEven when Congress lacks standing to initiate or intervene in a federal lawsuit as a full-fledged party, Congress may still play a role in litigation by participating as an amicus curiae, or \u201cfriend of the court.\u201d Courts frequently allow Members, houses, and committees of Congress to file amicus briefs in support of (or opposition to) particular parties or positions.",
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      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 595284,
      "date": "2019-03-28",
      "retrieved": "2019-04-17T13:51:01.593586",
      "title": "Congressional Participation in Litigation: Article III and Legislative Standing",
      "summary": "Houses, committees, and Members of Congress periodically seek to initiate or participate in litigation to, among other purposes, advance their legislative objectives, argue that the Executive is violating their legislative prerogatives, or defend core institutional interests. However, the constitutionally based doctrine of \u201cstanding\u201d\u2014which requires a litigant seeking federal judicial relief to demonstrate (1) a concrete and particularized and actual or imminent injury-in-fact (2) that is traceable to the allegedly unlawful actions of the opposing party and (3) that is redressable by a favorable judicial decision\u2014may prevent legislators from pursuing litigation in federal court. The U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have issued several important opinions analyzing whether\u2014and under what circumstances\u2014a legislative entity has standing to seek relief. \nAlthough legislative standing jurisprudence defies easy characterization, it is possible to distill several principles from existing precedent. For example, whereas courts commonly allow individual legislators to assert injuries to their own personal interests, following the Supreme Court\u2019s seminal opinion in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997), courts have generally (though not universally) been less willing to permit individual legislators to seek redress for injuries to a house of Congress as a whole, at least in the absence of explicit authorization to do so from the legislative body itself. The Supreme Court\u2019s case Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), is generally understood as setting forth the lone exception, allowing individual legislators to sue when their vote has been \u201cnullified\u201d by some claimed illegal action. In addition, generally speaking, a congressional plaintiff cannot predicate a federal lawsuit solely on a complaint that the executive branch is misapplying or misinterpreting a statute, as litigants must demonstrate concrete and particularized injury to themselves. \nIn addition to initiating litigation, Congress also occasionally seeks to intervene in preexisting litigation. In cases in which the executive branch has declined to defend a federal statute from a constitutional challenge, for example, congressional entities have attempted to intervene as defendants in support of the law. The Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), has allowed Congress to intervene to defend a law that the executive branch has declined to defend but still enforces. Nonetheless, neither case resolved whether significant exceptions to this rule exist, let alone explored what rules are in place when the President both declines to defend and enforce a federal law. Moreover, in cases that do not involve the executive branch\u2019s refusal to defend a federal statute, Congress\u2019s ability to intervene as a full party to the case may be more circumscribed.\nEven when Congress lacks standing to initiate or intervene in a federal lawsuit as a full-fledged party, Congress may still play a role in litigation by participating as an amicus curiae, or \u201cfriend of the court.\u201d Courts frequently allow Members, houses, and committees of Congress to file amicus briefs in support of (or opposition to) particular parties or positions.",
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      "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov",
      "title": "Congressional Participation in Litigation: Article III and Legislative Standing",
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  "topics": [
    "Constitutional Questions"
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}