{ "id": "R46338", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R46338", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 623636, "date": "2020-04-30", "retrieved": "2020-05-19T13:56:41.509839", "title": "Veto Threats and Vetoes in the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations", "summary": "The Framers checked congressional legislative power by providing the President the power to veto legislation and, in turn, checked the President\u2019s veto power by providing Congress a means to override that veto. Over time, it has become clear that the presidential veto power, even if not formally exercised, provides the President some degree of influence over the legislative process. Most Presidents have exercised their veto power as a means to influence legislative outcomes. Of 45 Presidents, 37 have exercised their veto power.\nThis report begins with a brief discussion of the ways Presidents communicate their intention to veto, oppose, or support a bill. It then examines the veto power and Congress\u2019s role in the veto process. The report then provides analysis of the use of veto threats and vetoes and the passage of legislation during the George W. Bush Administration (2001-2009) and the Obama Administration (2009-2017) with some observations of the potential influence of such actions on legislation.\nAs specified by the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7), the President has 10 days, Sundays excepted, to act once he has been presented with legislation that has passed both houses of Congress and either reject or accept the bill into law. The President has three general courses of action during the 10-day presentment period: The President may sign the legislation into law, take no action, or reject the legislation by exercising the office\u2019s veto authority. A President\u2019s return veto may be overridden, or invalidated, by a process also provided for in Article 1, Section 7, of the U.S. Constitution. \nBecause Congress faces a two-thirds majority threshold to override a President\u2019s veto, veto threats may deter Congress from passing legislation that the President opposes. By going public with a veto threat, the President may leverage public pressure upon Congress to support his agenda. For purposes of this report, which focuses on the use of veto threats, the unit of analysis throughout is a veto (or a threatened veto), and the report does not distinguish between regular and pocket vetoes.\nFormal, written Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs, pronounced \u201csaps\u201d) are frequently used to express the President\u2019s support for or opposition to particular pieces of legislation and may include statements threatening to use the veto power. Among the Bush and Obama Administrations\u2019 SAPs examined later in this report, for example, 24% and 48%, respectively, contained a veto threat. \nAlthough the relationship between Congress and a President may change every two years with each new Congress, the relationship between an Administration and its President may also change by presidential term. For example, while the number of veto threats in SAPs slowly increased during the first three Congresses of the Bush Administration, the number of veto threats grew sharply in the 110th Congress. In comparison to the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration steadily increased its use of veto threats issued in SAPs in every subsequent Congress.\nPresident George W. Bush exercised the veto power 12 times during his presidency. Congress attempted to override six of President Bush\u2019s 12 vetoes and succeeded four times. President Barack Obama similarly exercised the veto power 12 times during his presidency. Congress also attempted to override six of President Obama\u2019s 12 vetoes and succeeded once. During the Bush and Obama Administrations, enrolled bills that passed both chambers and were met with a statement indicating that the President intended to veto the bill (a presidential veto threat SAP) were vetoed more often than were those that were met with a statement that agencies or senior advisors would recommend that the President veto the bill (a senior advisors threat SAP).", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R46338", "sha1": "0f828792178b3d337d08add00fd87f1a928fa137", "filename": "files/20200430_R46338_0f828792178b3d337d08add00fd87f1a928fa137.html", "images": { "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46338_files&id=/1.png": "files/20200430_R46338_images_0c8a866acbb31b87d0e90b19bbef0cee1d274b68.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46338_files&id=/6.png": "files/20200430_R46338_images_e17f299683e1bce37659a3e10a3ecb68a52110d5.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46338_files&id=/2.png": "files/20200430_R46338_images_6e7939727c017ef01e2d2e8459f6b351cded265d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46338_files&id=/0.png": "files/20200430_R46338_images_54a21424ed90d37faafc5908326f9525158ada6d.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46338_files&id=/4.png": "files/20200430_R46338_images_178e9e55b410a5e45cddcdab152842d3faae36f9.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46338_files&id=/5.png": "files/20200430_R46338_images_359c544f73347cb98e75eec5487cc90e95d7e2f0.png", "/products/Getimages/?directory=R/html/R46338_files&id=/3.png": "files/20200430_R46338_images_338fed3729eee8da8b26450bcef98d57a7d2e6b3.png" } }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R46338", "sha1": "a7b4e73fb8350e2a0aa2bc91991a656a644656c9", "filename": "files/20200430_R46338_a7b4e73fb8350e2a0aa2bc91991a656a644656c9.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [ { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4756, "name": "Separation of Powers" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4817, "name": "Executive Branch" }, { "source": "IBCList", "id": 4860, "name": "Oversight" } ] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Legislative Process", "National Defense" ] }