{ "id": "RL30374", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL30374", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101211, "date": "1999-11-19", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:40:57.384941", "title": "Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied Force", "summary": "The March-June 1999 NATO war over Kosovo raised questions about many issues affecting the\nfuture of NATO. Questions arising from the conflict about political objectives, strategy, command\narrangements, NATO-Russian relations, allied capabilities, future enlargement, allied unity, non-\nArticle V operations, and the response of potential adversaries remain under debate. This report\nprovides brief \"lessons learned\" from Operation Allied Force .\n NATO had limited political objectives in the conflict, most of which were at least partially met.\nKey considerations, such as avoiding civilian casualties and losses to NATO forces, affected design\nof the military strategy supporting these objectives. NATO's restrained escalation of force, with no\nthreat of ground attack and a gradual application of increased air power, violated conventional U.S.\nmilitary doctrine to maximize shock. A desire to sustain allied unity largely caused this restraint,\nand ceded time and initiative to Milosevic. Subsequent proposals to streamline allied decision-\nmaking, including an \"intervention committee,\" are discussed.\n Why Milosevic decided to accept NATO terms and withdraw his forces remains unclear. \nDamage caused by NATO bombing, sustained allied unity, possible allied planning for a ground war,\na desire to preserve his forces, and desertion of Russia as a possible protector were likely principal\nreasons.\n NATO sought to maintain political engagement with Russia, which sharply opposed the air war. \nRussia sought to undermine NATO's objectives, but in the end acceded to allied desires to assist in\nachieving a diplomatic solution.\n The conflict revealed a significant gap in military capability between the United States and its\nallies, which were deficient in key areas such as lift, precision-guided munitions, and night combat. \nThese shortfalls may have spurred European interest in developing greater capabilities, an interest\nnot yet reflected in defense budgets. The three new allies gave political support to NATO goals, but\ndid not send combat forces. Their restrained involvement raised issues for a possible next round of\nenlargement, such as candidate states' military preparedness and political will.\n NATO maintained unity, but a range of views was evident in allied governments. Leftist or\ncenter-left governments supported the conflict, Britain took a leading role, Italy bore a heavy burden,\nand the Greek government, despite vigorous popular opposition, maintained its political support for\nthe war. The conflict broke new ground in that the allies went to war in part for humanitarian\nreasons.\n Potential adversaries learned that NATO may no longer regard claims of sovereignty as a shield\nagainst allied intervention in their affairs. They may also have learned useful lessons from\nMilosevic's tactics intended to divide the allies, and that NATO may be more likely to take decisive\naction to protect interests near Europe, than when interests at a greater distance are affected.\n This report, in the form of a memorandum, was originally prepared for Senator William Roth,\nand is being made available to Congress as a whole with his permission.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30374", "sha1": "4267689feef813e6616222d1cc9e743750e93d91", "filename": "files/19991119_RL30374_4267689feef813e6616222d1cc9e743750e93d91.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19991119_RL30374_4267689feef813e6616222d1cc9e743750e93d91.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "European Affairs", "Foreign Affairs", "National Defense" ] }