{ "id": "R45657", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "R", "number": "R45657", "active": true, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov, EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration", "retrieved": "2021-02-20T04:03:48.157907", "id": "R45657_10_2021-01-22", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2021-01-22_R45657_fad0487b6ec228d765afe4efa0a73ca16f17a02c.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45657/10", "sha1": "fad0487b6ec228d765afe4efa0a73ca16f17a02c" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2021-01-22_R45657_fad0487b6ec228d765afe4efa0a73ca16f17a02c.html" } ], "date": "2021-01-22", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R45657", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source_dir": "crsreports.congress.gov", "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress and Through the Trump Administration", "retrieved": "2021-02-20T04:03:48.156777", "id": "R45657_8_2020-12-15", "formats": [ { "filename": "files/2020-12-15_R45657_4a71211e906a1b5d246314a342fc0718c1d3ab45.pdf", "format": "PDF", "url": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45657/8", "sha1": "4a71211e906a1b5d246314a342fc0718c1d3ab45" }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/2020-12-15_R45657_4a71211e906a1b5d246314a342fc0718c1d3ab45.html" } ], "date": "2020-12-15", "summary": null, "source": "CRSReports.Congress.gov", "typeId": "R", "active": true, "sourceLink": "https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R45657", "type": "CRS Report" }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 625132, "date": "2020-05-14", "retrieved": "2020-05-20T22:18:49.580503", "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress", "summary": "Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959 Cuban revolution. Current Cuban President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro in April 2018, but Castro continues to head Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. A new constitution took effect in 2019 that introduced some political and economic reforms but maintained the state sector\u2019s dominance over the economy and the Communist Party\u2019s predominant role. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by Venezuela\u2019s economic crisis, which has reduced Venezuela\u2019s support for Cuba and increased U.S. economic sanctions, and by the economic shutdown in response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Cuba\u2019s economy faces a contraction of more than 8% in 2020. The global contraction in economic growth, trade, foreign investment, and tourism likely will slow post-COVID-19 economic recovery. \nU.S. Policy\nSince the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation strengthening, and at times easing, U.S. economic sanctions. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions and toward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes. \nIn 2017, President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba that introduced new sanctions and rolled back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. In September 2017, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response to unexplained health injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana. The reduction affected embassy operations, especially visa processing. In November 2017, the State Department restricted financial transactions with over 200 business entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services; the so-called restricted list has been updated several times, most recently in November 2019. \nSince 2019, the Trump Administration has ramped up economic sanctions to pressure the Cuban government on its human rights record and its support for Nicol\u00e1s Maduro\u2019s government in Venezuela. The Administration has tightened restrictions on travel to Cuba, eliminating people-to-people educational travel, prohibiting cruise ship travel from the United States, and limiting flights between the United States and Cuba to Havana flights only. The Administration also has taken actions to allow lawsuits against those trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government, imposed sanctions targeting Venezuela\u2019s oil exports to Cuba, and imposed a series of other trade and financial sanctions. (See \u201cKey Trump Administration Sanctions and Other Actions,\u201d below.)\nLegislative Activity in the 116th Congress\nThe 116th Congress has continued to fund democracy assistance for Cuba and U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting to Cuba. For FY2019, Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-6, H.Rept. 116-9). For FY2020, Congress appropriated $20 million for democracy programs and $20.973 million for Cuba broadcasting (P.L. 116-94, Division G); Division J of P.L. 116-94 includes benefits for U.S. government employees and dependents injured while stationed in Cuba. The measure includes several Cuba reporting requirements in H.Rept. 116-78 and S.Rept. 116-126. Congress has begun consideration of the Administration\u2019s FY2021 budget request of $10 million for Cuba democracy programs and $12.973 million for Cuba broadcasting.\nAmong bills introduced in the 116th Congress, several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions in Cuba: H.R. 213 (baseball); S. 428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447 (U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overall embargo); and H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would direct the Administration to reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program. Several resolutions would express concerns regarding Cuba\u2019s foreign medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res. 232); religious and political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215); and the release of human rights activist Jos\u00e9 Daniel Ferrer and other Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU) members (S.Res. 454 and H.Res. 774). S.Res. 531 would honor Las Damas de Blanco, a Cuban human rights organization, and call for the release of all political prisoners. For more on legislative initiatives in the 116th Congress, see Appendix A.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45657", "sha1": "4e686770e0ecf08f077e9e7deba75f7f56fd26aa", "filename": "files/20200514_R45657_4e686770e0ecf08f077e9e7deba75f7f56fd26aa.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45657_files&id=/0.png": "files/20200514_R45657_images_ea23c0db57def9cbd75e09783bbc64d2337e140d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45657_files&id=/2.png": "files/20200514_R45657_images_e8691f8931adcb3c939a7fadb04e8047cd193438.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45657_files&id=/1.png": "files/20200514_R45657_images_41ee581fc50e0bae5ddd2e656defda0788df8d8a.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45657", "sha1": "892fec98241bdce8a7c2ebef8868dc7ca34ae177", "filename": "files/20200514_R45657_892fec98241bdce8a7c2ebef8868dc7ca34ae177.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] }, { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 595257, "date": "2019-03-29", "retrieved": "2019-12-20T19:36:39.304964", "title": "Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress", "summary": "Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the Cuban revolution in 1959. Current Cuban President Miguel D\u00edaz-Canel succeeded Ra\u00fal Castro in April 2018, but Castro continues to head Cuba\u2019s Communist Party. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, although it has not taken enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. Most observers do not anticipate major policy changes under D\u00edaz-Canel, at least in the short term; the president faces the enormous challenges of reforming the economy and responding to citizens\u2019 desires for greater freedom. \nU.S. Policy\nSince the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted of economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening, and at times easing, U.S. economic sanctions. In 2014, however, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift moving away from sanctions toward a policy of engagement. This included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba\u2019s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through regulatory changes. \nPresident Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017 that increased sanctions and partially rolled back some of the Obama Administration\u2019s efforts to normalize relations. In 2017, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response to unexplained injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana; 26 individuals have been affected. The reduction has affected embassy operations, especially visa processing, and has made bilateral engagement more difficult. The most significant Trump Administration policy changes include restrictions on transactions with over 200 entities controlled by the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services (on a \u201crestricted list\u201d maintained by the State Department) and the elimination of people-to-people educational travel for individuals (such travel with a group specializing in educational tours is still permitted). In March 2019, the Administration ratcheted up economic pressure on Cuba by allowing certain lawsuits to go forward against those entities on the \u201crestricted list\u201d for trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba. In light of increased U.S. sanctions against the regime of Nicol\u00e1s Maduro in Venezuela, the Administration has increased its criticism of Cuba\u2019s military and intelligence support for the regime in Caracas. \nLegislative Activity in the 116th Congress\nIn the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6, H.J.Res. 31) enacted in February 2019, Congress provided $20 million in Cuba democracy assistance ($10 million more than requested) and $29.1 million for Cuba broadcasting ($15.4 million more than requested). \nSeveral legislative initiatives on Cuba have been introduced in the 116th Congress: H.R. 213 would waive certain prohibitions to allows nationals of Cuba to come to the United States to play organized professional baseball; S. 428 would repeal or amend many provisions of law restricting trade and other relations with Cuba; and H.R. 1898 would authorize private financing for U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. S.Res. 14 and H.Res. 136 would express the sense of the Senate and House, respectively, that Cuba\u2019s foreign medical missions constitute human trafficking; and H.Res. 92 would call for the extradition or rendering to the United States all fugitives from U.S. justice receiving safe harbor in Cuba. For more on legislative initiatives in the 116th Congress, see Appendix A.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45657", "sha1": "b349d92ebc687fec12a2b9f517530b3e5831e5c6", "filename": "files/20190329_R45657_b349d92ebc687fec12a2b9f517530b3e5831e5c6.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45657_files&id=/0.png": "files/20190329_R45657_images_ea23c0db57def9cbd75e09783bbc64d2337e140d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45657_files&id=/2.png": "files/20190329_R45657_images_e8691f8931adcb3c939a7fadb04e8047cd193438.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45657_files&id=/1.png": "files/20190329_R45657_images_008ee3476eecbce7931bb77763f1238f7344bc02.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45657", "sha1": "eccbf62211950995c6636ad32eb8e040511d1c92", "filename": "files/20190329_R45657_eccbf62211950995c6636ad32eb8e040511d1c92.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4847, "name": "Latin America, Caribbean, & Canada" } ] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Foreign Affairs", "Immigration Policy", "Intelligence and National Security", "Latin American Affairs", "National Defense" ] }