{ "id": "R46221", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R46221", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 616685, "date": "2020-02-11", "retrieved": "2020-02-11T23:20:47.585176", "title": "Drug Pricing and Pharmaceutical Patenting Practices", "summary": "Intellectual property (IP) rights in pharmaceuticals are typically justified as necessary to allow manufacturers to recoup their substantial investments in research, development, and regulatory approval. IP law provides exclusive rights in a particular invention or product for a certain time period, potentially enabling the rights holder (e.g., a brand-name drug manufacturer) to charge higher-than-competitive prices. If rights holders are able to charge such prices, they have an incentive to lengthen the period of exclusive rights as much as possible. Indeed, some commentators allege that pharmaceutical manufacturers have engaged in patenting practices that unduly extend the period of exclusivity. These critics argue that these patenting practices are used to keep drug prices high, without any benefit for consumers or innovation. Criticisms center on four such practices:\n\u201cEvergreening\u201d: So-called patent \u201cevergreening\u201d is the practice of filing for new patents on secondary features of a particular product as earlier patents expire, thereby extending patent exclusivity past the original twenty-year term. Later-filed patents may delay or prevent entry by competitors, thereby allowing the brand-name drug manufacturer (the brand) to continue charging high prices.\n\u201cProduct Hopping\u201d: Generic drug manufacturers allege that as patents on a particular product expire, brand manufacturers may attempt to introduce and switch the market to a new, similar product covered by a later-expiring patent\u2014a process known as \u201cproduct hopping\u201d or \u201cproduct switching.\u201d This practice takes two forms: a \u201chard switch,\u201d where the older product is removed from the market, and a \u201csoft switch,\u201d where the older product is kept on the market with the new product. In either case, the brand will focus its marketing on the new product in order to limit the market for any generic versions of the old product.\n\u201cPatent Thickets\u201d: Generic and biosimilar companies also allege that the brands create \u201cpatent thickets\u201d by filing numerous patents on the same product. These thickets allegedly prevent generics from entering the market due to the risk of infringement and the high cost of patent litigation.\n\u201cPay-for-Delay\u201d Settlements: Litigation often results when a generic or biosimilar manufacturer attempts to enter the market with a less expensive version of a branded pharmaceutical. Core issues usually include whether the brand\u2019s patents are valid, and whether the generic or biosimilar product infringes those patents. Rather than litigate these issues to judgment, however, the parties will often settle. Such settlements may involve the brand paying the generic or biosimilar to stay out of the market\u2014referred to as \u201creverse payment\u201d or \u201cpay-for-delay\u201d settlements. These settlements are allegedly anticompetitive because they allow the brand to continue to charge high prices without risking invalidation of its patent, thus unjustifiably benefiting the settling companies at the expense of the consumer.\nDrug manufacturers respond that their patenting practices protect new, innovative inventions, as Congress intended when it created the patent system. In their view, the terms for these practices are unfairly pejorative, or, at most, describe outlier behavior by a few companies. Defenders of these patenting practices reject their characterization as anticompetitive and emphasize that strong patent rights are needed to encourage innovation and life-saving research and development efforts.\nIn recent years, some commentators and Members of Congress have proposed patent reforms that seek to limit or curtail these patenting practices, which some perceive as contributing to high prices for pharmaceutical products. Such proposals aim, for example, to reduce the impact of later-filed patents (e.g., TERM Act of 2019, H.R. 3199, and REMEDY Act, S. 1209/H.R. 3812); to encourage challenges to pharmaceutical patents (e.g., Second Look at Drugs Patents Act of 2019, S. 1617); to make product hopping an antitrust violation in certain circumstances (e.g., Affordable Prescriptions for Patients Act of 2019, S. 1416); to facilitate generic market entry (e.g., Orange Book Transparency Act of 2019, H.R. 1503); to increase transparency as to the patents that cover biological products (e.g., Purple Book Continuity Act of 2019, H.R. 1520, and Biologic Patent Transparency Act, S. 659); and to reform pay-for-delay settlements (e.g., Preserve Access to Affordable Generics and Biosimilars Act, S. 64/H.R. 2375).", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R46221", "sha1": "d63cb3bd9bc77ab1472bd68a666661ac87e1b216", "filename": "files/20200211_R46221_d63cb3bd9bc77ab1472bd68a666661ac87e1b216.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R46221", "sha1": "145095cd7a7d37a957722140d6e708a1d52de5a1", "filename": "files/20200211_R46221_145095cd7a7d37a957722140d6e708a1d52de5a1.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Economic Policy", "Health Policy" ] }