{
  "id": "RL30265",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL30265",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 105424,
      "date": "1999-07-21",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:43:33.358941",
      "title": "Kosovo: Review and Analysis of Policy Objectives, 1998-June 1999",
      "summary": "Since the outbreak of violent conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo in early 1998, the\nUnited\nStates and European countries have been actively involved in various initiatives to end the conflict\nand restore peace. At first, international objectives, as expressed by the six-nation Contact Group\nand the U.N. Security Council, were limited to seeking a cease-fire in the province, ending the\nrepression of the Kosovo civilian population by Serb forces and improving the humanitarian\nsituation, and facilitating a political dialogue between the parties. As fighting continued, the United\nStates pressed for NATO to threaten punitive air strikes in order to achieve compliance with U.N.\nDemands. The Contact Group became more involved with the possible terms of a political\nsettlement. In early 1999, the Contact Group sought Serb and Kosovar Albanian acceptance of a\ndetailed interim peace plan that would restore substantial autonomy to the Kosovo population while\nupholding Yugoslavia's territorial integrity. \n Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic's rejection of the draft peace plan and his escalating use\nof force in Kosovo prompted NATO to launch a sustained air campaign, Operation  Allied\nForce ,\nagainst Serb targets throughout Yugoslavia beginning in March 1999. NATO leaders sought to deter\nBelgrade from a bloodier offensive in Kosovo and to damage Belgrade's military capacity. In\nresponse, however, Milosevic stepped up efforts to drive out the ethnic Albanian population from\nKosovo, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians across borders. NATO established five key\nconditions for Milosevic to meet before air strikes would end: an end to all military action in\nKosovo; the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo; agreement to the stationing of a NATO-led\nmilitary presence in Kosovo; agreement to the return of all refugees; and, willingness to negotiate\na political framework agreement for Kosovo. In June, Milosevic accepted a peace framework\nincorporating these demands, eventually leading to an end to the bombing campaign. U.S. and allied\nofficials proclaimed victory for the operation and moved quickly toward a peacekeeping and peace\nimplementation phase in Kosovo.\n U.S. and European objectives in Kosovo remained largely consistent, although some evolved\nin response to changing circumstances and met with varying degrees of success. In late 1998, the\nthreat of air strikes achieved the objective of averting a humanitarian disaster, at least for a while. \nIn 1999, however, NATO did not succeed in deterring the largest Serbian offensives to date during\nthe course of the air campaign. The humanitarian situation in Kosovo is likely to improve\nsubstantially in the absence of violent conflict. The NATO operation achieved Belgrade's agreement\nto withdraw all of its forces from Kosovo, and the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army's commitment to\nde-militarize under NATO supervision. A NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR, has been deployed\nto Kosovo under unified command and control arrangements, with Russian participation. Contrary\nto some expectations, NATO countries generally remained unified behind the air operation, though\nwere divided on other military options. The objective of attaining a durable political settlement in\nKosovo remains elusive, but has been superceded to some extent by the establishment of a virtual\nU.N. protectorate for Kosovo.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs"
  ]
}