{ "id": "R45946", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R45946", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 605940, "date": "2019-10-07", "retrieved": "2019-10-10T22:18:48.625850", "title": "Executive Branch Service and the \u201cRevolving Door\u201d in Cabinet Departments: Background and Issues for Congress", "summary": "Individuals may be subject to certain restrictions when leaving the government for private employment or joining the government from the private sector. These restrictions were enacted in response to what is often referred to as the revolving door. Generally, the revolving door is described as the movement of individuals between the public and private sector. Individuals may move because they possess policy and procedural knowledge and have relationships with former colleagues that are useful to prospective employers. \nLaws attempting to restrict the movement of individuals between the government and the private sector have existed since at least the late 1800s. Today\u2019s revolving door laws focus on restricting former government employees\u2019 representational activities that attempt to influence federal officials with whom they used to work. Found at 18 U.S.C. \u00a7207, revolving door laws for executive branch officials include (1) a lifetime ban on \u201cswitching sides\u201d (e.g., representing a private party on the same \u201cparticular matter\u201d involving identified parties on which the former executive branch employee had worked while in government); (2) a two-year ban on \u201cswitching sides\u201d on a broader range of issues; (3) a one-year restriction on assisting others on certain trade and treaty negotiations; (4) a one-year \u201ccooling off\u201d period for certain senior officials on lobbying; (5) two-year \u201ccooling off\u201d periods for very senior officials from lobbying; and (6) a one-year ban on certain former officials from representing a foreign government or foreign political party. In addition to laws, executive orders have been used to place further restrictions on executive branch officials, including officials entering government. For example, President Trump issued an executive order (E.O. 13770) to lengthen \u201ccooling off\u201d periods for certain executive branch appointees both entering and exiting government. \nTo date, much of the empirical work concerning the revolving door has focused on former Members of Congress or congressional staff leaving Capitol Hill, especially those who become lobbyists in their postcongressional careers. This report provides some empirical data about a different aspect of the revolving door\u2014the movement into and out of government by executive branch personnel. Using research conducted by the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University\u2019s capstone class over the 2017-2018 academic year, this report presents data about the revolving door in the executive branch through the lens of President George W. Bush\u2019s and President Barack Obama\u2019s Administrations. The analysis includes Cabinet department officials who were listed, for either Administration, in the United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (the Plum Book). \nThrough an examination of appointees in President Bush\u2019s and President Obama\u2019s Administrations, several findings emerge. First, approximately 92% of executive branch officials in the examined dataset were never registered lobbyists, while 8% were registered lobbyists at some point before or after their government service. Second, Cabinet departments differed greatly in the number of officials who were registered lobbyists either before or after their federal service. Although every Cabinet department surveyed had some percentage of officials registered as lobbyists either before or after their government service, the percentage of officials included in the dataset who registered as lobbyists before their government service, after their government service, or both ranged from a high of 18% (Department of Commerce) to a low of 1% (Department of Justice). \nThird, the data also show that for lobbyists entering government, the percentage of officials in the dataset who had been lobbyists before government serving in the Bush and Obama Administrations ranged from 10% in the Department of Labor to 61% in the Department of Veterans Affairs. The analogous percentages for government employees in the dataset leaving to become lobbyists ranged from 39% in the Department of Veterans Affairs to 82% in the Department of Transportation.\nFinally, the report identifies several areas for potential congressional consideration. In recent years, several bills have been introduced in Congress to address many of these potential areas. These include options to amend existing \u201ccooling off\u201d periods and evaluate the administration and enforcement of revolving door regulations. Alternatively, Congress may choose to maintain current \u201ccooling off\u201d periods, administration, and enforcement practices.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R45946", "sha1": "41fec052db8b5b690104bf4bd1de7ea701944389", "filename": "files/20191007_R45946_41fec052db8b5b690104bf4bd1de7ea701944389.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45946_files&id=/0.png": "files/20191007_R45946_images_722bcadf4ce5774ef06843bf12dcfe2b66c79e78.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R45946_files&id=/1.png": "files/20191007_R45946_images_0d7bfcb013a9b83aea90c8aae0ede5f851a32d2b.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R45946", "sha1": "8249dcaabe9e960a42d5f684e6eccf4c13d572d6", "filename": "files/20191007_R45946_8249dcaabe9e960a42d5f684e6eccf4c13d572d6.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4876, "name": "Government Ethics & Lobbying" } ] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Economic Policy" ] }