{
  "id": "RL30551",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL30551",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com, University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 104452,
      "date": "2003-01-03",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:01:16.640941",
      "title": "Iran: Arms and Weapons of Mass Destruction Suppliers",
      "summary": "Successive U.S. administrations since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution have viewed Iran as a\npotential\nthreat to U.S. allies and forces in the Persian Gulf and in the broader Middle East and have sought\nto limit its strategic capabilities. The greater visibility of moderate elements inside Iran since 1997\nled the United States to seek to engage Iran in a formal governmental dialogue, but the Clinton and\nGeorge W. Bush Administration did not reduce U.S. efforts to deny Iran advanced conventional arms\nand weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. Iran's moderates appear to see regional\nthreats to Iran as do Iran's hardliners and have made no apparent effort to curb Iran's efforts to\nacquire WMD. Even if moderate leaders had sought to do so, they have been largely\noutmaneuvered on defense and other issues by hardliners who still control the armed forces, internal\nsecurity services, the judiciary, and key decision-making bodies.\n  In the past, Iran has generally lacked the indigenous skills to manufacture sophisticated\nconventional arms or independently develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and one of Iran's\nobjectives over the past decade has been to obtain the technology and skills to become self-sufficient. \nIran has come a long way toward that objective in certain areas, including ballistic missiles and\nchemical weapons, but in the aggregate, Iran remains reliant on foreign suppliers. This dependence\nhas given the United States some opportunity to work with potential suppliers to contain Iran's\nWMD capabilities. European allies of the United States have agreed not to sell conventional\nweaponry to Iran, and the United States has persuaded its European allies not to sell any technology\nthat could have military applications (\"dual use items\") to Iranian military or security entities.\n  To try to thwart U.S. efforts, Iran has cultivated close relationships with foreign suppliers that\nare not allied to the United States, especially Russia, China, and North Korea. Curtailing arms and\ntechnology supplies to Iran has formed an important part of the U.S. agenda with all three of these\ncountries, but more pressing U.S. objectives with each of them have sometimes hampered the U.S.\nability to dissuade them from assisting Iran. Iran apparently continues to receive critical technology\nfrom all three, but U.S. efforts appear to be limiting their supply relationships with Iran.\n  Congress and successive Administrations have enacted several laws and executive orders, many\nof which are similar to each other, that impose sanctions on countries and firms that sell WMD\ntechnology to Iran. The most recent measure enacted is the Iran Nonproliferation Act ( P.L.\n106-178 ), signed in March 2000. The Clinton Administration generally preferred diplomacy and\nengagement with supplier states, and it used the threat of sanctions to obtain supplier cooperation. \nThe Bush Administration has taken much the same approach, although it has appeared more willing\nthan its predecessor to sanction entities in some supplier states.\n  This report will be updated as events warrant.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "encoding": "utf-8",
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/RL30551",
          "sha1": "c29087616202ee0eb4ba41a47a3f00fab98f8b9e",
          "filename": "files/20030103_RL30551_c29087616202ee0eb4ba41a47a3f00fab98f8b9e.html",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30551",
          "sha1": "cc5f353380ab485637f5995a045a859997ead8fb",
          "filename": "files/20030103_RL30551_cc5f353380ab485637f5995a045a859997ead8fb.pdf",
          "images": null
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    },
    {
      "source": "University of North Texas Libraries Government Documents Department",
      "sourceLink": "https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs2059/",
      "id": "RL30551 2001-01-26",
      "date": "2001-01-26",
      "retrieved": "2005-06-12T16:45:54",
      "title": "Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions",
      "summary": null,
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORT",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "filename": "files/20010126_RL30551_7b2134c0c3a0ab4242059c0b50ef29cebc6cd022.pdf"
        },
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "filename": "files/20010126_RL30551_7b2134c0c3a0ab4242059c0b50ef29cebc6cd022.html"
        }
      ],
      "topics": [
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Weapons systems",
          "name": "Weapons systems"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Foreign relations - Iran - U.S.",
          "name": "Foreign relations - Iran - U.S."
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Iran",
          "name": "Foreign relations - U.S. - Iran"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Weapons - Iran",
          "name": "Weapons - Iran"
        },
        {
          "source": "LIV",
          "id": "Foreign policy",
          "name": "Foreign policy"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "Intelligence and National Security",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}