{
  "id": "RL30394",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL30394",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 101403,
      "date": "2000-03-10",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:38:10.452941",
      "title": "Russian Capital Flight, Economic Reforms, and U.S. Interests: An Analysis",
      "summary": "Russian capital flight is a longstanding problem with very negative consequences for the Russian\neconomy. Authoritative studies estimate Russian capital flight to have totaled $150 billion from\n1992-1999. Recent reports of Russian money laundering and other financial scandals involving the\nRussian Central Bank, the Bank of New York, other commercial banks, and even former President\nYeltsin's household involve forms of capital flight and have drawn greater attention to the problem.\nThey have been the subjects of recent Congressional hearings and have focused the attention of\nMembers of Congress and others on U.S. interests in Russia. Some legislation has been proposed\nas a result of concern over the these scandals and Russian capital flight. \n  Capital flight deprives the Russian economy of critical financial resources that could be used\nfor investment, tax revenues, restructuring pensions, and other social security programs. More\nimportantly, capital flight indicates a lack of confidence by Russian and foreign investors and\nresidents in the Russian ruble, in the Russian financial system, and more generally in the Russian\neconomy itself. Capital flight is a sign that Russia's transition to a market economy continues to be\nincomplete.\n  An analysis of the rationale for Russian capital flight suggests that to reverse capital flight the\nRussian economy will have to provide an environment that motivates asset- holders to keep their\nwealth in rubles and repatriate assets that they have sent abroad. To do so, the Russian policymakers\nwill have to take significant steps to establish and maintain macroeconomic stability and to complete\nthe partial economic restructuring. \n  Post-Cold War U.S. policy has reflected a number of national security, foreign policy, and \neconomic interests. U.S. policy has aimed to decrease the Russia military threat and at the same\ntime encourage the development of democracy in Russia. In the economic sphere, U.S. policy has\nfocused on establishing economic stability and on developing the institutions required for a market\neconomy. The United States also views Russia has a burgeoning trade partner and source of\ninvestment opportunities. It can be argued that without a sound economy, Russia will find it difficult\nto achieve political stability, which in turn might increase the national security threat posed by\nRussia. Continuing capital flight is an indicator that Russia has yet to realize a functioning market\neconomy. \n  In the near term, U.S. economic policy on Russia is likely to focus on the issue of whether to\ndelay or move forward with pending IMF assistance. However, whether Russia undertakes complete\neconomic reform will be determined by Russia alone. A key question in U.S. policy is whether it\ncan persuade Russian policymakers to proceed with economic reform. This report will be not be\nupdated but will remain available for congressional needs.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30394",
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      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economic Policy",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Industry and Trade"
  ]
}