{ "id": "RL30623", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL30623", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101960, "date": "2000-07-31", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:34:41.425941", "title": "Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan: Issues for Congress", "summary": "The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 ended South Asia's condition of \"existential\"\ndeterrence. Both countries now have overt nuclear postures, and U.S. concerns in the region have\nfocused on preservation of global nonproliferation regimes and related efforts, prevention of an arms\nrace in South Asia, and movement toward reconciliation between India and Pakistan, especially on\ntheir mutual differences over the area of Kashmir.\n The \"benchmarks\" which provide a framework for U.S. policy in this area encompass key\naspects of nonproliferation efforts. Progress toward stated goals has been limited. Neither India nor\nPakistan is signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation or Comprehensive Test Ban treaties, and there\nare indications that both are continuing to produce fissile materials and perhaps even deploy nuclear\nweapons.\n The 1999 Kargil conflict had the effect of suspending the so-called Lahore process of\nreconciliation begun in February of that year. The October 1999 military coup in\nPakistan and the\nNovember 1999 political victory of the Hindu nationalist party in India brought renewed fears of\nfurther conflict in the region, but the governments of both countries have thus far maintained fairly\nmoderate external policies.\n There remain no confirmed reports of the actual deployment of nuclear weapons by India or\nPakistan, but both governments have indicated that their militaries are prepared to make use of such\nweapons. In August 1999, a quasi-governmental Indian body released a Draft Nuclear Doctrine for\nIndia. This document calls for a \"minimum credible deterrent\" (MCD) based upon a triad of delivery\nsystems and pledges that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. It has been\nneither accepted nor rejected by New Delhi. Islamabad has made no comparable public declaration,\nbut it also seeks to maintain an MCD while rejecting a no-first-use pledge.\n Some observers consider the current situation of territorial contiguity and weak command and\ncontrol structures in South Asia to be inherently unstable. Others believe that, in the absence of\nincreased regional tensions, strategic stability will continue to be present. Given China's strategic\ncomplacency in relation to India, and Pakistan's largely reactive posture, New Delhi's nuclear\ndeployment decisions are perhaps key to regional stability. At present, strategic, economic, and\ntechnological factors indicate that the growth of South Asian nuclear and missile forces likely will\ncontinue to be limited in the foreseeable future.\n In pursuit of its stated policy goals, the U.S. government may employ four broad approaches\nto proliferation in South Asia, each with its own potential strengths and weaknesses. These are: \n increased pressure to compel greater cooperation, continuation of the\napproach currently in place,\n increased incentives to encourage greater cooperation, and/or the provision of\n technological\nassistance to allow for better managed and, therefore, potentially safer nuclear arsenals.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30623", "sha1": "d2cdc53ffe0f48bb19e11292c63feedd6008c27f", "filename": "files/20000731_RL30623_d2cdc53ffe0f48bb19e11292c63feedd6008c27f.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20000731_RL30623_d2cdc53ffe0f48bb19e11292c63feedd6008c27f.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "Asian Affairs", "Foreign Affairs", "Intelligence and National Security", "National Defense" ] }