{
  "id": "R45807",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R45807",
  "active": true,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 603567,
      "date": "2019-06-28",
      "retrieved": "2019-08-14T22:15:18.086596",
      "title": "India\u2019s 2019 National Election and Implications for U.S. Interests",
      "summary": "India, a federal republic and the world\u2019s most populous democracy, held elections to seat a new lower house of parliament in April and May of 2019. Estimates suggest that more than two-thirds of the country\u2019s nearly 900 million eligible voters participated. The 545-seat Lok Sabha (People\u2019s House) is seated every five years, and the results saw a return to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was chief minister of the west Indian state of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014. Modi\u2019s party won decisively\u2014it now holds 56% of Lok Sabha seats and Modi became the first Indian leader to win consecutive majorities since Indira Gandhi in 1971.\nThe United States and India have been pursuing an expansive strategic partnership since 2005. The Trump Administration and many in the U.S. Congress welcomed Modi\u2019s return to power for another five-year term. Successive U.S. Presidents have deemed India\u2019s growing power and influence a boon to U.S. interests in Asia and globally, not least in the context of balancing against China\u2019s increasing assertiveness. India is often called a preeminent actor in the Trump Administration\u2019s strategy for a \u201cfree and open Indo-Pacific.\u201d Yet there are potential stumbling blocks to continued development of the partnership. In 2019, differences over trade have become more prominent, and India\u2019s long-standing (and mostly commercial) ties to Russia and Iran may run afoul of U.S. sanctions laws. Additionally, India maintains a wariness of U.S. engagement with Pakistan and intentions in Afghanistan, with Islamabad presently facilitating a U.S.-Taliban dialogue and India counseling against a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. \nPrime Minister Modi\u2019s return to power promises broad continuity, even with some notable changes to the federal cabinet. By many accounts, Modi\u2019s record as an economic reformer and liberalizer is mixed, and his reputation as a nationalist \u201cwatchman\u201d has not always translated into effective foreign policy, according to some analysts. It is unclear if Modi will use his renewed domestic political mandate to pursue more assertiveness internationally, possibly in ways that challenge U.S. preferences. Still, most analysts contend that Modi and the BJP have been and will continue to be more open to aligning with U.S. regional strategy and more energetic in pursuing U.S.-favored economic reforms than would have been any alternative Indian leadership.\nThe BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, born in 1980 of a larger social movement, and Narendra Modi is a self-avowed Hindu nationalist (India is roughly 79% Hindu and 14% Muslim). The 2019 Modi-BJP campaign was widely criticized for divisiveness, and nationalist fervor following a February India-Pakistan crisis may have benefitted the BJP at the polls. India\u2019s minority communities and the country\u2019s civil society are widely reported to be under increasing threats emanating from Hindu majoritarian policies and sentiment. These threats can take violent and repressive forms, at times with the involvement of Indian officials or political figures, as reported by the U.S. State Department and independent human rights watchdogs, and as criticized by some Members of Congress.\nThis report reviews the recent Indian election process and results, the country\u2019s national political stage, and possible implications for U.S. interests in the areas of bilateral economic and trade relations, defense and security ties, India\u2019s other foreign relations, and human rights concerns.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
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      "topics": [
        {
          "source": "IBCList",
          "id": 4931,
          "name": "South & Southeast Asia"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Asian Affairs",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Industry and Trade",
    "National Defense",
    "South Asian Affairs"
  ]
}