{
  "id": "RL30249",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL30249",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101871,
      "date": "1999-06-23",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:44:06.113941",
      "title": "The Separation of Powers Doctrine: An Overview of its Rationale and Application",
      "summary": "As delineated in the Constitution, the separation of powers doctrine represents the belief that\ngovernment consists of three basic and distinct functions, each of which must be exercised by a\ndifferent branch of government, so as to avoid the arbitrary exercise of power by any single ruling\nbody. This concept was directly espoused in the writings of Montesquieu, who declared that \"when\nthe executive and the legislature are united in a single person or in a single body of magistracy, there\nis no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will\nexecute them tyrannically.\"  (1)  The Framers of the Constitution shared this\nview, with James Madison\nstating that \"the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,\nwhether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be\npronounced the very definition of tyranny.\"  (2) \n  To alleviate the dangers inherent in centralized power, the Constitution establishes three\nseparate branches of government, the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Through this\nstructure, the Framers sought to create an efficient governmental system which would limit the\npower vested in any one branch. Realizing that mere textual separation would be insufficient to\nguard against aggrandizement by the respective branches, however, a system of checks and balances\nwas developed, by which the three arms of government could resist against encroachment. Through\nthis system, the various branches of government share certain interdependent characteristics which\nenable efficient governance, while other functions are staunchly protected, so as to prevent the\naccumulation of excessive power by any single branch. \n     1.  Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al.\neds., 1989).\n  2.  The Federalist Papers, No. 48, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.\n1961).",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "American Law",
    "Constitutional Questions"
  ]
}