{ "id": "RL30366", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL30366", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 105471, "date": "1999-11-05", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:41:18.383941", "title": "Kosovo: Implications for Military Intelligence", "summary": "North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aerial operations conducted in April-June 1999\nagainst\nSerbian forces and installations (Operation Allied Force) demonstrated that an air campaign largely\nbased on precision weapons can accomplish major military and political objectives even in the\nabsence of a ground campaign. Eventual Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo was achieved with\nalmost no casualties among friendly forces. \n The prerequisite to success in NATO's air campaign was highly accurate allied, particularly\nU.S., intelligence and precision weapons. The combined use of precise intelligence and munitions\nto strike troop positions and stationary targets has been described as a major component of an\nongoing technological revolution that is integral to defense planning in the post-Cold War world. \nFar different than the plans for second strike nuclear capabilities and extended deterrence that\ncharacterized earlier U.S. planning, the emphasis on precise targeting that limits friendly and non-\ncombatant casualties greatly increases the need to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence in\nsomething approaching \"real-time.\"\n Despite a successful military outcome, however, the Kosovo campaign demonstrates that\nneither the Defense Department nor the Intelligence Community is yet fully prepared to provide the\nextensive intelligence support required in the military operations envisioned for the next century. \nCollection assets were stretched thin; resources had to be borrowed from other theaters. Intelligence\ncould not in many cases be transmitted immediately to attacking aircraft. Several instances of\nerroneous bombing, including the attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, have been blamed on\nfaulty intelligence.\n It is widely agreed that limitations in U.S. reconnaissance capabilities especially manned\naircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) must now be addressed. Acquisition of airborne\nreconnaissance platforms, as well as satellites, has been complicated by budgetary limitations and,\naccording to some observers, by administrative shortcomings. Congress has expressed concern\nabout inadequate progress on UAV programs in particular and some argue that the failure of the\nExecutive Branch to present comprehensive reconnaissance plans for the entire Defense Department\nhas forced Congress to make necessary trade-offs. Numerous detailed provisions in FY2000 defense\nand intelligence legislation deal with reconnaissance assets. The Conference Report on the FY2000\nDefense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-79 ) indicates that reconnaissance questions will be a matter\nof significant concern in consideration of future defense budgets.\n Kosovo also demonstrated that other NATO countries are, in large measure, unprepared for the\nuse of precise intelligence to support precision weaponry, even though such capabilities might cost\nless than the large ground force structures currently being maintained. This will present difficult\nchallenges should the Alliance become involved in further combined operations, but the U.S. has\nonly a limited ability to achieve the redirection of NATO defense planning.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30366", "sha1": "fb37a2ab7103f2cb51abadd9b733cdba2110a286", "filename": "files/19991105_RL30366_fb37a2ab7103f2cb51abadd9b733cdba2110a286.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19991105_RL30366_fb37a2ab7103f2cb51abadd9b733cdba2110a286.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Appropriations", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }