{ "id": "RL30673", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "RL30673", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101988, "date": "2000-09-12", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:33:42.941941", "title": "The President's Cabinet: Evolution, Alternatives, and Proposals for Change", "summary": "The President's Cabinet is an institution whose existence rests upon custom rather than law. \nPresident George Washington found the Cabinet concept, a meeting of departmental secretaries, to\nbe useful, and all subsequent Presidents have followed this precedent. Presidents have differed in\ntheir opinions as to the utility of the Cabinet, but all have found some political and administrative\nstrengths in its continuance.\n This report discusses how membership in the Cabinet has changed over the decades. The\nselection and removal processes are examined as well as commentary on the Cabinet by persons who\nhave been participants.\n In this century, a whole host of sub-Cabinet groups have been created as substitutes for full\nCabinet sessions. The authority and configuration of these sub-Cabinet groups ( e.g., \nCouncil on\nEconomic Policy) vary from administration to administration and few institutions and sets of\nrelationships have acquired permanent status. A number of sub-Cabinet groups have staffs\n( e.g., \nNational Security Council), and it is these staffs that help provide some measure of institutional\ndepth to the presidency.\n Despite two centuries of criticism, the Cabinet remains a fixture in the President's political\nworld. This report reviews criticisms directed at the Cabinet, and the \"reforms\" offered to correct\nalleged deficiencies, and provides an assessment of the utility of the Cabinet to successive\nPresidents. The Cabinet is retained because it provides to the President: (1) political and managerial\nadvice; (2) a forum for interdepartmental conflict resolution; (3) a location where he can address\nmost of the executive branch and thereby enhance administrative coherence; and (4) a source of\npolitical support for his programs and policies.\n This report concludes with several observations on the nature of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is\nnot now, and is not likely to become, a body with collective responsibility. Presidents cannot\nappropriately share their legal authority or responsibilities with the Cabinet. Thus, there are inherent\nlimitations to the Cabinet that no reforms can alter or overcome. The Cabinet, its members, and its\nsub-groups provide the President with an adaptive resource with which to manage the executive\nbranch of government.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30673", "sha1": "eb2a8e39b86e0c3686894f26818c2339590bed6b", "filename": "files/20000912_RL30673_eb2a8e39b86e0c3686894f26818c2339590bed6b.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/20000912_RL30673_eb2a8e39b86e0c3686894f26818c2339590bed6b.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "American Law", "Constitutional Questions", "Economic Policy", "Intelligence and National Security" ] }