{
  "id": "RL31023",
  "type": "CRS Report",
  "typeId": "REPORTS",
  "number": "RL31023",
  "active": false,
  "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
  "versions": [
    {
      "source": "EveryCRSReport.com",
      "id": 100445,
      "date": "2001-06-19",
      "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:23:28.646941",
      "title": "Putin's Economic Strategy and U.S. Interests",
      "summary": "President Putin has set as a goal the conversion of Russia to a functioning market system in this\ndecade. Without successful reform to develop a functioning market system with sustained growth,\nthe Russian economy is likely to recede in performance toward the level of a developing country. \nPutin's strategy calls for rapid and comprehensive changes in the structure of the Russian economy,\nincluding radical changes in fiscal, financial, enterprise and administrative systems. Whether Putin\nis able and willing to implement the difficult decisions to bring about successful market reform in\nRussia may become evident in 2001 to 2002.\n Several American and Russian empirical studies support Putin's reform strategy. Putin's\nreforms are designed to convert the Russian economy from a disinvestment and disincentive to a\nfunctioning market system. Elements of successful reform center on changes deemed necessary to\nincrease productivity and attract investors. \n Reform prospects have been improved by the action program in Putin's State of the Nation\naddress of April 2001. Putin is building on the blueprints and programs established in the year 2000\nto move toward rapid legislation and implementation of these structural reforms. Unparalleled\ncurrent economic growth may, if continued, provide a window of opportunity for gaining political\nsupport for reform and funding to facilitate reform implementation. \n Authoritarian trends in governance would tend to deter the development of a rule of law regime\ncentral to successful market reform. Possible economic crises in debt management, demographic\nand infrastructure problem areas may pose difficult budgetary choices and draw future political and\neconomic support away from reform. Resistance to reform and increased defense spending, which\nhave been especially favored by some oligarchs, may be tempered and reversed. Acceptance of\ninternational market rules and corporate governance would facilitate an increase in productivity and\ngenerate larger inflows of investment. Support in place of previous strong opposition by Gazprom,\nthe world's largest energy company, may be the single most important factor in the success or failure\nin initiating Putin's comprehensive structural reforms.\n A functioning market system in Russia might benefit U.S. interests by providing profitable\ninvestment opportunities and a less threatening and more cooperative Russia. Successful reform\ncould open opportunities for Russia and its creditor nations to better manage official Paris Club debt\nand for Russia to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The dangers of a failed Russian\nreform to U.S. interests might come from the revival of a security threat with potential confrontations\nin foreign, security, and domestic policies averse to U.S. national interests.",
      "type": "CRS Report",
      "typeId": "REPORTS",
      "active": false,
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          "format": "PDF",
          "encoding": null,
          "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/RL31023",
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          "images": null
        },
        {
          "format": "HTML",
          "filename": "files/20010619_RL31023_849ed40342fc3071d235d0674f114635600db407.html"
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      ],
      "topics": []
    }
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economic Policy",
    "Foreign Affairs",
    "National Defense"
  ]
}