{ "id": "R46365", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "R46365", "active": true, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 625188, "date": "2020-05-18", "retrieved": "2020-05-20T22:17:35.516450", "title": "Child Support Enforcement-Led Employment Services for Noncustodial Parents: In Brief", "summary": "The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program is a federal-state partnership that seeks to ensure child support is a regular source of income for families. The program transfers financial support from a noncustodial parent (NCP) to a child\u2019s primary caretaker (usually a custodial parent). Nearly two-thirds of participating custodial families report having incomes below 200% of the federal poverty threshold. The CSE program collects about two-thirds of the current support that is due each year, with the remainder that is unpaid becoming arrears (i.e., past-due support). \nMany NCPs who do not pay their obligations in full struggle with finding consistent and sufficient employment. Employment programs within the context of CSE are designed to increase NCP employment and child support collections. Many states have CSE-led employment programs and a number of practitioners report that, in their experience, these services are a more effective tool for NCPs with limited ability to pay than other enforcement strategies. CSE employment programs only serve a small proportion of NCPs making zero or partial payments; many observers primarily attribute this to a lack of sustainable funding. In response, some policymakers have proposed dedicating federal funding for CSE-led employment services.\nCSE employment programs use varied eligibility criteria, but they typically focus on low-income NCPs. Programs also vary in their reliance on mandatory or voluntary recruitment policies, or both. Mandatory recruitment involves courts ordering parents who are behind in their payments to participate or risk incarceration. Voluntary recruitment relies on NCP interest and referrals from CSE staff, courts, and partner organizations. \nCSE employment programs usually provide a wide range of services, including intensive case management, employment, child support, parenting/fatherhood, and other support services. Service provision is often contracted to partner agencies or community organizations. In terms of employment services, programs traditionally provide services such as job readiness, job search, and job development. Participants are less likely to participate in transitional jobs (short-term subsidized employment) or more intensive vocational education and training services. \nUnder current law, federal funds that can be used by CSE programs to support employment services are fairly limited. Although the federal government normally reimburses each state at 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE activities\u2014financing that totaled more than $3.5 billion in FY2018\u2014employment services are currently not a reimbursable activity. Similarly, the second largest CSE funding stream, incentive payments (expected to exceed $510 million for FY2018), cannot be automatically used to support employment services. States can pursue Section 1115 waiver demonstrations as a means to receive federal matching payments or request authorization to spend incentive funds on employment services, but both approaches come with restrictions. States can also tap non-CSE federal funding to support employment services for NCPs, such as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, but this use must compete with other potential uses for the funding.\nSeveral rigorous evaluations have been conducted on two employment service models with NCPs: traditional employment services and transitional jobs. Evidence on the effectiveness of traditional employment services for NCPs is mixed, with the most recent federally funded, large-scale random assignment study on this model finding little or no impacts. Earlier evaluations reported more promising effects. Transitional jobs programs are more expensive and challenging to implement, but a recent federally funded, large-scale random assignment evaluation on this model reported stronger impacts than traditional employment services. The effects were substantial while participants were in subsidized jobs, modest for a period after the transitional jobs ended, but then usually continued to fade over time.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": true, "formats": [ { "format": "HTML", "encoding": "utf-8", "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/R46365", "sha1": "a6e40f5e0f27444c80f7004541d47734efb7de94", "filename": "files/20200518_R46365_a6e40f5e0f27444c80f7004541d47734efb7de94.html", "images": {} }, { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "https://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/R46365", "sha1": "8f93f2572418775d34c8e41df655ca40430c997a", "filename": "files/20200518_R46365_8f93f2572418775d34c8e41df655ca40430c997a.pdf", "images": {} } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Domestic Social Policy" ] }