{
  "id": "RL30841",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL30841",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 100294,
      "date": "2001-02-09",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:27:38.778941",
      "title": "Airborne Electronic Warfare: Issues for the 107th Congress",
      "summary": "Electronic warfare (EW) has been an important component of military air operations since the\nearliest days of radar. Radar, EW, and stealth techniques have evolved over time as engineers,\nscientists, and tacticians have struggled to create the most survivable and effective air force possible.\n Several recent events suggest that airborne EW merits congressional attention. Operation Allied\nForce, the 1999 NATO operation in Yugoslavia, appears to have marked an important watershed in\nthe debate over current and future U.S. airborne EW. It appears that every air strike on Serbian\ntargets was protected by radar jamming and/or suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft.\nElectronic countermeasures self protection systems, such as towed radar decoys, were credited with\nsaving numerous U.S. aircraft that had been targeted by Serbian surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).\n The Department of Defense is engaged in numerous activities - such as research and\ndevelopment (R&D) programs, procurement programs, training, experimentation - that are\ndesigned\nto improve various electronic attack (EA), ECM, and SEAD capabilities both in the near and long\nterm. These activities often cut across bureaucratic boundaries and defy easy categorization and\noversight, which makes it difficult to determine and assess DoD-wide EW priorities. Often, it\nappears that DoD has no single, coherent plan coordinating all these efforts or setting priorities.\n The Clinton Administration's DoD budget request for FY2001 was the 106th Congress' first\nopportunity to exercise oversight of EW and SEAD programs in the post-Kosovo era. Congressional\nappropriations and authorization conferees often matched or exceeded DoD's request for EW and\nSEAD programs to ensure the survivability of numerous aircraft and to increase the military's ability\nto suppress or destroy enemy air defenses. Congress also disagreed with DoD plans, and reduced or\nconstrained some programs accordingly.\n As part of its FY2002 budget oversight responsibilities, Congress can strongly influence DoD's\nEW force structure, aircraft survivability and air campaign effectiveness. Some issues Congress may\nconsider include: 1) the overall level of DoD's electronic warfare spending, and its spending\npriorities within EW; 2) how DoD can wring the most warfighting capability out of its EA-6B force,\nwhich will be DoD's only radar jamming aircraft until 2010 or later; 3) why the Navy and Air Force\nare pursuing distinctive paths in addressing tomorrow's SEAD challenges, and whether the country\nis best served by pursuing both approaches; 4) why DoD and Congress appear to have distinct\nperspectives on the need to upgrade or replace key electronic countermeasures such as aircraft radar\nwarning receivers.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
      "formats": [
        {
          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL30841",
          "sha1": "332ffed7e23ea15e6d23f135536acbb3519e0a48",
          "filename": "files/20010209_RL30841_332ffed7e23ea15e6d23f135536acbb3519e0a48.pdf",
          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "filename": "files/20010209_RL30841_332ffed7e23ea15e6d23f135536acbb3519e0a48.html"
        }
      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Appropriations",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}