{
  "id": "R46179",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "R46179",
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  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 613842,
      "date": "2020-01-14",
      "retrieved": "2020-01-22T13:59:55.826461",
      "title": "Presidential Pardons: Overview and Selected Legal Issues",
      "summary": "Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the President \u201cto grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.\u201d The power has its roots in the king\u2019s prerogative to grant mercy under early English law, which later traveled across the Atlantic Ocean to the American colonies. The Supreme Court has recognized that the authority vested by the Constitution in the President is quite broad, describing it as \u201cplenary,\u201d discretionary, and largely not subject to legislative modification. Nonetheless, there are two textual limitations on the pardon power\u2019s exercise: first, the President may grant pardons only for federal criminal offenses, and second, impeachment convictions are not pardonable. The Court has also recognized some other narrow restraints, including that a pardon cannot be issued to cover crimes prior to commission.\nThe pardon power authorizes the President to grant several forms of relief from criminal punishment. The most common forms of relief are full pardons (for individuals) and amnesties (for groups of people), which completely obviate the punishment for a committed or charged federal criminal offense, and commutations, which reduce the penalties associated with convictions. An administrative process has been established through the Department of Justice\u2019s Office of the Pardon Attorney for submitting and evaluating requests for these and other forms of clemency, though the process and regulations governing it are merely advisory and do not affect the President\u2019s ultimate authority to grant relief.\nLegal questions concerning the President\u2019s pardon power that have arisen have included (1) the legal effect of clemency; (2) whether a President may grant a self-pardon; and (3) what role Congress may play in overseeing the exercise of the pardon power. With respect to the first question, some 19th century Supreme Court cases suggest that a full pardon broadly erases both the punishment for an offense and the guilt of the offender. However, more recent precedent recognizes a distinction between the punishment for a conviction, which the pardon obviates, and the fact of the commission of the crime, which may be considered in later proceedings or preclude the pardon recipient from engaging in certain activities. Thus, although a full pardon restores civil rights such as the right to vote that may have been revoked as part of the original punishment, pardon recipients may, for example, still be subject to censure under professional rules of conduct or precluded from practicing their chosen profession as a result of the pardoned conduct.\nAs for whether a President may grant a self-pardon, no past President has ever issued such a pardon. As a consequence, no federal court has addressed the matter. That said, several Presidents have considered the proposition of a self-pardon, and scholars have reached differing conclusions on whether such an action would be permissible based on the text, structure, and history of the Constitution. Ultimately, given the limited authority available, the constitutionality of a self-pardon is unclear.\nFinally, regarding Congress\u2019s role in overseeing the pardon process, the Supreme Court has indicated that the President\u2019s exercise of the pardon power is largely beyond the legislature\u2019s control. Nevertheless, Congress does have constitutional tools at its disposal to address the context in which the President\u2019s pardon power is exercised, including through oversight, constitutional amendment, or impeachment.",
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  "topics": [
    "Constitutional Questions"
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}